WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXI, Number 3 April 1979

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0043-8871

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

CYRIL E. BLACK — JANET KELLY
HEDLEY BULL — STEPHEN D. KRASNER
LOWELL DITTMER — ERNEST R. MAY
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE — JAMES N. ROSENAU
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN — KENNETH N. WALTZ

Editors: CYRIL E. BLACK, GERALD GARVEY
HENRY S. BIENEN (*Review Articles*)
Associate Editors: WILLEM H. BUITER (Spring Term), STEPHEN F. COHEN, JAMES D. DENARDO, LEON GORDENKER, JEFFREY A. HART, CHARLES ISSAWI, PAUL E. SIGMUND, ROBERT L. TIGNOR (Fall Term), LYNN T. WHITE, III
Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate, together with an abstract of approximately 150 words. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, typed double-spaced, and placed at the end of the manuscript.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within three months from date of submission. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of editors' and readers' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for informing authors of readers' evaluations or suggestions for improvement of rejected manuscripts.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere (even in somewhat different form), or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from Permissions Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

U.S. and Canada—Individual subscribers: $10.00 per year; $17.50 for two years; $25.00 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $20.00 per year; $37.00 for two years; $49.00 for three years. Back issues: $5.25.

Foreign—Individual subscribers: $12.50 per year; $22.00 for two years; $31.25 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $25.00 per year; $46.25 for two years; $61.25 for three years. (Please add $2.00 additional per year for foreign postage and handling.) Back issues: $6.50.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from Johnson Associates, P.O. Box 1017, Greenwich, Conn. 06830. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets* (CRIS), *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, and International Political Science Abstracts*.

Copyright © 1979 by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS (USPS 692-500). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1979. Vol. xxxi, No. 3. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

HOSTED TO JSTOR.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XXXI · April 1979 · No. 3

CONTENTS

Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control — *Ian Lustick* 325

Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices — *Brian Weinstein* 345

Explaining Ethnic Political Participation — *Nelson Kasfir* 365

Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries — *Dennis A. Rondinelli* 389

Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War — *Peter R. Moody, Jr.* 417

REVIEW ARTICLES

A Consumer's Guide to Texts on Mathematical Modeling — *Dina A. Zinnes* 434

Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process — *Robert C. Gray* 457

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

IAN LUSTICK is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, and the author of *Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in the Control of a Minority Population* (forthcoming). He is currently working on a critique of rational-man organization theory based on a structural analysis of task environments.

BRIAN WEINSTEIN is Professor of Political Science at Howard University, and a former Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of *Eboué* (1972), and co-author of *Introduction of African Politics* (2d ed. 1977). Currently he is preparing a book on the politics of language.

NELSON KASFIR, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, is the author of *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda* (1976). He is currently working on a study of the negotiation process that brought an end to the civil war in the Sudan.

DENNIS A. RONDINELLI is director of the Graduate Planning Program and a member of the faculty of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He is the author of *Urban and Regional Development Planning: Policy and Administration* (1975) and *Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth* (1978), and editor of *Planning Development Projects* (1977). He is currently engaged in a study of national planning and administrative implications of equitable growth policies in developing countries, and in an analysis of the political economy of regional underdevelopment and modernization in the Third World.

PETER R. MOODY, JR. is a member of the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. His most recent long work is *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (1977).

DINA A. ZINNES is Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. She is the author of *Contemporary Research in International Politics* (1976), and co-author of *Content Analysis* (1963), *Quantitative International Politics* (1976), *Mathematical Models in International Relations* (1976), and *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research* (1977).

ROBERT C. GRAY is Assistant Professor of Government at Franklin and Marshall College. He has published articles on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and is currently conducting research on the relationship between arms control and the weapons acquisition process.

The appearance of the code at the bottom of the first page of an article in this journal (serial) indicates the copyright owner's consent that copies of the article may be made for personal or internal use, or for the personal or internal use of specific clients. This consent is given on the condition, however, that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., P. O. Box 765, Schenectady, N.Y. 12301, for copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control

By I. LUSTICK

This paper examines the consociational approach to the study of deeply divided societies and notes its weaknesses. It argues that the absence of a well-developed alternative "control" approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models. Control models, focusing on how superordinate groups manipulate subordinate groups rather than on the emergence and functioning of elite cartels, need to be developed—not only for the study of stable, deeply divided societies in which consociational models are inappropriate, but also as a means of eliminating certain theoretical problems that have been raised as criticisms of consociationalism. The paper includes a critical review of the literature that is available to guide study of control in deeply divided societies, and concludes with recommendations for the shape of an analytical framework within systematic comparison.

Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices

By B. WEINSTEIN

The decision to use and develop a low-status language in translations and creative works is often based on a desire to provide symbols that will assist the efforts of political leaders to challenge existing national and ethnic frontiers and to create new groups loyal to different institutions. New frontiers alter the relationships between peoples and also affect patterns of access to power and wealth within a group. Writers, translators, dictionary makers, and other literary figures who innovate for this reason should be called "language strategists." Although primarily moved by a creative and artistic spirit, these persons are often intimately associated with national and ethnic movements because they share the interests of the political elites who lead them. This conscious or unconscious alliance is essential in the creation of ethnic and national identities.

Explaining Ethnic Political Participation

By N. KASFIR

Most concepts of ethnicity are unsuitable for political analysis because they ignore either subjective or objective aspects, and because they ignore the fluid and situational nature of ethnicity. The approach flowing from the concept proposed here permits the observer to examine empirical variations that tend to be treated as rigid assumptions by modernization analysts on the one hand and class analysts on the other. The concept is applied to a study of the Nubians of Uganda because of the intermixture of class and ethnic features involved in their fall from status at the beginning of the colonial period and their subsequent sudden rise following the 1971 coup d'état of Idi Amin. The fairly recent creation of the Nubians as an ethnic category and the relative ease with which others can become members illustrate other features of the proposed concept of ethnicity. Finally, this concept is used to examine and criticize overly restrictive notions of ethnicity found in theories based upon both cultural pluralism and consociationalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries

By D.A. RONDINELLI

Integrated rural development has become the focus of growth with equity policies in developing countries. Evaluations of development programs and plans over the past two decades indicate that little change can be achieved in developing societies through single purpose policy interventions and that diversified and integrated programs aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and dispersing directly productive and social overhead investments in rural regions are essential for socially equitable economic growth. Because of their importance to emerging development strategies, this paper identifies and analyzes the political and administrative problems of planning and implementing integrated rural development programs. It reflects a sympathetic but skeptical view of the prospects for achieving rural development without fundamental political and administrative reforms. It suggests that unless governments in developing countries and international assistance agencies can resolve three crucial problems—those of mobilizing political commitment, restructuring administrative arrangements, and delivering basic services to the rural poor—integrated rural development may go the way of all previous development fads, and have little impact on intended beneficiaries.

Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War

By P.R. MOODY, JR.

American strategic theorists used to urge that the United States adopt a Clausewitzian point of view on international conflict, that we treat war as something undertaken to serve the larger aims of policy, with the conduct of war subordinated to the larger considerations of policy. Under contemporary conditions, however, this notion of warfare is not appropriate. The experience of warfare since the time of Clausewitz shows that his distinction between war in the abstract and war in the concrete is not any kind of dialectical unity; rather, political war and total war (the concrete manifestation of Clausewitz's war in the abstract) are two distinct phenomena, and our technological and ideological positions discourage political war. War is no longer an instrument of state policy, a means whereby those who rule the state attain their values; instead, it is increasingly the fact or possibility of war which determines the values of the state.

A Consumer's Guide to Texts on Mathematical Modeling

By D.A. ZINNES

Five texts on mathematical modeling in the social sciences which have appeared within the last five years are described and evaluated. The analysis of the texts proceeds by considering such issues as the mathematical background required, general readability, ability of the text to train the reader to develop his own models, consideration of important philosophical issues inherent in modeling, and the types—substantive and mathematical—of models covered. The goal of the review is to pinpoint those texts, or parts of texts, that are most useful to the researcher in international relations.

Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process

By R.C. GRAY

This review article presents three case studies of the U.S. strategic weapons acquisition process: the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Polaris fleet ballistic missile (FBM), and the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). By considering programs that stretch from the 1950s to the 1970s, the essay provides a record of the changing environment of American weapons choices over the past 25 years. After a description of research methods and major arguments, each study is assessed in terms of bureaucratic politics and of its relevance to contemporary policy. Conclusions are drawn about the most fruitful approach to the study of weapons acquisition, about the lessons of these cases for the development of weapons in an age of arms control, and about the challenges of future studies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Columbia

Soviet Bargaining Behavior
The Nuclear Test Ban Case

CHRISTER JÖNSSON. The issues of U.S.-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet dispute, and domestic Soviet politics are central to Christer Jönsson's rigorous analysis of the Soviet nuclear test ban negotiations of 1958-63. This exhaustive study offers conclusive evidence that Soviet negotiating conduct changed significantly over time, contrary to Western assumptions about an established Soviet negotiating stance. 248 pages, $13.50

Victims of Politics
The State of Human Rights

KURT GLASER AND STEFAN T. POSSONY. "The current situation of 'man's inhumanity to man' is expertly documented in this impressive, historically based work. The authors go beyond graphic description and alarmism to an innovative series of constructive recommendations. . . . This encyclopedic work will serve . . . as a fundamental . . . reference on a vital topic of universal concern."—*Library Journal*. 548 pages, $35.00

Socialism, Politics, and Equality
Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR

WALTER D. CONNOR. In a systematic study of social, economic, and political stratification in contemporary Eastern Europe and the USSR, Walter D. Connor examines socialism's record on equality. Utilizing the broad range of national data now available, Connor provides a realistic picture of everyday life in the socialist countries and offers the first authoritative comparison of the socialist experience to that of life in the United States and Western Europe. 448 pages, $20.00

To order send check or money order to Dept. JN at the address below. Individuals must enclose payment, including $1.30 per order for postage and handling. Institutions may request billing.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders:
136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scientists in Power

Spencer Weart

In 1939, a group of French scientists designed a uranium bomb and transformed the world. Here is the astonishing story of nuclear power and politics told from the inside. *Scientists in Power* affords an outstandingly clear exploration of the relationships among science, society, and technology. $17.50

The War Game

A Critique of Military Problem Solving

Garry D. Brewer and Martin Shubik

A fascinating examination of the system of military combat simulations and the new class of bureaucrats in defense establishments who promote them. $18.50

Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises

Richard K. Betts

"An excellent use of analysis to separate policy fact from speculative fiction. . . An extremely important study for Washington officials and students of defense policy." —*Foreign Affairs* $15.00

War

Controlling Escalation

Richard Smoke

"A most useful book for the student of war. It will be difficult to write on escalation without referring to this work."—*Political Science Quarterly* $18.50

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 GARDEN ST., CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138
HARVARD

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STABILITY IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: Consociationalism versus Control

By IAN LUSTICK

THE rise of communal assertiveness in scores of "national" political arenas, from Britain and Canada to Lebanon and Malaysia, must certainly be seen as one of the broadest, strongest, and most interesting social-political trends to have developed since World War II. Regardless of what elements—racial, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or otherwise—are used in the formulation of group identity, the restless discontent of many such groups with the conditions of their existence has led to the articulation of powerful demands for change.[1] Also associated with this phenomenon has been a fascination, by social scientists, with the dynamics of ethnic differentiation, accompanied by a generalized desire on their part to discover how rival communal groups can relate to one another without conflict, chaos, and the disintegration of large political units. Abhorring violence and oppression, interested academics have devoted a great deal of attention to compromise, bargaining, and accommodation as methods for achieving stability in deeply divided societies.

For the purposes of this article, "stability" or "political stability" will refer to the continued operation of specific patterns of political behavior, apart from the illegal use of violence, accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to remain intact in the forseeable future. "Deeply divided," a term used by Eric Nordlinger in *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies*, will be used as a synonym for "plural," "vertically segmented," "communally divided," and so forth. I shall consider a society as deeply divided if ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues. As a minimum condition, boundaries between rival groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear and, with few exceptions, unchangeable.[2]

[1] I find Milton J. Esman's definition of "communalism" as "competitive group solidarities within the same political system based on ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious identities" to be satisfactory for my purposes. See "The Management of Communal Conflict," *Public Policy*, XXI (Winter 1973), 49. Because I shall make no assertions concerning the possible political implications of various modes of group identification, I shall use such terms as "ethnic" and "communal" interchangeably.

[2] The phrase "terminal identity" is derived from Rupert Emerson's discussion of

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030325-20$01.00/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between the prevailing "compromise" or "consociational" approach alluded to above and an alternative approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies—one that would focus on effective group control over rival group(s). After arguing that consociational models can be deployed effectively only if an alternative typological category of "control" (or domination) is available, I shall evaluate the work that has been done to develop such a category. I shall conclude by specifying some of the important questions that might be raised by sustained study of "control" in deeply divided societies, and by suggesting the conceptual requirements for any serious comparative attempt to answer these questions.

First, however, it will be useful to identify the intellectual location of the general problem of explaining stability in deeply divided societies. It will then be possible to discard as inappropriate most clusters of theory that might otherwise seem to bear upon this problem.

Distinguishing "Consociationalism" from "Control"

If one begins with a vision of a society as a cohesive, integrated unit, one is not then likely to be puzzled by the stable operation of that society. What demands explanation is not the persistence of that sociopolitical system; rather, conflicts among various elements within it, sustained attempts to alter its internal dynamics, and the various manifestations of disorder—all of which are likely to accompany conflict and attempted change—are the conditions that puzzle, and that attract analytical attention. As a general approach to the study of social systems, this vision has an illustrious intellectual genealogy. From Hegel through Weber and Parsons, theorists have analyzed social-political units as coherent and stable systems which, when subjected to various technological, social, and/or ideological forces, respond and develop in characteristic patterns.

An equally respectable intellectual tradition is based on an opposing vision of society. From Hobbes through Durkheim, Dahrendorf, and Samuel Huntington, societies have been analyzed as agglomerations of individuals and/or groups whose interests and desires conflict. According to such a vision of society, competition and disorder are to be ex-

"terminal communities." See *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press 1960) 95-96. The exclusion of class segmentation from the population of deeply divided societies is in a strict sense somewhat arbitrary. It constitutes, however, a useful narrowing of focus, given the theoretical tasks undertaken in this paper. For a discussion of the relevance of studies of ethnic segmentation for problems of interclass control, see Peter Flynn, "Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, XII (July 1974). See also fn. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pected and are, in themselves, neither puzzling nor in need of explanation. What is puzzling, in the context of such a general approach, is the persistence of social-political systems over time—especially the stable continuation of particular patterns of political relations.

To be sure, the works of "consensus" theorists contain analyses of conflict, while concepts developed by "conflict" theorists contain, and can be used for, the analysis of system maintenance. Still, the central focus of a theory stemming from one or the other approach typically remains consistent with its intellectual origins. Whether a particular analyst chooses to gain theoretical entry into his material by employing a conflict-oriented or a consensus-oriented approach will depend not only on his training and sensibility, but also on the nature of the problem that is puzzling him. For students of deeply divided societies, conflict and disorder are expected; stability and persistence are puzzling; and theories that attempt to explain why unlike and antagonistic social units remain in a stable political relationship are analytically attractive. The problem, the puzzle, is *how to explain political stability over time in societies that continue to be characterized by deep vertical cleavages.*

Theories that take as their starting point the problem of the *persistence* of sociopolitical systems are thus all candidates for analytical application. Upon examination, however, it becomes clear that most such theoretical approaches are inappropriate. The pluralist approach, exemplified by such theorists as Truman, Simmel, and Coser, cannot be used since it requires criss-crossing conflicts and multiple loyalties to produce stability. Neither do theories of mass society and totalitarianism suggest themselves, since they explain political stability by an atomization of society which obliterates vertical divisions of any kind except those between individuals. Nor can a melting-pot model, focusing on processes of acculturation, socialization, and assimilation, be of assistance since it, too, explains political stability and system persistence as the consequence of the disappearance of intergroup differentiation.

There are, however, two theoretical approaches that do focus directly on the problem at hand: "consociationalism" and "control." Both consociational and control models take as their point of departure the continuation of deep divisions or vertical segmentation in the societies under consideration, as well as the presence of intense rivalry between those segments for important social, economic, and/or political resources.[3] Consociationalism and control can thus be seen as alternative explanations for stability in such societies. But, whereas consociation-

[3] For an in-depth discussion of the conditions under which ascriptive identities become politically important, see Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California 1976), 28-85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alism focuses on the mutual cooperation of subnational elites as decisive in this regard, a control approach would focus on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments.

Ever since 1968, when Arend Lijphart published *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, the literature dealing with accommodationist techniques for achieving and preserving stability in deeply divided societies has expanded rapidly. Lijphart's book was soon followed by a spate of articles and papers in which he elaborates his consociational model and experiments with its theoretical and empirical application. Concentrating mainly on Canada, pre-civil war Lebanon, and the smaller European democracies (Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland), scholars such as Gerhard Lembruch, Jurg Steiner, Val R. Lorwin, and S.F.R. Noel have deployed models very similar to that developed by Lijphart. Articles by these and nine other scholars appear in a volume edited by Kenneth McRae, entitled *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (1974). Each author, according to his view, attempts to evaluate the contribution that "accommodative," "consociational," "proportional," or "concordant" techniques have made to the stability of particular segmented societies.

Eric Nordlinger's *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies* (1972), is a serious and sustained effort to elaborate a theory of stability in segmented political systems by identifying conditions that conduce toward the successful operation of one or more of six possible "conflict-regulatory" practices. But the best definition of consociationalism as an explanation of political stability is that provided by Lijphart himself. Consociational models are applicable, according to Lijphart, to the extent that stability is the result of the "co-operative efforts" of subculture elites "to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation."[4] Indeed, at the core of almost all consociational approaches is an image of an elite cartel whose members share an overarching commitment to the survival of the arena within which their groups compete, and who seek to negotiate among themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises.[5]

[4] Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, IV (March 1971), 9.

[5] That most consociational theorists limit their hypotheses to what they call "open" or "democratic" societies is an important point; but since, as I shall argue below, the nature of consociationalism itself makes the democratic character of such regimes problematical, I prefer now to consider consociational hypotheses as bearing upon the general problem of stability in deeply divided societies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Several important review articles have heralded the consociational approach and urged that even more effort be put into the development of kindred theories and their empirical application. Criticizing the conflictual bias of several books on pluralism, Donald Rothchild suggests that greater attention be paid to interethnic bargaining, compromise, balancing, reciprocity, and cooperation as techniques for maintaining the stability and integrity of plural societies in Africa.[6] According to Hans Daalder,

> The typological coining of the model of consociational democracy constitutes a major contribution to the literature. It widens our understanding of the variegated possibilities of effective democratic rule, and undermines the assumptions of dichotomous models based implicitly on the contrast between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Weimar Germany, the French Third and Fourth Republics, and Italy on the other.[7]

Brian Barry describes the consociational democracy theme "as part of the movement among political scientists in recent years towards a reassertion of politics as the 'master science' in relation to the socio-economic reductionism implicit in the explanatory claims of political sociology."[8]

Barry, though accepting the basic integrity and utility of the consociational model, has launched several well-aimed criticisms at the tendency to apply consociational categories with more enthusiasm than care. Barry indicates that, when policy prescription is involved, this practice can lead to consociational remedies that may aggravate rather than rehabilitate.[9] From an analytic standpoint, Barry criticizes consociational theorists for a disposition to emphasize cooperative, formalistic behavior by sub-unit elites at the expense of power relations and manipulative devices which may be more relevant, for the explanation of stability in the societies considered, than various consociational or conflict-regulative practices. Barry also points out that, although many writers on the consociational theme stress the democratic nature of the segmented societies which they study, the analytical implications of the

[6] Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics*, XXII (July 1970), 615. For a study of ethnic politics in Africa that closely follows Rothchild's advice, see James Lawler, "Conflict Avoidance in Africa," *Peace Research Reviews*, VII (June 1976).

[7] Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics*, XXVI (July 1974). See also Esman (fn. 1), 51.

[8] Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, V, part 4 (October 1975), 494.

[9] Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," *European Journal of Political Research*, III (December 1975), 393-411.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

antidemocratic, manipulative nature of many consociational "techniques" are generally ignored.[10]

Barry's argument leads to consideration of the other group of theories that could conceivably assist in the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies: theories of intergroup control or domination. A "control" model is appropriate to the extent that stability in a vertically segmented society is the result of the sustained manipulation of subordinate segment(s) by a superordinate segment. Although no deeply divided society is likely to present itself as a pure example of either consociationalism or control, and although some societies may contain both kinds of relationships between different sets of groups,[11] it is necessary that, as conceptual approaches, the two be sharply distinguished. From an empirical standpoint, there are at least as many deeply divided societies whose stability is accounted for by the effective exertion of the superior power of one sub-unit as by the "cooperative efforts" of rival sub-unit elites. Examples would include South Africa; black-white relations in the American South before WW II; Mestizo-Indian relations in Bolivia; Jews and Arabs in Israel; Transjordanians and Palestinians in post-civil war Jordan; Arabs and Kurds in Iraq since 1975; Russians and other nationalities in the Soviet Union; Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi; Amharic and Rommo, Eritrean, Somali, and Galla in prerevolutionary Ethiopia; and mainlanders and native Formosans on Taiwan.

In order to establish as clear a conceptual distinction as possible between consociationalism and control, two deeply divided, hypothetical political systems may be considered, each of which contains two rival segments. Consociationalism can then be contrasted with control in at least *seven* important respects.

(1) *The criterion that effectively governs the authoritative allocation of resources* is, in the consociational system, the common denominator of the interests of the two segments as perceived and articulated by their respective elites. In the control system, it is the interest of the superordinate segment as perceived and articulated by *its* elite.

(2) *Linkages between the two sub-units or segments* in the consociational system take the form of political or material exchanges: negotiations, bargains, trades, and compromises. In the control system, the linkage is penetrative in character: the superordinate segment extracts what it needs from the subordinate segment (property, political support, labor, and/or information) and delivers what it sees fit.

(3) *The significance of bargaining*, then, is very different in the two systems. In the consociational system, hard bargaining between sub-unit

[10] Barry (fn. 8), 483-86, 500.

[11] See fn. 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elites is a necessary fact of political life; bargains—haggled, struck, and kept—are concrete signs that consociationalism is operating successfully. In the control system, however, hard bargaining between elites of the superordinate and subordinate sub-units would signal the breakdown of control as the means by which the political stability of the system is being maintained.

(4) *The role of the official regime*, represented by the civil service bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, the courts, the public educational system, and the armed forces, is different substantively (though not necessarily formally). Consociational societies exhibit regimes that, in F. G. Bailey's suggestive terminology, are in the nature of "umpires." Bailey distinguishes umpires from "leaders." A leader, according to Bailey, acts on behalf of his group or his "team." He strives to exploit or modify the rules that govern competition with other groups, in order to achieve advantages for his group and for his position as group leader. "An umpire," says Bailey, "does not do this."

> In the first place, insofar as he is an umpire, he has no group to maintain. What he must preserve is the structure of rules which regulate political competition. His concern is not a team, but an arena. This does not mean, of course, that the umpire's role is wholly conservative. In practice, most of an umpire's time is spent in seeing that the existing rules are obeyed and that deviant competitors are brought back into line. But the role also includes modifying the existing rules and even making new rules to cope with unanticipated disorders which may break out in the arena. But his goal is always the preservation of that arena. . . .[12]

In its role as umpire, the official regime in the consociational system must translate the compromises reached between sub-unit elites (or leaders) into appropriate legislation and effective administrative procedure, and enforce these rules without discriminating. The role of the official regime in the control system, on the other hand, is that of the legal and administrative instrument of the superordinate segment or group. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state, staffed overwhelmingly by personnel from the superordinate segment, uses what discretion is available in the interpretation and implementation of official regulations to benefit the sub-unit which it represents at the expense of the subordinate segment.[13]

[12] F. G. Bailey, *Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics* (New York: Schocken Books 1969), 135.

[13] Suggestive here is Leo Kuper's description of the role of the central political system in white settler societies. Referring to the central political system as the basis of settler domination, Kuper remarks that "Marx's concept of the state as the executive of the ruling class exactly describes its role in independent white settler societies." See "Some Aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Political Change in Plural Societies," in Leo Kuper

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(5) *The type of normative justification for the continuation of the political order likely to be espoused publicly—but more importantly, privately—by the regime's officials* is closely linked to the differential role of the official regime. In the consociational society, the political status quo is likely to be legitimized by vague and general references to the common welfare of both sub-units, and by specific and detailed warnings of the chaotic consequences, for each segment, of consociational breakdown. By contrast, the control system is likely to be endowed with legitimacy by an elaborate and well-articulated group-specific ideology; specific, that is, to the history and perceived interests of the superordinate sub-unit.

(6) *The character of the central strategic problem that faces sub-unit elites* is another distinguishing feature. In the consociational system, the problem is symmetrical for each sub-unit: elites must strike bargains that do not jeopardize the integrity of the system as a whole, on terms that can be enforced within the respective sub-units which they represent. For elites in both sub-units, then, internal group discipline is a crucial and constant political challenge. The character of the central strategic problem facing sub-unit elites in the control system, though, is first of all *a*symmetric with respect to the superordinate and subordinate segments. For superordinate sub-unit elites, the main strategic problem is to devise cost-effective techniques for manipulating the subordinate group. For subordinate sub-unit elites (if they exist), the central strategic problem is to devise responses to the policies of superordinate groups which cope as satisfactorily as possible with the consequences of subordination, and to evaluate opportunities for bargaining or resistance which may appear. In spite of this asymmetry, however, the strategic concern of elites of *both* sub-units in the control system is much more externally focused than that of sub-unit elites in the consociational system.

(7) Finally, *the visual metaphor* appropriate for a "perfect" consociational system is a delicately but securely balanced scale, while that appropriate for a control system is a puppeteer manipulating his stringed puppet. Though reflective of the basic differences between the two sorts of relationships, both images contain a suggestion of the separateness of sub-units, of the specificity of the linkages that join them, and of their overall stability.

---

and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1969), 186. See also the discussion of the "capture" of the state apparatus by a dominant segment, in Kasfir (fn. 3), 156-58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Necessity of Developing "Control" as an Analytical Approach

Thus, "control" as a model for the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies can be distinguished, conceptually at least, from the consociational approach. But before evaluating attempts that have been made to articulate usable models of control, it is reasonable to ask what, specifically, is to be gained from an elaboration of control as an alternative model and from the implicit task of differentiating and investigating various types of control systems.

There is much to be gained. First, the development of control as a typological category would provide analysts of stable, heterogeneous societies with an opportunity to explain the absence of effective politicization on the part of subnational groups other than by questioning the genuineness of the group's cultural, ethnic, or racial differentiation.[14] Hans Daalder's criticism of the tendency to assume "without detailed political analysis that social divisions are automatically translated into political conflicts" is relevant here.[15] Daalder is particularly critical of Nordlinger who, he says, lapses into tautology by arguing that, "if segments take on a high degree of political salience, as they invariably do in deeply divided societies, they will form the basis of *conflict groups*."[16] A superordinate sub-unit, however, may well be directly responsible for the failure of subordinate sub-units to produce effective political organization.

Another reason for developing a control approach is connected to the general recognition that coercion, in and of itself, is highly unlikely to serve as the basis for a stable pattern of intergroup relations. Thus, frequent use of "violence" or "repression" as labels for the residual category into which all non-consociational, though stable, deeply divided societies are placed, seems unnecessarily vague and probably wrong.[17] There are likely to be many different kinds of control systems; they may involve different mixes of coercive and noncoercive tech-

[14] See, for example, Cynthia Enloe's remarks on the failure of a Formosan nationalist movement to emerge in Taiwan. No mention is made of constraints that may exist against political activity of this sort, other than the difficulty of distinguishing native Formosans from mainland-Chinese immigrants. *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), 20-21. On this point, see also fn. 22.

[15] Daalder (fn. 7), 614.

[16] Quoted *ibid.*, 615. Enloe's *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (fn. 14) and Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle's *Politics in Plural Societies* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1972), are based on the proposition that ethnic identity is inevitably and effectively politicized. For an extended critique of this presumption, see Kasfir (fn. 3), 28-85.

[17] See, for example, Robert Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 358.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

niques; emerge under particular social-structural, ideological, economic, or political conditions; have different implications for the political and social evolution of their societies; and be more or less attractive as prescriptive models.

Many consociational theorists attempt to deal with the problem of stable, nonconsociational, deeply divided societies by explicitly limiting their concern to democratic, or open, regimes or systems. Nordlinger is most definite in this regard: "The present theoretical statement is not intended to apply to all deeply divided societies; it is limited to those with open regimes."[18] His central hypothesis is that, in the absence of at least one of "six conflict-regulating practices" (the stable coalition, the proportionality principle, depoliticization, the mutual veto, compromise, and concessions), deeply divided "open" societies will experience intense and destabilizing conflicts. But Nordlinger's theoretical exercise is less satisfying than it might be, because of his failure to provide operational distinctions between closed and open regimes. As a result, it becomes difficult to imagine evidence that might disconfirm his hypothesis. There is a great temptation to categorize any stable, deeply divided society in which none of the "conflict-regulating practices" is employed as "closed." On the other hand, constraints on free participation in public decision-making processes and suppression of dissent are required by several conflict-regulatory techniques. In light of the unavoidably elitist character of consociational regimes, certain consociational societies may in fact be more closed for more citizens than societies in which a certain measure of control is exercised by, for example, a dominant majority over the free political behavior of a subordinate minority.[19] Recognizing the difficulty, Nordlinger suggests that a regime should be classified as "closed" only if it is seen as occupying an extreme position on an open-closed continuum.[20]

However, in expanding his theoretical universe to include what he terms "partly open" regimes, Nordlinger runs into another problem which a well-developed alternative "control model" might help him to avoid. All consociational models contain the assumption that sub-unit elites share an overarching commitment to the perpetuation of the political arena within which they operate. Nordlinger, like other theorists, lays great stress on the "purposeful behavior of political elites" in accounting for the successful regulation of an intense conflict.

An analysis of the six conflict-regulating practices brings into strong

[18] Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers No. 29 (Cambridge 1972), 10.
[19] Barry (fn. 8), 483, 500.
[20] Nordlinger (fn. 18), 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> relief the critical role of conflict group leaders. In each case of conflict regulation it was the conflict group leaders who took the initiative in working out the various conflict-regulating practices, who put them into operation, and who did so at least partly with the goal in mind of arriving at a conflict-regulating outcome.[21]

But, as one moves along Nordlinger's open-closed continuum, away from a pure type of consociational system where sub-unit elites and officials of the regime act vigorously and systematically to "regulate" conflict, one encounters partly open regimes in which the political behavior of sub-unit elites is much more likely to be determined by the competitive interests of their sub-units than by desires for system maintenance or the achievement of a conflict-regulating outcome. In other words, Nordlinger—operating without a clearly articulated alternative control model according to which conflict would be absent (not "regulated") because of the successful manipulation of subordinate groups—tends to reify an "umpire" regime and consociationally oriented elites where there are merely competitors for political goods and for the administrative apparatus that can effectively distribute them. Thus, for example, conflict regulation is said to have "failed" even in the absence of the elite's attempts to engage in it.[22]

Not only would a well-articulated typological category of control help to establish the conceptual boundaries of the consociational approach, but the study of various mechanisms or systems of control also would result in direct contributions to the elaboration of consociational models. Given the importance of elite control over sub-unit behavior in such models, it would be surprising if explicit studies of how control is exercised by superordinate sub-units over subordinate sub-units in deeply divided societies did not result in ideas and empirical analyses of use to students of consociational systems.

Furthermore, it is conceivable and in fact empirically demonstrable that one society can contain both kinds of relationships between different sets of groups. For example, two groups which relate to one another in the consociational mode, might, in their joint relationship to a third group, adopt and enforce a relationship of the control type. In such

[21] *Ibid.*, 40.

[22] *Ibid.*, 12. One can imagine a "hybrid" political system in which stability in a deeply divided society is the result of controls exerted over each segment by an "umpire regime" with independent access to sufficient political, military, or political resources to support its stabilizing objectives. Yugoslavia might be such a case. The continued stability of such a society could not be explained within either a consociational or a control approach (as those approaches are understood in this paper). That is to say, consideration of such a society from either of these perspectives would probably result in predictions of serious instability or in a reexamination of that society's classification as "deeply divided."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cases, it would be highly distortive to use "consociational" or "control" as labels to characterize the political system as a whole.[23]

Much of the energy invested in consociational approaches is drawn from a normative concern for the amelioration of the consequences of communally based conflicts.[24] But it is perfectly reasonable to presume that, in some deeply divided societies, the effective subordination of a segment or segments by a superordinate segment may be preferable to the chaos and disorder that might accompany the failure of consociationalism. The horrors of the recent civil war in Lebanon provide a case in point. In deeply divided societies where consociational techniques have not been, or cannot be, successfully employed, control may represent a model for the organization of intergroup relations that is substantially preferable to other conceivable solutions: civil war, extermination, or deportation.[25] Moreover, with the development of control as an approach to the explanation of political stability in deeply divided societies, the foundation is laid for a comparative study of various types of systems of control. The residual category of "violent and repressive" regimes can then be seen as including a variety of manipulative relationships; some are more, and some less, desirable or "civilized" as prescriptions for the integration of deeply divided societies where accommodationist models, for political or ideological reasons, seem inappropriate.[26]

"Control" as an Underdeveloped Concept

Thus far I have demonstrated:

(1) how "control" can be distinguished from consociational approaches to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies; and

[23] Israel is an example of such a case. Consociational techniques have been used to maintain political stability among Jewish political and clerical subcultures, while the absence of conflict and instability in the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel is best explained in terms of control. For an example of the need to exclude consideration of the Arab minority from consociational analysis of the Israeli political system, see K. Z. Paltiel, "The Israeli Coalition System," *Government and Opposition*, x (Autumn 1975), 3397-3414. For analysis of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel in terms of "control," see Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in the Control of a Minority Population* (Austin: University of Texas Press, forthcoming).

[24] See, for instance, Kenneth McRae, *Consociational Democracy* (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart 1974), 300-302.

[25] Brian Barry argues that, in societies deeply divided along *ethnic* lines, consociational solutions to problems of conflict and instability are very unlikely to emerge. Barry (fn. 8), 502-5.

[26] The suggestion of integration through control or domination is consistent with the argument of writers such as Enloe, Rabushka and Shepsle, and Walker Connor who stress the need—in a world of proliferating subnational units—to consider modes of political integration other than the democratic nation-state as legitimate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) what benefits are to be derived from the systematic conceptual and empirical elaboration of control models.

These arguments have been necessitated by the limited amount of attention that has been given to the systematic development and application of "control" or "domination" models regarding the integration of deeply divided societies. Nonetheless, though underdeveloped, a literature of sorts does exist.

In 1958 Manning Nash, based on his investigation of Guatemala's "multiple society," counseled students of comparative ethnic relations to analyze, systematically and in detail, "how the multiple society operates, the mechanisms of political control, and the social and cultural circumstances which are amenable to, or inimical to, the perpetuation and continuity of such a political structure."[27] In 1966, in discussing the prospects for system change in plural societies, Leo Kuper speculated that "the system of domination" may be "the crucial factor affecting the possibility of evolutionary change. Different types of domination may have their own somewhat specific laws of change, with varying potentialities for evolutionary transformation."[28]

A significant number of writers have included control or domination categories within typologies describing the integration of segmented societies. M. G. Smith has characterized "structural pluralism," or "differential incorporation," as one "mode of collective accommodation." Such societies, according to Smith, "owe their maintenance to a central regulative organization which is prescriptively reserved for the dominant corporate group."[29] But Smith's primary concern is in relating the mode of collective accommodation (equivalent, universalistic, differential) to the depth and extent of diversity within societies. The category of differential incorporation is itself left undeveloped.[30] Concerning the emergence, operation, and variable impact of different types of control systems or mechanisms, all we are told is that,

> however variable the system may be in its specific conditions and properties, the collective character, and the scope of its substantive differentiations, must be sufficiently rigorous and pervasive to establish an effective order of corporate inequalities and subordination by the

[27] M. G. Smith, "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 418.

[28] Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," *ibid.*, 21.

[29] Smith, "Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies," and "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," both *ibid.*, 96 and 445, respectively.

[30] See Ira Katznelson, "Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity," *Comparative Politics*, v (October 1972), 143.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differential distribution of civil and political rights and the economic, social, and other opportunities that these permit or enjoin.[31]

Pierre van den Berghe, using a four-box matrix that crosses a homogeneous/heterogeneous variable with a democratic/despotic variable, generates a category (Type III) of "pluralistic-despotic" societies in which stability and equilibrium are explained by

> a combination of political coercion and economic interdependence. . . . Debt peonage, slavery, contract labor, indenture, and other forms of economic dependence serve at once to reinforce political subjection, to make the latter profitable, and to sustain the ruling group and its repressive apparatus.

However, Van den Berghe's analysis does not go beyond this list of typical economic techniques of control, except to offer the subcategory of "Herrenvolk democracies," i.e., those Type-III societies "wherein power is relatively diffusely and equally distributed among the members of an ascriptively defined group which, in turn, rules despotically over other such groups."[32]

The general argument made by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle is that plural (deeply divided) societies cannot develop as stable democracies. One way of resolving the tension between the plural character of a society and a democratic political ethos is by what they call "the dominant majority configuration." This is characterized by

> infrequent ethnic cooperation, immoderate ethnic politics at the expense of minority groups at the constitutional as well as the policy level, and eventual repression of minority political activity. Majoritarianism is the cause of the dominant community and electoral machination is its method of preserving its dominance. Violence is often fostered. . . . The symbols of democracy remain; the substance atrophies.[33]

In a similar vein, Milton Esman has suggested "institutionalized dominance" as one of four paths to the "management of communal conflict." The other three are "induced assimilation, syncretic integration, and balanced pluralism." Esman asserts that regimes committed to the dominance of one communal group at the expense of another (or others) will "always use three methods of conflict management":

> 1) proscribe or closely control the political expression of collective interest among dominated groups, 2) prohibit entry by members of

[31] Smith, "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," and Kuper, "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depluralization," both in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 430 and 473, respectively.

[32] Pierre van den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," *ibid.*, 81n.

[33] Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 16), 90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> dominated groups into the dominant community, and 3) provide monopoly or preferential access for members of the dominant group to political participation, advanced education, economic opportunities, and symbols of status such as official language, the flag, national heroes, and holidays, which reinforce the political, economic, and psychic control of the dominant group.[34]

Esman emphasizes that, though "basically coercive . . . , a network of controls for maintaining hegemony is often highly sophisticated and deeply institutionalized."[35] However, although he provides several historical and contemporary examples of the variation that this category contains, he—like Smith, Rabushka and Shepsle, and van den Berghe —does not go beyond the generation of a "control" category and provision of historical and praxeological illustration.

Leo Kuper does go beyond the listing of "typical" methods of subordination by employing the concept of a "system of domination"—a system that may or may not be "self-sustaining" and that, accordingly, may to a greater or lesser degree depend on "force and repression."[36] In his analysis of white settler regimes in Africa, Kuper uses this concept to focus on domination resulting from the calculated re-creation and strengthening of diversity among subordinate groups (divide and rule), combined with the establishment of "intercalary structures, functioning between dominant and subordinate sections, and serving both to maintain separation and to provide contact and control."[37] For Kuper, it is the exploitation of existing social structural and cultural circumstances by a battery of complementary regime policies that gives domination its systemic character in white settler societies. Kuper goes on to argue that, in fact, the system of control sponsored by the white settler regime in South Africa "is far from self-sustaining; on the contrary, it is increasingly sustained by force and repression."[38] To be able to see the overt use of coercion as a sign of the breakdown of domination or control, and not merely as evidence of its presence, is an important insight occasioned by Kuper's conceptual advance.

Heribert Adam, in his study of South Africa, uses an approach quite similar to Kuper's, but comes to a different conclusion. Adam, like Kuper, is interested in investigating "what apart from naked coercion enables a society ridden with such deep-seated conflicts to continue to

[34] Esman (fn. 1), 56. [35] *Ibid.*, 57.

[36] Kuper, "Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization," in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 177-82.

[37] Kuper, "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depluralization," *ibid.*, 475.

[38] Kuper, "Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization," *ibid.*, 182.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

function?" Adam's answer to this central question is contained in his analysis of apartheid as a "pragmatic race oligarchy" and as "an increasingly streamlined and expanding system of sophisticated dominance."[39] He goes on to discuss a variety of mechanisms that the regime has adopted to maintain white supremacy and effective control over the non-white population in South Africa. These mechanisms have included exclusion of non-whites from even a qualified franchise; elaborate legislation erecting and enforcing social barriers between whites and non-whites; government-sponsored programs to rejuvenate and maintain tribal identities and traditional social structures; energetic propagation of the concept of separate development; use of local and regional non-white self-governing bodies to deflect mass dissatisfaction among non-whites; and explicit state intervention in the private sector of the economy on behalf of the white minority. Adam uses his framework to highlight the adaptiveness and success of South African apartheid as new policies are designed and implemented by a regime anxious to maintain effective control, at bearable cost, while faced with gradual social and economic change.

Unfortunately, Adam's treatment is somewhat haphazard. For example, he fails to establish systematic linkages among these policies, which would perhaps justify his characterization of domination in South Africa as a "system." Nevertheless, there is immense value in Adam's study. It is especially instructive in regard to (1) the fundamental way in which he poses and answers the central question of the stability of the South African political system; (2) his emphasis on the *peculiar* characteristics of the South African system of domination; (3) the sensitivity that he demonstrates for the manner in which specific techniques of domination were tailored to suit particular social and historical circumstances; and (4) his willingness to formulate conceptual categories appropriate to the South African case without insisting that they fit into a generally applicable or preconceived category such as, for instance, fascism.

In the development of any new analytical approach, there is the possibility of borrowing frameworks and models from cognate fields. The value of such theoretical poaching is dependent on the coherence of the borrowed models themselves, and on the extent of isomorphism, or fit, between the problem at hand and the problem toward which the borrowed models apply. Control is a concept that plays a central role in the study of many political phenomena, but only one body of theory

[39] Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and empirical evidence has significantly influenced the study of control relations in deeply divided societies, namely, that associated with the study of overseas European imperialism.

As many scholars have observed, the geographical separation of metropolis and colony is difficult to justify as a necessary condition for the emergence of "imperialist" or "colonialist" patterns of relations. Based on this insight, the concept of "internal colonialism" and the vocabulary associated with the study of (especially) 19th-century European imperialism have been used to describe superordinate/subordinate group relations within "national" political units. Those who have taken this approach and applied it to specific societies have generally succeeded in matching patterns of superordinate/subordinate group interaction within societies with those commonly thought of as characteristic of "blue water" imperialism. The economic dependence of colonies on the imperial mother country, erection of jurisdictional and administrative barriers between colonists and natives, systematic extraction of primary products from the colony and their transfer to the metropolis, emergence of "comprador" groups within the colony, limitations placed on free political activity by natives, attempts to impose the values and doctrines of the metropolis on the colonial populations, development of a "slave mentality" by colonized peoples, and conservation of traditional forms of social organization in close association with the limited introduction of modern means of production and administration—all these have their counterparts in the relations between superordinate and subordinate groups *within* various societies.[40]

The problem with internal colonialism as an approach to the study of control in deeply divided societies is, then, not a lack of fit between the phenomena under consideration and those that served as the empirical referents for classical theories of imperialism. Rather, the study of internal colonialism has been obstructed by a failure to elicit, from the rich diversity of European imperial expansion and from the full range of theories describing it, a set of defining characteristics.[41] It becomes tedious rather than interesting to notice again and again that

[40] See James D. Cockcroft and others, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1972), esp. chaps. 1 and 10. For an interesting critique of this material, see Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case," in Ivar Oxaal and others, eds., *Beyond the Sociology of Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975), 229-50.

[41] Several proponents of the "internal colonialism" approach have indicated their awareness of this difficulty. See Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1975), 33n., 349-50; and Dale Johnson, "On Oppressed Classes," in Cockcroft (fn. 40), 279n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superordinate/subordinate relationships within societies have some features that resemble development patterns, social formations, psychological reactions, or motivations characteristic of one or another example or theory of European overseas colonialism. If the instances of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, of blacks in the pre-World War II American South, of Chicanos in the barrios of large American cities in the 1970s, and of Indian populations in rural Brazil are all accepted as examples of internal colonialism, then that category has become coextensive with inequality. One could conceivably go on to differentiate various forms of internal colonialism. However, the concept is so weighted down with historical and rhetorical freight that the analytical process is likely to be more impeded than assisted by the use of the term in such a highly abstract fashion.

Harold Wolpe has adopted another approach. By drawing explicitly on Marx and Lenin for what he deems to be a coherent theory of imperialism, Wolpe attempts to distinguish "internal colonialism" from other superordinate/subordinate relations. Regardless of whether Marxist-Leninist theories of European overseas imperialism are correct, and regardless of the success of Wolpe's attempt to use these theories to analyze white/non-white relations in South Africa, the explicit elaboration of internal colonialism according to a particular and well-delevoped theory of overseas imperialism is legitimate and promising.[42]

Conclusion: Analytic Requirements for the Comparative Study of "Control" in Deeply Divided Societies

Though unimpressive in number when compared with the amount of research devoted to consociationalism, studies of control as an explanation for stability in deeply divided societies have yielded some results. Primarily, they have demonstrated that in addition to coercion or the threat of coercion, effective control can be based on a wide range of political and economic mechanisms, institutional arrangements, legal frameworks, and sociocultural circumstances. A number of authors have attempted to introduce a measure of coherence into the field by differentiating among various syndromatic mixes of control techniques. The notion of internal colonialism, even if used only as a suggestive metaphor, has helped to develop sensitivity to circumstantial factors that permit the systematic and sustained subordination of one group by another.

[42] Wolpe (fn. 40), 244-50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, such efforts have not and cannot provide answers to the really interesting questions suggested by a study of control as an explanation for, or as a means of achieving, stability in deeply divided societies. These questions include the following:

1. In what ways do particular social, cultural, or economic circumstances support certain types of control techniques, while making others more difficult or costly to implement?

2. In what ways might the content of superordinate group ideology or the organizing principles of superordinate group institutions affect the type of control techniques adopted or rejected?

3. Do different mixes of control techniques contain different possibilities for evolutionary or revolutionary change?

4. Specifically, do different mixes of control techniques contain different strategic opportunities to subordinate group members desirous of breaking the control relationship? If so, what can analysis of these opportunities reveal about the costs and benefits associated with different modes of resistance in the context of different types of control relationships?

Though these questions cannot be answered in this short article, the manner in which they might be addressed can be illustrated. In connection with the second question, for example, one might hypothesize that superordinate group ideologies that emphasize the value implications of inherited characteristics (such as Afrikaaner ideology or Nazism) are more likely to generate control techniques that are explicitly promulgated through legal codes and enforced by judicial systems; in the case of superordinate group ideologies (such as Zionism or Marxism), whose substance is less centrally concerned with inherited characteristics as rationales for differential treatment of individuals, control techniques are more likely to operate in a *sub rosa* fashion.

To test this hypothesis (or others that might be offered in response to the above questions), an analytic framework is necessary within which the great variety of control techniques employed can be plotted. For any control relationship, such a framework should specify two conditions:

(1) the kinds of factors that will require investigation; and

(2) the functional requisites for the achievement of effective control in any deeply divided society.

The first condition will require a multilevel analysis that systematically distinguishes pertinent cultural, geographical, ecological, or social-structural givens from institutional or ideological factors, and from the calculated policies designed and implemented by superordinate groups

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in order to achieve control or to reinforce the circumstances that make maintenance of control possible. The second injunction will require an abstract analysis of control between communal groups, which specifies necessary and sufficient conditions. Without expanding on this idea, I shall only suggest that a functional understanding of control should focus on how subordinate group members are deprived of facilities for united political action; how the subordinate group is denied access to independent sources of economic support; and how (for purposes of surveillance and resource extraction) effective superordinate penetration of the subordinate group is achieved.

A final comment is perhaps in order with regard to the value implications of elaborating more powerful theories of how effective control can be achieved and maintained. In particular situations and for limited periods of time, certain forms of control may be preferable to the chaos and bloodshed that might be the only alternatives. Those who would resist the notion that control or domination could ever serve as a prescriptive model might consider that the empirical and conceptual analysis of systems of control makes it possible to identify typical weaknesses, patterns of breakdown, and appropriate strategies for resistance. Such analysis thus represents a necessary part of any struggle to dismantle systems of control that now exist or those that may emerge in the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LANGUAGE STRATEGISTS: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices

By BRIAN WEINSTEIN*

ETHNIC and nationalist movements are the expression of group interest. Political elites define the interest in terms of access to power and wealth. Cultural elites define the group in terms of where frontiers begin and end. The two leaders rarely merge in one individual; more often, each plays a different but complementary role. Political innovators easily capture our attention. Their cultural counterparts receive a passing glance because no one really believes that the pen is mightier than the sword. Within this neglected category of actors are the great writers, translators, poets, and dictionary makers whose choice of tongue for their literary works can raise that language up the flagpole of identity. The virtuosity of the pen creates a symbol for new community frontiers and new interests—which are defined and defended by the thrust of the sword. The person who thus innovates linguistically in order to promote interests should be called a language strategist.

Why do languages become symbols of groups? What linguistic choices are made by strategists to realize this potential? How do we know that their motives are political and not solely artistic? What are their political goals, and whose interests are promoted? The present attempt to answer these questions should begin to clarify the cooperative relationship between political and cultural elites that is essential to the precipitation of ethnic and nationalist identities.

Language as Symbol

No strategies are needed to connect language variation with an individual's perception of social distance and power. In a very natural way all humans associate their first language with their most intimate social groups—family and peer. Other languages, dialects, or varieties are learned in church, school, business, or in dealings with the government; they are consequently associated with these other, more distant domains

* An earlier version of this paper was prepared and presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where I was a Fellow in 1976. The article has benefited from the comments of other Fellows and from the advice of Carol Scotton, Walker Connor, Donald Horowitz, Joshua A. Fishman, Crawford Young, Joan Rubin, and Rupert Emerson.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030345-20$01.00/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beyond kinship and neighborhood. All humans also quickly discover that, within every variety of language, the choice of style, words, and sounds reflects differences in power, status, and intimacy between users. The asymmetrical use of *tú* and *usted* or first name and family name are obvious examples. These differences are *lived*; no abstraction of them is made. They are not ordinarily intellectualized or tied to any consciously held ideology or belief system.

Strategies are needed, however, in order that language variation might serve a consciously articulated political goal requiring the mobilization of significant numbers of people. Somehow, existing or newly created variation must be raised to a symbolic level and nailed to the mast of ideology. The transformation, like the creation of any symbol, requires an agreement that discrete tangible characteristics represent intangible values or a larger reality, such as ten million people. In this case, a covenant defines a people by the particularities of language in the same way that the peculiar design and colors of a flag are accepted as the symbol of a state. The use or alleged use of the variety of language must then be equated, in the ideology, with loyalty to a new community that permits the satisfaction of interests. The frontiers of this new community are either more inclusive or more exclusive than the frontiers of previous communities to which the same or many of the same people were expected to be loyal. If the linguistic symbols are legitimized or accepted by significant numbers of people, a powerful weapon is available for political elites demanding economic and power benefits for the new ethnicity or nationality in whose name they claim to speak. Although the labels "ethnic" and "national" may not be acceptable for all collectivities mobilized in this way before the 18th century, manipulation of language variation accompanies the expansion and contraction of political frontiers over the centuries.[1]

For example, the expansion of Castile from a small kingdom on the Iberian peninsula to present-day Spain accompanied the creation and development of the Castilian language and prose style. The people of this region rejected external authority and achieved supremacy over their neighbors. They fought the Visigoth and Muslim conquests; they rebelled against the Christian kingdom of León to which they were attached; they conquered others, or allied themselves with them.

In 1140, reduction to writing of *El Cid*, the epic poem of heroism and

[1] Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays* (Rowley, Mass: Newbury House 1972); Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1975), 111-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

triumph over the Muslim conquerors, gave prestige to the language by associating it with a great event, and provided raw material for further development. During the same century, a school in Toledo promoted writing in Castilian by translating important documents and books from Latin and Arabic. The apogee in the early development of Castilian prose was reached during the reign of King Alfonso X, from 1252 to 1284. These three decades marked a renaissance in science and letters around the court. A lexicographer himself, the king selected or adapted Castilian words to replace Latin or Arabic technical terms. A growing number of writers—particularly Jews who preferred the spoken language rather than "Catholic" Latin—used Castilian in their translations and original works; this effort made possible its use in government documents. Alfonso also settled the problem of which variety would be the norm by advising writers to choose the speech of Toledo.[2]

In the political realm, the king conquered Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, and Murcia. These new territories either voluntarily accepted or were forced to accept written Castilian, soon to be called "Spanish." Spanish became a symbol of this growing nation; centuries later, it would be considered a symbol of domination and a target of Basques and Catalans wishing to redraw frontiers with the aid of their own languages.

Many other examples come from the 19th century. In 1850, a group of intellectuals representing Croats and Serbs—who speak essentially the same language while using different alphabets—signed a "Literary Agreement" in which they accepted the Stokavski variety of language for writing; they incorporated spelling reforms to draw the two written varieties as closely together as possible. This action facilitated the expansion of literary activity, but it also created a symbol to which these neighboring Slavic peoples would be encouraged to plead their loyalty. "Serbo-Croatian" or "Croato-Serbian" was used by political elites in efforts to unite all southern Slavs—the Yugo-Slavs—into a new large political community.[3]

Over two thousand miles away, the Reverend Samuel Crowther, a Yoruba-speaking minister of the Church Missionary Society, endeavored to produce a translation of the Bible that would be acceptable to all Yoruba-speaking peoples, then divided into several competing king-

[2] Rafael Lapesa, *Historia de la lengua española* (6th ed.; Madrid: Escelicer 1965), 169, 172.

[3] Elinor Murray Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, distributed by Columbia University Press 1975), 93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doms. He chose one of the major spoken varieties because, he asserted, "it appears to me to be the medium between the other two."[4] Disputes over his orthography led to a conference in 1875 at which rules for the representation of certain sounds were adopted.

Discussion continues to the present. In 1966, a Yoruba Orthography Committee, composed of leading scholars and linguists, reconsidered the spelling system. They were concerned about inconsistencies in the representation of certain vowel sounds and about lack of agreement on where to divide words.[5] Printers had expressed their dissatisfaction with the irregularities; writers wished to reach a larger audience. The committee members chose what they called an "educated" Yoruba spelling based largely on Crowther's work; they also set down the rules for the use of other varieties. This work on Yoruba facilitated proselytization; it expanded the market for the countless Yoruba novelists and printers of the 20th century; and it shaped the language into a building block of Yoruba political unity within Nigeria. Despite the mutual intelligibility of several varieties of Yoruba, widespread acceptance of "educated" Yoruba solved the problem of intra-ethnic communication. Today it is recognized as the major symbol of identity for more than 15 million people—a fact which has been exploited by political leaders.

The converse process of frontier *contraction* may also occur through linguistic manipulation. The separation of England from the Continent began in 1204, when the French crown won sovereignty over Normandy. The King of England, who since William the Conqueror's victory in 1066 had also been the Duke of Normandy, henceforth ruled only on one side of the Channel. Political differences grew with the commencement of the Hundred Years' War in 1337. For the time being, Latin and French continued to dominate in education, the church, government, and the courts, but Englishmen—even those of Franco-Norman descent—began to consider them as foreign tongues despite their utility and prestige. Wycliffe's translation of the Bible, the setting down in English of *Piers Plowman* (a poem expressing a growing sense of English identity), and the decision to open Parliament in 1363 with a speech in English contributed to the rise of a new symbol for a new identity. In this favorable context, Geoffrey Chaucer could write: "Let Frenchmen endite their quaint terms in French for it is

[4] Crowther, *Grammar and Vocabulary of the Yoruba Tongue* (London: Seeley's 1852), 1.

[5] Ayọ Bamboṣe, *Yoruba Orthography—a Linguistic Appraisal with Suggestions for Reform* (Ibadan: Ibadan University 1965), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kindly to their mouths, but let us show our fantaisies in suche words as we learned from our dames' tongues."[6]

Following his own advice to use the mother tongue, Chaucer translated French literature into English, enriching the latter by coining English equivalents or adapting French terms. He wrote and read the *Canterbury Tales* in English at the king's court. Through all his work he added about a thousand words to the language; he demonstrated new prose styles, word orders, syntax, and idioms, thereby giving English a new flexibility and prestige, and a prose that could be used in government, education, and the courts of a resurgent state that was independent of outside control.

Four hundred years later, Noah Webster sought ways to create a symbolic frontier between Englishmen in London and Englishmen in Connecticut. The orthographic changes proposed in his dictionaries and spelling books, as well as the redefinition of many words, would suit the American experience, he said: "It has been my aim in this work [the 1828 dictionary] to furnish a standard of our vernacular tongue which we shall not be ashamed to bequeath to *three hundred millions of people* who are destined to occupy and, I hope, to adorn the vast territory within our jurisdiction."[7]

To be sure, language is not the only symbol chosen to alter ethnic and national frontiers. Religion served to consolidate Spanish unity in the 15th century, and Jewish writers, still devoted to the Spanish language, were excluded from the nation. Religion also helped to justify the annihilation of the Albigensians, perceived as separatists in meridional France. The Scottish National Party uses symbols from history to promote nationhood. For Pan-Africans, race is the guiding force; for Zionists, religion and common descent are the bases of frontiers. Symbols may even undergo change: the Bengalis transformed themselves into East Pakistanis in 1947 by identifying themselves as Muslims; the same people then separated from West Pakistan in 1970 by identifying themselves as Bengali speakers.[8]

[6] Cited in Kathleen Lambley, *The Teaching and Cultivation of the French Language in England During Tudor and Stuart Times—With an Introductory Chapter on the Preceding Period* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1920), 18.

[7] "Preface," *An American Dictionary of the English Language*, reprinted in Homer D. Babbidge, Jr., ed., *Noah Webster on Being American: Selected Writings, 1783–1828* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1967), 173; emphasis in original.

[8] For the theoretical underpinnings, see Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown 1969), 9-38. Crawford Young calls a person who creates and manipulates cultural symbols of any nature a "cultural entrepreneur." See Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1976), 45-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An explanation for the power of linguistic symbols, as opposed to other cultural characteristics, is "diglossia," the functional differentiation of languages in a community. One type of diglossia is particularly susceptible to political exploitation: A majority of the population in a determined geographic area speaks an unwritten language that is restricted to low status and powerless domains. Another variety, generally written, is imposed from another geographical area by invaders or promoted by a small indigenous ruling class; it serves high-status functions in government, commerce, and religion. Examples of the results of invasion are Latin and the Gauls, Franco-Norman and the English, and English and the Nigerians. Examples of class differences are classical Arabic over colloquial Arabic, Katharévusa or high "pure" Greek over Demotiki (the people's Greek), Ottoman over Turkish, Sanskrit over Hindi, Boksmål Norwegian over Landsmål Norwegian, Mandarin over Cantonese.[9]

The speakers of the majority tongue may not be directly prevented from learning the high-status variety, but the difficulties are significant: the need for expensive schooling and travel; the fear of betraying one's group or class by appearing to want to assimilate into the "elite"; and, most important, the absence of opportunities to use the high-status language if one's social position does not change. Without fluency—and usually literacy—in the dominant language, the road to great wealth, power, and prestige is barred.

If most people are content to till the soil or to wander with their herds, and if they remain relatively isolated from the centers of power and wealth, accept the existing distribution of power and wealth, and agree with the conventional wisdom that their own speech is not suitable for high-status activities, the linguistic issue is dormant. No one challenges any of the symbols that define the group or the patterns of access to power and wealth.

Passivity and isolation erode with movement to cities; disasters such as epidemics and wars that affect the supply, demand, and recruitment of labor; higher levels of literacy; accumulation of some wealth by users of the low-status language; political conflicts among the ruling classes; internal revolution; the winning or losing of political independence; new forms of oppression; and changes in patterns of trade and communication that bring low-status people into broader or nar-

[9] Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia," in *Word*, XV (August 1959), 325-40; Joshua A. Fishman, *Sociolinguistics: A Brief Introduction* (Rowley, Mass: Newbury House 1970), 75-82. Many types of diglossia are possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rower economic circuits. All of these contribute in various ways to altering the status and aspiration of people on the lowest rung of the ladder. A new stratum of businessmen, professionals, skilled laborers, teachers, and prosperous artisans and peasants emerges. Increased wealth can support intellectuals whose "cloak provide[s] safe cover for the passions of the day" which they articulate into "public opinion" and which coalesce into symbols.[10]

The first members of this new middle class can easily be co-opted into the ruling stratum whose language and customs they have learned. Others may reject assimilation out of a new pride in their wealth and culture. The latter are joined by members of the disappointed second generation who find less room at the top as the ruling structures become less able or willing to absorb them. New forms of prejudice, discrimination, and oppression emerge, and blockage of aspiration leads to a sense of "relative deprivation," the perception of a gap between what people want and believe they deserve in terms of material goods, power, and prestige on the one hand, and what they can actually get because of constraints on the other hand.[11]

The oppressed seek relief by organizing families, neighbors, and others who share some characteristics into a constituency to support their demands for entry or a redefinition of the rules of entry into existing structures. In the face of strong resistance, or because of their own increased self-confidence, they may challenge the existing structures and the bases that support them. Their intellectuals propose new community frontiers which, defined by different symbols, would exclude the former ruling classes and would facilitate their own access to power, prestige, and wealth. Some members of the assimilated first generation may join the new movement to counteract a growing sense of alienation from families, friends, and regions they had abandoned earlier.

The aspiring elite needs an ideology or belief system to validate its demands in terms of transcendental principles, to provide a long-range strategy, and to mobilize the masses. The ideology articulated by intellectuals consequently projects goals of liberation through a redefinition of community frontiers which would permit an economic and political program bearing labels such as liberal, socialist, fascist, com-

[10] Alexis de Tocqueville, "How Towards the Middle of the Eighteenth Century Men of Letters Took the Lead in Politics and the Consequences of this New Development," reprinted in George B. de Huszar, ed., *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1960), 14.

[11] Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 46. Other motivating forces are at work, too.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist, or conservative. Symbols taken from the living culture of the people are integrated with the ideology to make it tangible and to unify the middle and lower classes.[12]

The new elites tend to rely on the low-status language rather than on religion as a symbol of the new community and the mobilizing ideology. Several factors contribute to this preference. Religion, or religious leaders, may deny the importance of exclusive frontiers. Roman Catholic leaders have taken this position in some countries. (On the other hand, if a religion such as Judaism or Anglicanism can be narrowly identified with a particular community, leaders may be inclined to choose it as a symbol.) Religion also limits politicians' and intellectuals' manipulation of symbols. Religious elites are the keepers of religious symbols, and their use gives priests an advantage over aspiring political elites who are interested in secular goals. The conflict between secular and religious elites is still a serious problem for the development of countries such as Israel and Pakistan. Where it is not possible to avoid religious influence, the new elites may attempt, as in the case of India, to make language (which they can manipulate), the symbol of religion (which they cannot). The tactic has its risks: Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who had used the Sinhalese language in order to win the support of both secular Sinhalese and Buddhists, lost his life in Ceylon when a segment of the priesthood became convinced he had betrayed their special interests.

The persistence of diglossia is another reason for the choice of language over other symbols. The masses generally use the low-status language or can be made to use it, at least in its spoken form. They can also be convinced that they use it already. Despite the immense pressure of English in North America, the Québécois have never given up their French—although many have left the Catholic church. Despite the fact that spoken Urdu and other tongues were widely used in pre-independence India by Hindus, nationalist emphasis on Hindi and Hinduism as the defining symbols of a renascent India convinced millions that they were using Hindi. The sudden reappearance of Catalán in public after the Spanish-American War provided important support for the symbolization of frontiers between Barcelona and Madrid.

A third factor in the choice of language is the desire to prevent the symbolization of other cultural characteristics which will undermine the frontiers that elites are trying to build. Douglas Hyde, a Protestant

[12] In northern India, language has served to consolidate the group across class lines. See Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1974), 22, 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Irish nationalist, made an attempt to define the differences between Ireland and England on the basis of the Gaelic language, more out of a desire to unite Protestants and Catholics than to pursue complete political independence. It was too late: the masses had already shifted to English and refused to learn what they considered a useless language. Hyde's efforts to unite the religions failed, and Ireland is divided today.[13] Conversely, nationalist leaders in multilingual societies of Africa avoided the language issue until several years after independence in order not to divide the population which, in opposition to colonial rule, had been fairly well united. (An exception is Tanzania, where the leaders were able to choose Swahili because people accepted and learned it as an indigenous *lingua franca* unassociated with any aggressive ethnic group.)

Fourth, language will serve as a powerful symbol of change if it has been systematically denigrated by previous ruling elites, and if another language has become the symbol of oppression. Flemish, mocked by French-speaking elites in Belgium; Creole, labeled a "mere patois" in Haiti; Bengali, spoken by the "impure" in Pakistan—all were already so closely identified with the oppressed that they could be turned around and made the banner of liberation and justice.

The fifth and sixth reasons are closely tied with the foregoing: the state of the language itself. The form of the language must have been developed during the period of diglossia to permit its use in political action, education, and literature. And the form must be legitimized by content. Original great works or accepted translations of holy texts can permit genuine pride in the form. Development of linguistic form and the creation of great literature in it are the most important preconditions for the symbolization of language in ethnic nationalist movements, and that is where strategists play their role.

Choices of Language

Writing, standardizing, and modernizing a previously low-status spoken language is the essence of development.[14] The amount of labor required in "graphization" of a previously unwritten language discourages all but the most dedicated. This is the reason that missionaries, fired by religious zeal, have led the revolution. Their belief in salvation

[13] See Douglas Hyde, "The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland," reprinted in Charles Gavan Duffy, George Ingerson, and Douglas Hyde, *The Revival of Irish Literature* (New York: Lemma 1973), 117-61.

[14] Charles A. Ferguson, "Language Development," in Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson, and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, eds., *Language Problems of Developing Nations* (New York: Wiley 1968), 27-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through Christianity (or Islam) sustained the literary travail. Saint Cyril's mission to the Slavs in the 9th century necessitated the setting down of Slavic tongues and the creation of an alphabet for them. Conversion of the Indians of Mexico in the 16th century necessitated literacy in their languages, and the Franciscans promoted Nahuatl despite the Spanish king's orders to teach Castilian.[15] In Africa, texts in Ewe were produced in 1658, in Duala in 1665, in Wolof in 1732, and in Igbo in 1777.[16]

First translations seldom create symbols. The reasons are stylistic and contextual: Wycliffe's translation of the Bible into English was stilted and unattractive, and pre-Luther translations into German were similarly unpopular. Some translations introduce too many new words and styles all at once. It is also important to recall that the first translations of the Bible and other texts into spoken languages were labeled acts of heresy. Etienne Dolet set rules for translation: use the common language and produce the sense and tone of the original. These rules and his works—one of which was dedicated to the "French people,"—offended church and political leaders, who burned him at the stake in 1546.[17] In Africa, there were other obstacles: translations bore the stigma of association with European conquest; a high rate of illiteracy kept audiences small; and regional variations prevented widespread comprehension.

Standardization, the second stage of development, also requires immense labor over a long period of time. A writer may choose one variety of a spoken language. He and others who agree with the choice then promote it by myth and fact among people who do not already use it.[18] Acceptance of this variety will relegate the former high-status language to more limited areas of life and will confirm the low status of other varieties.

Because language varies mostly according to region, it is difficult to choose a standard which is not associated in people's minds with some

[15] Shirley Brice Heath, *Telling Tongues: Language Policy in Mexico—Colony to Nation* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University 1972).

[16] P.E.H. Hair, *The Early Study of Nigerian Languages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1967), 4, n. 1; P. W. Schmidt, S.V.D., "The Use of the Vernacular in Education in Africa," in *Africa*, III (April 1930), 137-49.

[17] Dolet, "La Manière de bien traduire d'une langue en aultre," in E. Cary, *Les grands traducteurs français* (Geneva: Librairie de l'Université 1963), 2-5; Richard Copley Christie, *Etienne Dolet: The Martyr of the Renaissance, 1508–1546—A Biography* (London: Macmillan 1899).

[18] Punya Sloka Ray, *Language Standardization* (The Hague: Mouton 1963), 70. Cf. Janet Byron, *Selection Among Alternates in Language Standardization* (The Hague: Mouton 1976), 17-30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

geographic area and some group's interests. The choice made by writers is naturally influenced by their own mother tongue and by the preferences of the classes who support schools and purchase literary products. Most often, leading writers come from regions of expanding economies; but some decide to promote a variety of language from a weaker region in order to avoid giving offense.

Whatever the selection, writers will try to disguise their regional origins if they wish large numbers of people to accept their standard. This action is the first hint of a political motive. For example, Dante wrote in Tuscan, but he maintained that his so-called Illustrious Vulgar Italian was "perceptible in every town, but abiding in none," and that therefore it "belongs to all the towns in Italy, but does not appear to belong to any one of them. . . ."[19] Dante wished all Italians to accept Tuscan.

Vuk Karadžić, who came from Hercegovina, proposed that his mother tongue, a variety of both Serbian and Croatian, be used as a standard for the Serbs. This variety was adopted by Gaj, who in 1835 began to call all southern Slavs "Illyrans" in his newspaper. He asserted that the language used by him and Vuk (as he is commonly known) was "Illyrian," the original language of all southern Slavs: "There can be only one true literary language. We do not seek it in any one locality or state but in all of greater Illyria."[20] Martin Luther contended that he used the standard language: "I talk a common, standard German rather than a particular dialect, and thus I can be understood in both Upper and Lower Germany."[21]

Writers who deliberately appeal to a narrow readership insist on the identification of their variety of language with a particular region, class, race, or religion. Any aspect—writing system, orthography, syntax, or phonology—can serve to create a narrow standard. (Just the *pronunciation* of "shibboleth" sufficed to differentiate Ephraimites from Gileadites.)[22] Macedonian writers, for instance, whose own language was close to Serbian, rejected Vuk's and Gaj's choice. They went to the remotest rural areas to find structures and words to build a standard that could be used to distinguish Macedonian from Serbo-Croatian.

[19] Dante, *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, trans. by A. G. Ferrers Howell (London: Rebel Press 1973), 43.

[20] Cited by Despalatović (fn. 3), 91. Also see Arash Bormanshinov, "The Illyrian Movement as Reflected in the Serbo-Croatian Literature and Language," Ph.D. diss. (University of Pennsylvania 1958).

[21] Cited in Preserved Smith, *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1911; reprinted 1968), 266.

[22] Judges 12:5-6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These efforts coincided with the struggle to create a separate Macedonian Republic in Yugoslavia.[23] Sikh writers energetically promoted a standard to separate their language from Hindi; the two were actually very close to each other in the spoken form. They insisted that "Sikh" must be written in the Gurumukhi script which was intimately associated with the Sikh religion, while they considered the Devangari script, used to write Hindi, as appropriate only for Hindus. The gap between Sikh and Hindi grew further with the introduction of new words, and today there are two separate standards and two separate peoples. The Sikhs now have their own state in India.[24]

The second major basis for the choice of standard is class, and this is where most of the dissembling occurs. Writers who promote the acceptance of their variety, whether over a wide or a narrow area, all seem to contend they are using the spoken language of the common people. The substance of their works depends heavily on the oral tales collected among the masses. Thus, Luther, who turned out to be no great friend of German peasants, proclaimed their cultural supremacy:

> We must not, like these asses, ask the Latin letters how we are to speak German; but we must ask the mother in the home, the children on the street, the common man in the market place about this, and look them in the mouth to see how they speak, and afterwards do our translating. That way they understand it and mark that one is speaking German to them.[25]

Chaucer claimed to use the popular idiom "bare and pleyn"; and Dante said he would "endeavour, by the aid of the wisdom which breaths from Heaven, to be of service to the speech of the common people."[26] In present-day Quebec, writers desire to exalt the speech of workers. The poet Gérald Godin and his wife, the popular singer Pauline Julien, say they depend on it: "My own poetry is part of my will and desire to use and treasure the realities lived by the majority of Québécois—the workers."[27]

Whatever the true regional and class basis of the standard, it must be modernized once it is chosen. A degree of rationalization, the expansion of the vocabulary, and the introduction of new styles are necessary to ensure that the language can express everything in all domains of the

[23] Horace G. Lunt, "The Creation of Standard Macedonian: Some Facts and Attitudes," in *Anthropological Linguistics*, I (May 1959), 19-26. Heinz Kloss calls this creative language-building "Ausbau." "Abstand Languages and Ausbau Languages," in *Anthropological Linguistics*, IX (October 1967), 29-41.

[24] Brass (fn. 12), 309, 326-27.

[25] Luther, "On Translating: An Open Letter 1530," reprinted in H. E. Jacobs, ed., *Works of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman and Castle Press 1931), 15.

[26] Dante (fn. 19), 15.

[27] Interview, Montreal, March 2, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

community. Scientific words and scientific style must, for example, be part of the repertoire of a fully functioning official language of an independent state.

Noah Webster believed that a completely phonetic orthography ought to be used in American English: "labor" for "labour" and "bred" for "bread." Vuk Karadžić suggested that written Serbian be limited to 30 characters. His intention to introduce six new symbols into Serbian Cyrillic, including the Roman letter "J," brought a storm of protest on his head. In 18th-century Russian, word order was the great problem; in present-day Wolof, it is syntax and word division.

In order to solve these problems, and to introduce new words and styles, writers must be bilingual or trilingual. They must borrow from the old high-status language; words must be translated from it; and old words must be redefined to suit concepts originally introduced by the high-status language.[28] Innovators are probably more familiar with the older high-status tongue than they are with the low-status tongue they are modernizing. Like Gaj, who spoke German first, or Hyde, whose mother tongue was English, they may have to make a special effort to learn it.

Without knowing German, Arabic, and other languages, Eliezer Ben Yehuda could not have enriched the Hebrew lexicon through his newspaper, word lists, and bilingual dictionaries.[29] Without knowing French, Old Church Slavonic, and the spoken Russian of Moscow, Pushkin could not have solved the problems of Russian style. Because of his erudition and artistry, he was able to set the rules for the use of words out of their familiar context, establish norms for borrowing from French, and demonstrate different acceptable styles through his poetry and dramatic works. He established "a variety of styles within one single national literary language."[30]

Political Motives

The simple coincidence of efforts at linguistic change with nationalist and ethnic movements aiming at a redefinition of frontiers in Great Britain, pre-1948 Palestine, the Balkans, and Russia is insufficient evi-

[28] S. V. Shanmugam, "Modernization in Tamil," *Anthropological Linguistics*, XVII, (February 1973), 53-67.

[29] See Jack Fellman, "The Role of Eliezer Ben Yehuda in the Revival of the Hebrew Language: An Assessment," in Joshua A. Fishman, ed., *Advances in Language Planning* (The Hague: Mouton 1974), 427-55.

[30] Vinogradov, *The History of the Russian Literary Language from the Seventeenth Century to the Nineteenth*, translated, condensed, and introduced by Lawrence L. Thomas (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1969), 128.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence for the proposition that choices of linguistic form are made to serve political purposes. In rare instances, however, the proof is evident because one person, like King Alfonso X, plays both a political and a cultural role.

Another example is Njegoš, the poet, prince, and bishop of Montenegro (1811?–1851). In the political realm, he subdued regional leaders and began to centralize power while keeping Montenegro independent from the Turks. At the same time, he wrote poetry and published it on the printing presses he set up. He thereby helped to develop and promote the use of the Montenegrin language. After meeting Vuk Karadžić in Vienna, he adopted the latter's orthography, including the controversial "J"; Gaj visited him to apprise him of the goals of the Illyrian movement. Njegoš's work on language shows that he wished his subjects to accept one literary variety as a symbol of Montenegrin identity and as an instrument of daily living, and desired to draw his people closer to other southern Slavs in their self-perception and their commercial and political relations. His political and literary choices served identical goals.[31]

Unlike Alfonso and Njegoš, most writers are not in a position to make important political choices. It is nonetheless surprising how often their biographies show them immersed in or discreetly associated with political movements, how frequently they explicitly admit the nonliterary purposes of their linguistic preferences, and how often political elites seize upon or vigorously reject their innovations. Noah Webster and Vuk Karadžić plunged into the political fray at an early age. As a student at Yale, Webster supported American independence and a republican form of government; later he preached these themes as a teacher and newspaper publisher. He promoted the policies of his friend, General George Washington, and wrote a history of the revolution. Even before the appearance of his famous spelling book and dictionaries, this American intellectual could be considered a "striking representative of early American nationalistic thought."[32] At the age of 17, Vuk joined the rebellion against the Turks in 1804 and served as "secretary to one of the Serbian military leaders, Djorǵe Curćija."[33]

Alexander Pushkin was 26 at the time of the Decembrist uprising against the Czar in 1825. Evidence shows that he shared the rebel's desires for liberal reforms: he counted liberal army officers among his

[31] Milovan Djilas, *Njegoš: Poet–Prince–Bishop* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1966). Also see Albert B. Lord, "The Nineteenth-Century Revival of National Literatures: Karadžić, Njegoš, Radičević, the Illyrians, and Prešeren," in *Review of National Literatures*, v (Spring 1974), 101-11.

[32] Babbidge (fn. 7), "Introduction," 3. [33] Bormanshinov (fn. 20), 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

friends, and he belonged to literary societies such as the Green Lamp, some of whose other members also belonged to Decembrist associations such as the Union of Welfare. For this reason, and for his attacks on serfdom and despotism, the government put him under house arrest.[34]

Pushkin believed that his poetry and dramatic works must reflect his country and its problems: "Climate, type of government, and religion give each nation a particular physiognomy which to a greater or lesser extent is reflected in the mirror of poetry. There is a way of thinking and feeling, there is a multitude of customs, beliefs, and habits which belong exclusively to each individual nation."[35]

Luther's challenges to the church were also challenges to society and to the domination of the Papacy over the German states—a fact that the princes appreciated. And it was no accident that Ram Mohan Roy, who promoted Bengali by translating sacred Sanskrit texts and by preparing a grammar, also led the Brahmo Samaj movement. It had as its purposes to alter the caste system, abolish child marriage, and to promote Western education, woman's liberation, and monotheism in India. The Tagores—Devendranath and his Nobel-Prize winning son, Rabindranath—followed him in both his political and linguistic choices.[36]

Caught up in the conflict between Guelphs and Ghibellines, Dante was banned from Florence. In exile, he dismissed the Italian city-state and the church as bases for the ideal political community. He ultimately preferred a community larger than a Florence or a Venice, a community united by one language—Tuscan—which he chose for the *Divine Comedy*, his greatest work, in preference to Latin.[37] Although many have seen a call for a world-state in some of his writings, he explicitly affirmed and praised the underlying unity of Italy in his essay on language: "just as the members of the German Court are united under one Prince, so the members of ours have been united by the gracious light of Reason."[38] Boccaccio said that Dante made the Italian language "esteemed among those of us who are Italians," and Mazzini called him a father of Italian nationhood.[39]

Chaucer also was a political "insider." Born into a family of wine

[34] George V. Vernadsky, "Pushkin and the Decembrists," in Samuel H. Cross and Ernest J. Simmons, eds., *Centennial Essays for Pushkin* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1937), 45-76.

[35] Pushkin, "On Nationalism in Literature," in Carl R. Proffer, ed. and trans., *The Critical Prose of Alexander Pushkin* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press 1969), 41-42.

[36] Sisirkumar Das, *Early Bengali Prose: Carey to Vidyasagar* (Calcutta: Bookland Private 1966).

[37] A. P. d'Entrèves, *Dante as a Political Thinker* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1952).

[38] Dante (fn. 19), 46.

[39] Thomas Caldecot Chubb, *Dante and His World* (Boston: Little, Brown 1966), 764.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

merchants in London, he obtained a position at the court. For his years of loyal service, the king named him to a comfortable civil service post, and he sat in Parliament as a member of the king's party.[40] Chaucer's entry into the civil service coincided with "a larger measure of financial and administrative reconstruction . . . which, with all its imperfections, showed a real development of the administrative system into a more completed and coherent whole."[41] This development meant laicization and centralization, in which Chaucer participated. Prior to the 14th century, church clerics, over whom the King had only limited control, had dominated the state bureaucracy, and feudal lords jealously guarded their regional power. Churchmen were literate in Latin and French, while laymen tended to be more sure of themselves in English. (About 50 percent of male Londoners may have been literate in English in the 14th century.)[42]

The poet's promotion of English and his gentle criticism of church characters in the *Canterbury Tales* can be seen as anti-clerical. He had friends among the Lollard Knights who demanded church reform and the use of Wycliffe's Bible. He must have made some enemies in Rome, and his various services to the king—including secret missions complete with bodyguard—also earned the enmity of the barons. Every time the feudal forces got the upper hand, Chaucer lost his position. Like other members of London's middle class, Chaucer saw the future in terms of the Crown and of English—"and preye God save the King, that is lord of this langage."[43]

In all these cases, linguistic development furnished a point of reference for people pursuing their interests and protecting their beliefs. Acceptance of a standard form was the essential step in symbolization; the living and the dead and contemporaries over a geographical area had signed a pact. Signatories of this metaphorical agreement were writers, printers, teachers, linguists, and entertainers who either already belonged to a network of their own or created one by their acceptance of the standard. The reinforcement or the creation of a cultural network around language transformed an unconscious language group into a self-conscious "identity group."

[40] D. S. Brewer, "Images of Chaucer 1386–1900," in Brewer, ed., *Chaucer and Chaucerians: Critical Studies in Middle English* (London: Nelson 1970), 224.

[41] T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1928, reprinted 1967), 264.

[42] Sylvia L. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948), 158.

[43] Chaucer, "Treatise on the Astrolabe," reprinted in John H. Fisher, ed., *The Complete Poetry and Prose of Geoffrey Chaucer* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1977), 909.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chaucer's work would have been lost to posterity if other writers had ignored him and if scribes like John Shirley had not reproduced his works. Shirley directed a shop of scribes and probably knew Chaucer at the king's court; he collected the poet's works because he knew they would sell and because he genuinely liked their beauty: "Chaucyer which first enlumyned [th]is lande with retoryen and eloquent language of oure rude englisste modere tonge . . ."[44] Because he distributed the books he produced, Chaucer and other writers became known far beyond court circles.[45]

Later approval by printers assured even greater diffusion of Chaucer's work and language. William Caxton, who was a perspicacious businessman, seems to have been fond of the literature, and he saw a market for it. In 1478, just two years after he set up England's first press, he published the *Tales*.[46] Teachers used the texts in the classroom.

Interest and aesthetics joined happily in Germany, too, where printers and teachers made Luther's Bible into the first best-seller. In America, "itinerant pedagogues" took Webster's spelling book and carried it throughout the land; the McGuffey brothers adopted his choices for their *Readers*, which became immensely popular as economic expansion and urbanization convinced people of the utility of literacy in English.[47] Not even the Civil War could dislodge this Connecticut Yankee's spelling.

Webster and the others won acceptance for their choices of form because the socioeconomic and political context strengthened the use of a low-status or restricted language, because of their stylistic virtuosity, and because of the substance or content of their work. They influenced entertainers, teachers, and printers, who do not normally produce cultural innovations but who disseminate them, the latter two having authority over their students and customers. Widespread acceptance of the new written language created opportunities for political leaders to construct a political infrastructure of parties, movements, and ideologies which challenged other leaders and used the power of the state to make the new standard official. Identity groups could thus be transformed into organized "control groups" ready for action.[48] In Norway,

[44] Shirley, cited in Caroline F. E. Spurgen, *Five Hundred Years of Chaucer Criticism and Allusion 1357–1900*, I (New York: Russell and Russell 1960), 49.

[45] Otto Gaertner, *John Shirley—Sein Leben und Werken* (Halle: Ehrhardt Karras 1904), 62.

[46] N. F. Blake, *Caxton and His World* (London: Andre Deutsch 1969), 101, 213.

[47] Henry Steele Commager, "Introduction," *Noah Webster's American Spelling Book* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University 1962), 5, 10.

[48] Joshua A. Fishman's lectures at the Linguistic Institute, July–August 1977, helped me to understand the transformation of language group to identity group into control group.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for instance, the Socialist Party used Landsmål to integrate socialism and nationalism by re-interpreting "the national struggle . . . as a class conflict between the native farmer [using Landsmål] and the foreign bureaucrat [using Boksmål]."[49]

Goals and Interests

Linguistic choices can affect frontiers in these ways only during key moments in the history of the rise of ethnic and national groupings. At these times disorder is great; group identities, purposes, values, and the existing political, religious, and economic institutions are seriously questioned or severely damaged. Reasons may be external, such as defeat in war, or liberation; or they may be internal, such as the perception of inalterable corruption, the rise of urban areas, or new forms of economic activity. Whatever the causes, people search for new organizing principles. Sociolinguist Jiří Neustupný's term for the period of a country's development during which linguistic, political, and economic choices can completely reorder loyalties and priorities is "Early Modern." Nations and ethnic groups may go through this period only once in their existence, but the decisions taken at that time will determine basic institutions, frontiers, patterns of access, political culture, and ideologies for centuries to come.[50]

At such moments, choice of a language as a symbol of identity may not automatically determine the shape of institutions and ideologies, but there is no doubt that linguistic manipulation to locate frontiers between groups affects patterns of access to power and wealth within groups. Still, the elevation of a former low-status variety to a symbol of the community and the medium of education and government business does not necessarily serve the interests of all people who believe they speak it and in whose name it is chosen.

The development of English by Chaucer and his successors required the introduction, translation, and adaptation of French, Latin, and Greek words or combinations of words unknown to the uneducated. In this regard, he showed little sympathy for the desires of the lowest strata. In India, the development of Hindi created a symbolic barrier between Muslim and Hindu; with the introduction of many Sanskrit-

[49] Einar Haugen, *Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966), 114; Halvdan Koht, *Education of an Historian* (New York: Robert Speller and Sons 1957), 205-15.

[50] Neustupný, "The Modernization of the Japanese System of Communication," *Language in Society*, III (April 1974), 33-50. I also learned a great deal about the nature of politics and language in Professor Neustupný's course, "Language Planning, Linguistics and Language Change," at the 1977 Linguistic Institute, University of Hawaii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based words, it also created a tangible barrier that prevented lower-strata Hindi speakers from challenging the new elites. The newly developed standard did serve Indian nationalism and emerging elites anxious to replace both the British and the Muslims and bent on ensuring their own dominance of an independent state.[51]

Only the emergent strata—the middle classes in the cases discussed here—living in select urban regions are in a position to acquire fluency in the new standard. Although the lower classes and many regions mistakenly believe they know the language, in fact they do not, because of the infusion of vocabulary from the old high-status language and foreign languages in the areas of government, the law, courts, high fashion, science, medicine, and high church. The middle classes are more familiar with both low- and high-status varieties and can learn the emerging synthesis more easily than anyone else.[52] Unless they themselves promote universal education, the language is their exclusive property. These people bear the national or ethnic norm that distinguishes the community from its neighbors thanks to the work of literary figures; as a result, they have "a headstart in the race for power and position" within the community.[53]

Even where the base of the new norm is not the mother tongue of an emergent stratum, it can still become its special property. Ilocanos taking dominant positions in Philippine society accepted Tagalog as the national symbol; standardization of Malay from Sumatra has been enthusiastically accepted by the new Javanese elites; and Swahili and Sango speakers in Tanzania and the Central African Empire, without power themselves, have stood by as writers and literary specialists serving the interests of other groups determined the development of their languages.

Identification of literary choices with political interests in no way diminishes the artistry of these writers' work or the dignity of their persons. The ability to serve one's contemporaries and to bequeath a heritage that will be understood and valued by later generations and by other peoples is a great gift. It is only when a literary figure permits political considerations to overwhelm his work that his talent languishes and disappears. Yeats, who correctly saw that Gaelic could no longer

[51] Cf. John Gumperz and J. Das Gupta, "Language, Communication, and Control in North India," in Gumperz, *Language in Social Groups* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1971), 142-45.

[52] On this subject, I have benefited from Henry and Renee Kahane, "The Decline and Hidden Survival of Prestige Languages" (Papers of the 1978 Georgetown University Round Table, forthcoming).

[53] Haugen (fn. 49), 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serve Ireland, lamented Douglas Hyde's political passion because it diminished him as a poet.[54]

Because language strategists are perfectly at ease in the high-status language they eventually reject, they could easily continue their careers in the dominant and usual language of government and high culture. Their choice is free, and artistic motives are important in it. The original motivation for linguistic choice is seldom based on a completely conscious and rational calculation of economic or political interest. It may even be damaging to the artists' immediate interests.

The innovators' own life experiences may play a role in the choice: a shock from one event may set them on the new course. It may be the discovery of a book, a conversation with a political leader, the inability to converse with close relatives in the mother tongue, a perception of alienation, a sense of discrimination and prejudice, or the eternal quest for a new metaphor. Herder aroused Slavic intellectuals after he fought his own battle for the supremacy of Luther's variety of German over French at Weimar. Study at American and European universities awakened African intellectuals disappointed by the consequences of political independence and alienated from their cultures. Russian pogroms, job discrimination in Canada, and the Anglo-Boer War stimulated mysterious sensitivities in a number of artists, and they united personal literary choice with social purpose.

Political elites take the language fashioned by their cultural allies and make it a banner of challenge. Without the assistance of these manipulators of culture they would be unable to define their followers as ethnic or national groups. Nor would they pursue their class interests so successfully. Thus, the partnership stimulates the kind of movements that have created the world's nations and ethnic identities. The language strategists, whom we habitually praise exclusively for their contribution to literature and learning, are also political innovators standing unobtrusively behind the curtain during the most momentous acts in the human drama.

[54] W. B. Yeats, *Autobiographies: Reveries Over Childhood and Youth and the Trembling of the Veil* (London: Macmillan 1926), 270.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXPLAINING ETHNIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

By NELSON KASFIR*

FAR too many explanations of the role of ethnicity in political behavior, particularly in Africa, vastly understate or overstate its relevance. For every writer who insists that "tribalism is Africa's natural condition, and is likely to remain so for a long time to come,"[1] another will assert that "tribalism is not an explanation but an ideology, one which itself needs to be explained."[2] That observers of these matters—whether they be liberal modernization theorists or Marxists—are so often wide of the mark poses an interesting question about unrecognized biases hidden within Western social science. The conclusions of Marxist writers and of students of modernization usually conflict because their analyses begin from opposite assumptions. It is the restrictiveness of each set of assumptions that prevents an accurate assessment of ethnicity in particular political situations.

The concept of ethnicity developed here comprises both schools of thought. By converting the assumptions of both approaches into empirical questions, a more subtle and useful inquiry into the political force of ethnicity can be articulated. The essential feature that underlies this conjunction is the observer's acceptance that ethnic identity is both fluid and intermittent. Thus it is one of many possible identities that could become the motivation for political action. The political situation—both the present moment and its historic development—contains the causal factors impelling an individual to prefer a particular social identity. The individual's choice may be fundamentally ethnic, class, religious, or—it is worth stressing—a combination of these identities. This choice may be constant or it may change from one situation to another. Indeed, even when an ethnic identity is preferred, an individual may, within limits, change from one ethnic category to another. This choice is a political resource over which individuals have varying degrees of control.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1977 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association in Houston. I would like to thank James Mittelman for his suggestions.

[1] Colin Legum, "Tribal Survival in the Modern African Political System," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, v (January–April 1970), 102.

[2] Mahmood Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press 1976), 3.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030365-24$01.20/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When political participation is based on ethnicity, individuals are necessarily constrained (though to a greater or lesser degree) by those objective indicators of common ancestry thought to be especially salient —culture, myths, language, or territory. Whether these objective indicators are the product of a history of traditional usage or the result of recent manipulation, subjective perception by others involved in the same political situation is essential for credible political participation. Shared perception permits, but does not necessarily create, sufficient social solidarity to turn individuals assigned to an ethnic category into an active ethnic group. Even then, the likelihood of social solidarity being channeled into participation depends on the opportunities created by the specific political situation.

Each of the foregoing steps introduces a new set of empirical questions that take the place of the starting assumptions of the modernization and Marxist schools. The research task created as a result is immeasurably more complicated than most observers of ethnicity realize. However, it permits the observer to develop a more sophisticated explanation of the different possibilities and changing interrelationships between ethnicity and class in political action. The assumptions concerning politicized ethnicity common to writers on modernization, and those of Marxist or radical analysts are presented below. The utility in combining these postulates to resolve various empirical issues is then demonstrated. The argument is illustrated here by presenting a brief account of what it means to call the Nubians in Uganda an ethnic group —particularly now that they have spectacularly improved their political fortunes. In the final section, the tendency toward reification of the role of ethnicity in explanations based on cultural pluralism and consociationalism is highlighted by applying the situational notion of ethnicity in politics.

Political participation, understood in its broadest sense, includes any form of political involvement from voting to rioting, from nepotism to revolution. It may or may not be based to some measure on ethnic considerations.[3] When two cases of ethnic political participation are compared, differences almost always emerge—not only in the kind of political involvement, but also in the nature of ethnicity espoused.

Before examining the conflict in assumptions between the two approaches, it is worth noting the points on which there is some agree-

[3] The concept of participation is analyzed in Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics with a Case Study of Uganda* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1976), 5-14; six ethnic case studies from Uganda are presented, 119-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. First, ethnic political participation is concerned with actions of a group or an individual arising from the imputation of common ancestry to themselves or to others. It makes little difference whether that ancestry is genealogically factual or fictitious. Where common ancestry is not at least indirectly implied, ethnicity is not involved and the roots of political action must be sought elsewhere. Second, for Africa in particular, there is an important difference between "tribe" in the precolonial sense of a small, remote, culturally distinctive, and self-sufficient unit, and "tribalism," involving certain political actions taken in the colonial or independence periods.[4] To the extent that tribalism is taken to refer to the act of a tribesman who is defined in the former sense, it has virtually disappeared from Africa. Few Africans are so untouched by outside influences that they can be considered members of the tribes that social anthropologists have attempted to reconstruct. Third, ethnicity and tribalism refer to the same political actions. Unfortunately, the latter term suggests that political behavior in Africa is not only qualitatively different from ethnic participation elsewhere, but also inferior.[5] Although "tribalism" is in constant popular usage in Africa, wider generalizations and less emotional discussion are more likely to result if "ethnicity" is the operative term.

Opposing Sets of Assumptions

Anyone wishing to discuss ethnicity as a political variable has to consider the following questions: (1) Is ethnicity to be regarded as a characteristic of the mental state of the political actor or of the social milieu in which he lives? (2) Are the advocates of ethnicity those of high position within society, or those without power, wealth, or status? (3) Is the decision to act on ethnic motives based on rational calculation or deeply held values? Each of these questions has been stated in "either-or" terms to focus attention on the assumptions that analysts often make, usually implicitly, on each of these themes. A more comprehensive notion of ethnicity requires, however, that each of these themes be treated as an empirical continuum on which instances of politicized ethnicity can be placed according to the characteristics of each case studied.

[4] Aidan Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, v (January–April 1970), 28.

[5] An explicit comparison showing the similarity of "nationalist" movements in Europe and "tribal" movements in Africa can be found in W. J. Argyle, "European Nationalism and African Tribalism," in P. H. Gulliver, ed., *Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969), 41-58.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The restrictiveness of basic assumptions are illustrated by the dominant view on ethnicity in the late colonial period, particularly in the British colonies.[6] Fortified by acceptance of the proposition that all people move in a unilinear, irreversible path from tradition to modernity, observers took ethnicity to be a set of primordial values growing out of the coincidence of culture, political organization, language, and territory. As people were educated in schools with a Western curriculum, converted to a Western religion, or entered the cash sector by growing new crops or taking wage employment, they were believed to be shedding the trappings of tradition and embracing the modern (that is, the colonial) world. The growth of African cities was regarded as evidence of this shift, which came to be called "detribalization." Behind this point of view were three assumptions: (1) that ethnicity was based on objective indicators (2) which produced values held deeply (3) primarily by the masses—that is, those who had not gained elite status by entering the colonial cash economy.

A variety of difficulties afflict this point of view, even though it probably remains the most widely held conception of ethnicity today. The survival and intermixture of tradition and outside influences raise serious questions about the notion that social change leads ineluctably to an easily specified modernity. The coincidence between culture, political organization, language, and territory was questionable before colonial rule began; it was increasingly distorted afterwards. Seeing ethnicity as a primordial value meant overlooking the fact that new ethnic groups were suddenly appearing under colonial rule—sometimes in rural areas, but more inexplicably, in the towns.

The older perspective has recently also been subjected to a thoroughgoing attack by analysts influenced by Marxist modes of inquiry.[7] In their view, it is economic relationships that carry critical political importance. The economic factors that shaped the colonial situation permitted those who acquired control over one or another aspect of the means of production to use new forms of ethnicity as weapons to mystify peasants and workers. In this sense, members of disadvantaged classes who enter politics to pursue ethnic goals are the victims of "false consciousness." At the root of this point of view are the three assumptions (1) that ethnicity

[6] For example, see Daniel F. McCall, "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 298 (March 1955); and Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity* (New York: Free Press 1963).

[7] For example, see Archie Mafeje, "The Ideology of 'Tribalism,'" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IX (August 1971); and Ken Post, "'Peasantization' and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa," *Archives européenes de Sociologie*, XIII, No. 2 (1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is subjective (since it is the direct consequence of ideology rather than of economic material relationships), (2) that its political uses can frequently be traced to members of the recently formed middle classes who (3) advocate ethnic demands as a consequence of their rational calculations in pursuit of desired resources. These assumptions, of course, are the polar opposites of those adopted by the writers on modernization.

The basic problem with the radical approach is the willingness of its proponents to "throw out the baby with the bathwater." False consciousness is still consciousness, whether or not the actor recognizes his "true" interests. Where his life is in danger on the basis of an ethnic threat, it would be foolish to expect him to ignore ethnic considerations. To dismiss all manifestations of politicized ethnicity as irrelevant is to ignore a range of motives many of which will, on empirical examination, turn out to be strongly felt. Even where ethnic symbols are merely the façade for economic grievances, they often structure the political situation and thus affect the outcome.

A More Comprehensive Notion of Ethnicity

By accepting that a combination of the assumptions in both perspectives may sometimes explain an aspect of ethnic politics, we may examine how these different factors can vary from one case to another. It is useful, though, to begin with the issue of whether ethnicity is the product of subjective perception or whether it is an objective indicator, because we may then ask how pervasively ethnicity occurs in political participation. Or, to put a closely related question, when ethnicity is put forward to explain political participation, are other variables—notably class, but also religion and status—automatically ruled out?

Because ethnicity implies common ancestry, kinship is the most obvious objective indicator of membership in an ethnic group. Since many people cannot trace their genealogy through more than three generations, however, language, culture, and territory become more useful signs of membership in a larger group. The central difficulty—as in the case of using objective indicators to demonstrate affiliation with economic classes—is that the individual's perception of the group in which he considers himself a member may differ substantially from the group in which he would be classed on the basis of his first language, customs, or place of birth. The consequences for explaining his political participation are likely to be equally significant.

Thus, the subjective alternative—that an individual is a member of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a group when he so thinks of himself—seems more attractive. However, political action is the result not only of an individual's beliefs (presuming for the moment that he acts on the basis of those beliefs), but also of the reaction of others to his assertion. Insiders may classify him as an outsider despite his desire to join their ethnic category. This is particularly apparent where a person who bears the objective indicators of a low-prestige ethnic unit attempts to become a member of a more desirable category. The problem is parallel to that which faces analysts who infer class membership solely from class consciousness.

The solution is to take objective indicators as well as subjective perceptions into account without assuming that they will be combined in precisely the same way in every ethnic group. There are, so to speak, standard paraphernalia that each ethnic group must display in order to make a political claim that will be taken seriously. A traditional history that stretches back many centuries or a standard language that is widely spoken will give plausibility to the assertion of group identity. But, where these are missing, they can often be constructed—as many local cultural enthusiasts and political entrepreneurs set out to do during the colonial period. The question then is whether these indicators are matched by equally widespread perceptions of ethnic membership. It may seem unduly restrictive to require both insiders *and* outsiders to share a perception of ethnic membership before labeling participation as ethnic. But since self-perception and external perception affect one another in most instances, widespread agreement can often be achieved on membership boundaries. Where it is not, the political value of ethnic assertion will be dubious.

The combination of subjective perception and objective indicators shared by insiders and outsiders may be related, either closely or distantly, to the traditional heritage of particular individuals. The work of urban anthropologists has shown how much ethnic identities can change as people migrate to the city and find that new skills and new associations are necessary, first for survival, and then for economic advancement.

Many of the newly defined urban ethnic groupings brought together migrants whose traditional homes in the countryside were close to each other and whose languages were closely related, but who had never previously thought of each other as possessing the same ethnic identity. These new groupings often developed intense social solidarities and then became the successful vehicles of political entrepreneurs. Sometimes, consciousness of the enlarged group seeped back to the countryside, where it stimulated the basis of political unity of much larger rural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

groupings. Relatively small ethnic units thus coalesced into much larger ethnic groups during the colonial period, creating the Ibo, Yoruba, Bagisu, Iteso, and Kikuyu as we know them today. On the other hand, a new ethnic consciousness created in the city might be resisted in the countryside. The urban migrant would then develop two ethnic identities: one that was appropriate for his urban life, and a different set of loyalties that was activated whenever he returned to the countryside. A third possibility, typical of "target workers," was to import one's traditional lifestyle into the city and avoid new loyalties as much as possible.[8] Finally, some migrants chose to break their ties to their rural ethnic units when they moved to the city.

Because of the changes created in ethnic loyalties by colonial influences, particularly urbanization (and too often we overlook the changes in ethnic identities that occurred in the precolonial period), the problem of the "proper" ethnic label for the people one met, for one's friends, and for one's self became immensely complicated, especially in the cities. The solution, as in any complex social situation, was to stereotype by creating a small number of ethnic categories. Social distance and relative prestige have been shown to be important elements in constructing these categories on the Zambian copperbelt, for instance,[9] though the elements undoubtedly vary from one place to another and often also involve differences in economic position. Ethnic categories imposed by others may also become the basis of self-definition—at least in situations in which those categories are regarded as relevant.[10]

The categories themselves are not necessarily stable. They may vary over time, depending upon the degree to which they are reinforced. S. R. Charsley builds on Mitchell's work in a useful manner by treating ethnic categories as proposals by the identifier that may be accepted or rejected by the person so identified. If the "transaction" is not completed (that is, if the proposal is rejected), the parties must find a new category—not necessarily ethnic—or fail to interact.[11]

[8] For a discussion of the varieties of responses by migrants to the city, see David Parkin, "Tribe as Fact and Fiction in an East African City," in Gulliver (fn. 5), 286-92.

[9] The argument was originally developed by J. C. Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance*, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, No. 27 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1956).

[10] In his research, Mitchell used objective indicators (based on *rural* criteria) to establish the ethnic units whose social distance he then measured in an *urban* area by asking respondents to classify *others*. Both the uncritical reliance on objective indicators and the use of rural definitions in the urban setting make his findings dubious, though the conceptual implications greatly advanced the study of ethnicity. Mitchell rediscusses his own work, though without reference to these difficulties, in "Perceptions of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behavior: An Empirical Exploration," in Abner Cohen, ed., *Urban Ethnicity* (London: Tavistock Publications 1974).

[11] Charsley, "The Formation of Ethnic Groups," in Cohen, *ibid.*, 360-61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If ethnic categories are understood to be subjective and changeable, there are several implications for the observer of political behavior. First, the relationship between traditional culture and ethnicity is empirical and variable, rather than definitional and constant.[12] Thus, any demand for a political solution to satisfy an economic grievance or bolster local prestige on the basis of ethnicity will not necessarily involve primordial customs, though some sort of objective indicators must be asserted to make the appeal credible. Second, identifying someone as a member of an ethnic category at a particular time and in a particular place does not mean that, for political purposes, he will continue to hold that identity in other places and at other times. Again, the question must be decided empirically. Third, if categories are fluid, identity may shift dramatically not only from one ethnic category to another, but from ethnicity to class or religion. Fourth, and most important, by accepting that the identities people assume are both multiple and intermittent, the researcher must consider the situation that activates the particular identity the individual chooses.[13]

The identity chosen may be rationally selected by calculating costs and benefits, or it may be conditioned by deeply held values. Threats to personal survival because of membership in a particular ethnic group are likely to cause a potential victim to think in terms of his ethnic identity when objective indicators (characteristic scarification, for example) make it impossible for him to escape this label. The same individual may, in another situation (for example, where a strike is called to demonstrate against a government-ordered wage freeze), perceive himself and be perceived by others solely in terms of his class. Both cases point to the necessity for empirical research to establish how the choice of a particular identity, however constructed, is activated in the pursuit of a particular goal.

In taking this approach, it would be a mistake to assume that all social action must be reduced to fluctuating individual perceptions. A variety of factors help to stabilize political situations that reduce the choices open to an individual over a period of time. The possibilities of migration, economic opportunities, and social stratification may not change rapidly. The presence of entrepreneurs who assert a cultural identity by

[12] The point is developed by Frederick Barth, "Introduction," in Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: George Allen & Unwin 1969).

[13] For valuable analyses articulating this point, see Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1976), 41-44, 64-65, and particularly 140-62; Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (December 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reinforcing traditional values or creating new ones may establish a mass consciousness among the relevant public that firmly stabilizes an ethnic label accepted by insiders and outsiders. J. S. La Fontaine describes the process by which members of the "Bagisu-to-become" created an "ideology of unity" by standardizing the dialects spoken by several smaller groups to create a single language, and by emphasizing that everyone should carry out particular ceremonies, especially those involving circumcision.[14] A "tribal" welfare association was founded, and new administrative boundaries demarcating "Bagisu" land were claimed in colonial and postcolonial arenas.

The most important factor in the political situation in Uganda that stimulated the formation of the Bagisu, as well as other large ethnic units containing people who were conscious of the political advantages of a shared identity, was the favored position of the Baganda.[15] Others emulated the Baganda, both to avoid cultural and political domination and to improve their own share of economic rewards. Political mobilization took place when the process of ethnic formation so dominated the consciousness of people who might otherwise have chosen other identities that it became the basis of strong feelings of social solidarity. The vigorous Bagisu response to the Mbale dispute (in which two recently created ethnic groups were involved in disturbances in the late 1950s and early 1960s over "control" of a town) shows the intense passions that even newly created ethnic loyalties can arouse.[16]

The concept of ethnicity so far developed can be summarized in four steps:

(1) Particular objective indicators associated with common ancestry
(2) become the focus of subjective perceptions both by members within the unit and by non-members
(3) through social solidarity created by a resurgence, or the fictive creation, of traditional unity
(4) so that in certain situations political participation will occur.

The creation of social solidarity in response to a situation turns the members of an ethnic *category* into an ethnic *group*. Political mobiliza-

[14] La Fontaine, "Tribalism among the Gisu: An Anthropological Approach," in Gulliver (fn. 5).

[15] Kasfir (fn. 3), 104-113.

[16] For a brief account of this controversy, see *ibid.*, 139-41. In some ways, the "Bakedi," the opponents of the Bagisu, are a more extreme case because they had no basis on which to build a homogeneous "traditional" culture due to the extraordinary variation in local customs. The "Bakedi" were merely disparate groups who found themselves in a single administrative district. This circumstance did not prevent them from acting as if they were an ethnic group, and even demanding a traditional head like the Kabaka at the time of Uganda's independence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion may occur at the same time, thus producing ethnic political participation. However, the third step may also be bypassed where individual ethnic political action occurs in the absence of social solidarity. (An example would be a client-patron relationship based on personal loyalty.) A much debated issue—whether the ethnic group is the small subgroup or the larger coalition into which the subgroups have united—can easily be resolved in this framework. By examining the political situation, the boundaries of the politically active ethnic group can be determined. For purposes of participation no other group matters.

We can now more directly consider the opposition between ethnic and economic explanations of political action. By analyzing the second and third set of opposed assumptions in liberal and Marxist discussions, we come to a more complex perspective than the simple presumption that class and ethnicity are antithetical. Political action stemming from economic class may be conceived along the same lines as those just developed for ethnicity. There are objective indicators of class (occupation, salary, place of residence, education, and even language and culture) which may or may not be the focus of subjective perceptions of those within them, and of outsiders. Consider, for example, the members of the bourgeoisie who organize proletarian action, or members of the fallen petite bourgeoisie who intensely oppose the workers. The formation of social solidarity (shared class consciousness) *may* lead to political mobilization in response to particular situations. There is a peculiar blindness among some Marxist writers who presume that, when they have demonstrated a common objective class membership, they have proved that political action will occur on the basis of class.[17]

Political situations that evoke participation along class lines may appear and disappear just as they do for participation along ethnic lines. A well-known example involves the Nigerian workers who participated in a general strike in June 1964, only to vote along ethnic lines the following December.[18] Robin Cohen correctly argues that "class and class consciousness have a partial manifestation that may be activated in certain conditions and in certain measure."[19] It is a short step to recognizing that class and ethnicity may involve the same political participants in different situations, and that both may be involved in the same

[17] For a typical example, despite careful attention to definitional problems, see V. L. Allen, "The Meaning of the Working Class in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, x (July 1972), 177-78.

[18] Melson and Wolpe (fn. 13), 1127.

[19] Robin Cohen, "Class in Africa: Analytical Problems and Perspectives," in Ralph Miliband and John Savile, eds., *The Socialist Register 1972* (London: Merlin Press 1972), 243.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situation. In the latter case, class motives may either conflict with or reinforce ethnic motives.

By conceiving the relationship of ethnicity and class in this manner, we recognize a subtle variation in the possible answers to the questions whether political action is based on rational calculation or deeply held primordial values, and whether the active agents are leaders or followers. Where the persistence of ethnic groups can be directly attributed to the desire to acquire the fruits of the modernization process,[20] rational calculations are probably more important than long-held fundamental values. Thus, "tribal" unions were often willing to pay for the education of those possessing the same objective indicators of ethnicity in hope of gaining tangible benefits for their members when these men achieved professional status or political office. Abner Cohen provides a case in point in his study of "retribalization" of the Hausa in Ibadan who maintained their separation from their co-religionists among the Yoruba in order to protect their control over an economic speciality.[21]

On the other hand, the traditional values that form the basis for an ideology of unity may not be a recent fabrication, but the product of a long cultural history. Threats to their kingdom, the cultural inheritance of several centuries, have evoked deep responses among many Baganda —whether rich or poor, educated or illiterate. Of course, particular Baganda often have manipulated this response to their own economic advantage. For ethnic groups to persist, their members must rally to a shared set of definitions of common ancestry. The legitimacy and enrichment provided by a historical culture may (or may not) underlie the group's political coherence. Despite the stress Abner Cohen places on rational calculations in his account of the Ibadan Hausa mentioned above, he appropriately insists that explanations of ethnicity depending solely on maximizing self-interest are "one-sided and *cannot account for the potency of the normative symbols* which the individual manipulates in his struggle for power. An ethnic group is not simply the sum total of its individual members, and its culture is not the sum total of the strategies adopted by independent individuals."[22]

As Cohen goes on to argue, a political entrepreneur who attempts to advance himself by manipulating ethnic beliefs is necessarily *constrained* by the symbolic implications and cultural participation that

[20] Robert Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Comparative Political Studies*, VI (January 1974).

[21] Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969).

[22] "Introduction: The Lesson of Ethnicity," in Cohen (fn. 10), xiii; emphasis added.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make these beliefs meaningful to those whom he intends to persuade. The transaction between the entrepreneur and others receptive to these symbols occurs in the creation or reinforcement of the ethnic group. This transaction limits the choices open to the entrepreneur, no matter how disingenuous his motives may be. To understand this behavior, it is important to recognize that there may be differences in motives among those claiming membership. But in no way is it logically contradictory to recognize that some will respond to rational calculations and others to primordial values, while all intensely assert their ethnic membership.

Of course, any empirical examination of subjective perceptions that is carried out by means of Western techniques of social science will run the risk of substituting explanations of motives that are familiar to foreigners for those held by the actors. In Malaysia, for example,

> in some contexts where westerners would perceive class and party divisions, the Malaysian will see ethnic divisions so that the ethnic unit supports similar functions and ideology as does class in western society. . . . this is particularly noticeable in relations of greatest social distance and antipathy.[23]

The danger is greatest where the researcher is so eager to find either objective cultural or economic consequences for political participation that he presumes that the motives of the actors were determined by these consequences.

On the issue whether leaders or followers (or members of the middle or lower classes) are the active agents in ethnic political participation, there is a range of possibilities that are more useful than the opposed assumptions of those who adopted the tradition-to-modernity proposition in the late colonial period or of the Marxists who wrote approximately fifteen years later. Elites and masses cannot exist without each other. An ethnic group may evolve in response to frustration on the part of unemployed urban migrants unable to break into an ethnically stratified labor market, or to threats felt by poor villagers fearing domination from another group whom they perceive in terms of *its* ethnic charter. Or an ethnic group may be carefully constructed by an upwardly mobile entrepreneur looking for a political base, or by introducing ethnic disputes into the civil service or university. The educated man, lamented

[23] Judith Nagata, "The Status of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of Status: Ethnic and Class Identity in Malaysia and Latin America," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XVII (September–December 1976), 251.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kenneth Dike in July 1966, is "the worst peddler of tribalism in Nigeria."[24]

However, examination of either type usually reveals a complicated mixture of motives, often by self-designated leaders and their followers. Members of the political elite, for example, may find themselves at least temporarily outflanked by their followers or by marginal men eager to raise their own status. The Kabaka of Buganda and his (well-to-do) advisors took full advantage, and ultimately full control, of the *Kabaka Yekka* (the "King Alone") movement which swept all opposition in the kingdom's elections of 1962 with an extraordinary display of intense ethnic unity. But two years earlier, with ferment growing over Buganda's place in an independent Uganda, a wildcat anti-Asian boycott organized by low-level Baganda politicians and traders had succeeded for a time in taking the initiative from the Kabaka's hands. In eastern Nigeria, on the other hand, the rise in "Ibo consciousness" among peasants, which facilitated the creation of Biafra, was to a large degree the work of academics and civil servants who fled to the East following the massacres of 1966.[25]

In some cases, class or ethnicity alone may explain political action. For example, in 1968 the *Egbe Agbekoya* (the "Farmers are Suffering") movement in western Nigeria was a protest carried out by rural peasants who took violent action over several months, responding to peasant leaders from their own villages rather than to members of an elite or an urban bourgeoisie.[26] Aside from the apparently liberal use of traditional magic (which provided some ethnic reinforcement within the movement), this was basically a class action. The massacres of Ibos in May and September of 1966, in which the victims were chosen on the basis of objective indicators of ethnicity, on the other hand, were primarily ethnic political actions. Even here, however, elements of class motivation were involved. To many Hausa-Fulani and Middle Belt peoples, the Ibos symbolized exploitation and, after the January 1966 coup d'état, humiliation. Dudley finds that in both massacres the participants were predominantly petty hawkers and urban unemployed.[27] In Uganda the agitation—soon after Amin's coup in 1971—

[24] Quoted in Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1971), 278.

[25] B. J. Dudley flatly states that "it was the academics who spearheaded the movement for secession." *Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press 1973), 195n.

[26] C.E.F. Beer, *The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press 1976), 179-205.

[27] Dudley (fn. 25), 132-33 (May); 166 (September).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the return of the Kabaka's body for a funeral and for the coronation of his son as the new Kabaka seems primarily to have been an ethnic response—the release of long repressed cultural sentiments. Yet, members of the Baganda elite surely recognized that recapture of a strong political and economic position within Uganda would have been promoted by a resurgent Buganda.

Alternatively, both ethnicity and class may be organizing principles of equal fundamental importance within the same political situation. The two may be in conflict where, for example, migrants of rising economic status are involved in political disputes with indigenous inhabitants of a town—as occurred in Port Harcourt, Ibadan, and Kampala. Or, ethnicity and class may reinforce each other, as in the case of Ibo and Hausa-Fulani in pre-civil war northern Nigeria, where "conflict of any sort—whether over jobs or markets or political office—threatened an all-out communal struggle."[28] Differential modernization during colonial rule created similar cases in virtually every African country. In each of these four types of situations—class alone, ethnicity alone, class and ethnicity in conflict, and class and ethnicity in concert—the research problem is to untangle and assess the mixture of motives held by the actors.[29] In every case, the observer must seek the causes in the political situation that stimulate people to think of (and organize) themselves in class, ethnic, or other terms—or some combination of them.

Nubians in Uganda: An Illustrative Case

The abrupt but spectacular political and economic prominence achieved by the Nubians under their most illustrious member, Idi Amin, provides an apt illustration of much of the foregoing analysis. The Nubians have stretched the notion of common ancestry to its fictive limits by opening membership to Africans possessing objective traits of other ethnic units. Their "tribe" is a product *not* of the colonial situation, but of the pacification that established colonial rule. They live almost exclusively in urban communities, but have received little exposure to Western education and thus have taken little advantage of the opportunities of modernization. Their decline in status following colonial pacification in the early years of this century and their rise

[28] Melson and Wolpe (fn. 13), 1116.

[29] See Cohen (fn. 19), 250-52. It seems unnecessary to accept his additional categories of class structure within ethnic groups and of interethnic hostility within a class, as these can be adequately handled within the four types of situations identified here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since the 1971 coup d'état suggest the usefulness of relying on *both* class and ethnicity in explaining political participation.

The Nubians take their name from 19th-century slave traders (primarily from Dongola and as far south as Khartoum in northern Sudan), who commanded small military forces in their raids on what is now southern Sudan and northern Uganda. Some of these slave traders could trace their ancestry to the former Kingdom of Nubia in northern Sudan, which was Arabicized in the 13th century.[30] The militia they raised included freed slaves and camp followers, and consisted predominantly of people indigenous to southern Sudan. Some of these soldiers were recruited by Emin Pasha to continue his administration of Equatoria Province after this outpost of the Egyptian Khedive's dream of an empire was cut off by the successful rebellion of the Mahdi. When H. M. Stanley "rescued" Emin in 1888, these soldiers were abandoned. They turned to a life of banditry in the countryside. Their ties to the different cultural backgrounds from which they came were broken, at least while they remained away from home. They developed a group solidarity based on the adoption of a form of pidgin Arabic and acceptance of Islam—originally propagated by the slave traders they followed and by Emin's officers. These traits were strongly reinforced by the rewards of soldiery in comparison with the disastrously uncertain lot of the cultivators in the villages they had left behind.

In 1893 Sir Frederick Lugard recruited 900 Nubians from the remains of Emin's army to strengthen his alliance with Baganda chiefs.[31] Pain estimates that 18,000 more Nubians came into Uganda in the next four years; some of them were brought into the Uganda Army. There was continual military unrest during this time, culminating in a major mutiny in 1897.[32] Over the next several years, Nubian troops saw duty in Lango, Acholi, Karamoja, Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, and what is

[30] Dennis Pain, "The Nubians: Their Perceived Stratification System and Its Relation to the Asian Issue," in Michael Twaddle, ed., *Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians* (London: Athlone Press 1975), 177-79. Barri A. Wanji disagrees on the name of the people, calling them "Nubis," and locating the origin of their original military officers in the Nuba mountains in what has become Southern Kordofan province in central Sudan. "The Nubi Community: An Islamic Social Structure in East Africa," Sociology Working Paper No. 115 (Makerere University, n.d.), 21-22. P. L. Shinnie (*Uganda Argus*, December 23, 1957, p. 4), also argues for nominal origin in the Nuba mountains. However, cultural influences emanating from the homelands of the founders are slight enough to make irrelevant the question which place happened to be the origin of the name. Both terms seem to be in use in Uganda.

[31] Aidan Southall, "General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical Inevitability?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XIII (March 1975), 87.

[32] Pain (fn. 30), 179.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now Kenya. Because the Khedive disowned responsibility for them, and because the British had relied upon them in early battles, they were permitted to settle in towns and trading stations throughout Uganda. Several were appointed chiefs of counties in West Nile. In addition to reaping the rewards of a soldier's life in the disturbed conditions of Uganda in the 1890s, the Nubians perceived themselves to be partners of the British in the colonization of Uganda.[33] From this rather minor pinnacle of social stratification they steadily declined until civilian rule came to an abrupt end in Uganda.

During the colonial and independence periods, the Nubians lived in urban settings, primarily because there was no territory in Uganda which they could claim as their own. (That particular objective indicator is not available to them.) Without land or special skills, they often became petty traders. In Gulu, they set up stores near cotton collection centers, where they sold beer and distilled *enguli*.[34] However, the forces structuring modernization in Uganda worked against the economic and social acceptance of the Nubians. As Muslims, they were placed below Protestants and Catholics in the colonial social order.[35] As northerners, they took second place to southerners. Nor were these the only disadvantages. Since they were ignored by missionaries, there were fewer schools for their children to attend, and consequently fewer civil service positions for which they could qualify.

A revealing discussion that appeared in the letters column of the *Uganda Argus* in 1957 suggests both the distress felt by some Nubians over their lack of educational opportunities and the importance at least some of them attached to developing channels of cultural communication. "Without Education," Ahmad Juma Abongo wrote from Kira, "one cannot cope with modern civilization. I am exceedingly surprised and distressed to see that my tribe, the so-called Nubians in Uganda, have neglected their duty to send their children to school." Few, he asserted, had gone through three years of secondary school. Perhaps aware that the low estate of the Nubians might be remedied by greater cultural unity, Abongo complained that "because of this lack of education, there is not a single publication in the Nubian language in Uganda. The excuse they give is that it is a complicated language or

[33] Some British felt they owed "a very real obligation to these natives who have followed and fought under our flag, and who are now strangers in a strange land; and that obligation, I claim also, extends in some degree to their children . . ." J.R.P. Postlethwaite, *I Look Back* (1947) quoted in Pain (fn. 30), 228.

[34] Dennis R. Pain, "Ethnicity in a Small Town," paper delivered to the East Africa Universities Social Science Council Conference, Nairobi, December 1972, p. 8.

[35] F. B. Welbourn, *Religion and Politics in Uganda, 1952–62* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House 1965), 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather cannot be written, which I strongly disagree with. I only know that they have not made any attempt to write it."[36]

In response, two other letter writers indignantly insisted that many Nubians were indeed trying hard to educate their children and cited particular cases of students who had reached the engineering school at Nakawa and the Royal Technical College in Nairobi. The first of these, Mustapha Ramathan, asserted that Nubians had become more active in sending their children to school in the past ten years. However, he was forced to conclude that "about six" had passed the Cambridge School Certificate examination and none had yet gone to Makerere University College.[37] The other writer, A. M. Ally, blamed the lack of publications on the fact that "the Nubians, as immigrants, have no strong position in this country," but "that many . . . are working hard to see the existence of a paper in the Nubian language."[38] These comments suggest the Nubians' rather late awareness—in contrast to members of other Ugandan ethnic units—of the importance of ethnic solidarity for political protection as the possibility of independence began to seem likely. But they also demonstrate that Nubians "remain a byword for low education."[39] Still, a widespread consciousness of a Nubian identity had become firmly implanted.

But, although the Nubians were a marginal group, they possessed some important economic advantages during the colonial period, as well as a special status that created social solidarity and made them attractive to some outsiders. They formed a trading network which, on a very small scale, connected different Nubian settlements in the towns of Uganda. Because the British had created a Special Native Court in Bombo (a large Nubian settlement near Kampala) for Nubians, they were outside the jurisdiction of the Native Courts of Buganda until 1940.[40] For the remainder of the colonial period they were able to avoid local courts on an informal basis. Their continuing special status in the army was of great importance. Barri Wanji notes:

> The British built an exclusive military school for Nubi children. In that school they were taught crafts such as carpentry, mechanics and other trades. After the completion of seven or eight classes, they went straight

[36] *Uganda Argus*, December 18, 1957, p. 4.

[37] *Uganda Argus*, December 28, 1957, p. 4. Mustapha Ramathan is himself an example of the Nubian network (discussed below) on which Amin relies heavily. A teacher at about the time the letter was written, he became the Ugandan Ambassador to the United States in September 1971; in October 1973 he was recalled to Uganda to become Minister of Cooperatives and Marketing.

[38] *Uganda Argus*, December 31, 1957, p. 2.

[39] Pain (fn. 30), 184.

[40] *Ibid.*, 183.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the army. The logical result of that policy was to create an elite corps of N.C.O.'s predominantly Nubi and Sudanese by origin.[41]

They created a network within the army: "For almost every Nubi man a brother, father or uncle must have at one time or another served in the army."[42] Amin was part of this Nubian network at least from the time he joined the Ugandan Army just after World War II.[43] He rose through the ranks until chosen by his British officers as one of the first two Africans to receive a commission. When the officer corps was Africanized following the mutiny in 1964, Amin was appointed second in command. He was the officer who commanded the army during the troubles of 1966.

Caught by surprise by the sudden appearance of soldiers at his home just after the attempted assassination of Obote in 1969, Amin fled to the Nubian settlement in Bombo before trying to find out what was happening. The coup d'état of 1971 occurred in large part because Milton Obote attempted to maneuver Amin out of the chain of field command, and perhaps into prison. Amin had assiduously built up his Nubian contacts in the army. As men with little education but a respected military heritage, these soldiers had been unable to rise beyond the noncommissioned ranks. Thus, Amin's political network within the army leapfrogged the more highly educated Sandhurst graduates in the higher ranks, to reach the less well-educated noncommissioned officers who were in closer contact with ordinary soldiers. Still, his coup d'état was only barely successful and produced the instability which in part accounts for the continuing violence in Uganda.[44]

[41] Wanji (fn. 30), 22.

[42] *Ibid.*, 8-9. Southall asserts that "the core tradition of the Uganda army is a Nubi tradition" (fn. 31), 89.

[43] Amin, like many Nubians, can choose between two accepted ethnic identities—in his case Kakwa as well as Nubian. The Kakwa, unlike the Nubians, have land and a traditional history on which to draw in constructing their ethnic identity. Amin's birthplace is often asserted to be in the Northwest corner of Uganda (or in Sudan), because large numbers of people objectively identifiable as Kakwa live there. But Ugandans who have known Amin for a long time maintain that he grew up in Bombo, which became the site of a large Nubian settlement because it was the headquarters of the King's African Rifles until 1939. Amin himself has said that he was born in the Police Barracks in Kampala, and, significantly, that his father had been a policeman. As explained below, these facts suggest that he had close early associations with Nubians—which are entirely consistent with his Kakwa ties.

[44] David Martin, *General Amin* (London: Faber and Faber 1974), 27-66, offers an excellent account of the coup d'état that includes details of Amin's reliance on Nubian noncommissioned officers in its execution.

The widespread assertion (accepted by Martin), that Anya-nya guerrillas fighting in the southern Sudan secessionist forces helped Amin to take over the government, is probably false. As it happened, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement was under heavy military pressure from Sudan's national army at this time, and the site of the SSLM's headquarters was taken in battle by Khartoum forces on the same day as the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since the coup d'état, Amin has increasingly come to rely on Nubians in the army and civil service and has made opportunities in the private sector available to them far out of proportion to their numbers. By expelling the Asians in 1972, Amin made possible the rapid creation of an entirely new indigenous commercial class. The implications were not lost on Ugandans. Those with greater wealth and education may have anticipated receiving the juiciest plums. But because Nubian traders had relatives in the army, they were brutally effective in preventing richer Baganda businessmen (many of whom withdrew their applications for new businesses without explanation) from acquiring predominance in large-scale trade. However, the actual proportion of Nubians acquiring (and keeping) control of businesses is not known at present.[45]

These economic rewards are the consequence of the political importance Amin places on Nubian ethnicity, so intimately associated with his own survival. The economic advantages of Nubian status in contemporary Uganda suggest the danger of relying solely on a class explanation for military participation there. Ali Mazrui, for example, imaginatively borrows from Marx to create the notion of a *lumpen militariat* to describe the response to opportunities for wealth suddenly available to uneducated soldiers who leapt directly from village life to ruling positions.[46] But the notion underplays the importance of ethnic designation in determining *which* soldiers are powerful and likely to gain control of businesses, and which are likely to remain as disadvantaged as ever.

Even more fascinating in the context of the concept of ethnicity has been the open ethnic boundary maintained by the Nubians for the past 100 years. Formed into an ethnic category by a distinctive life of banditry and military operations far different from the culture of their home villages, the first Nubians followed a pattern of establishing new social identities that is morphologically identical to contemporary explantations of urban ethnicity—even though few of these forerunners ever set foot in a town.

Ugandan coup d'état. After March 1972, when the civil war in Sudan ended, 6,000 members of the SSLM (Anya-nya guerrillas) were admitted into the Sudanese national army as one of the terms of settlement. Far more than this number presented themselves for potential induction; most of the excess were attracted by the job opportunity and had not been part of the guerrilla forces during the past decade. It is entirely plausible that some of those rejected *then* found their way across the border and were recruited into the Ugandan Army.

[45] Data on the social composition of those to whom abandoned Asian businesses were allocated have been collected by Horace Campbell and E. A. Brett.

[46] Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications 1975), 127-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One of the enduring results of the original Nubian pattern of socialization has been the ease with which an individual can cross ethnic boundaries and become a Nubian. The basic requirements are ability to speak the Nubi language (pidgin Arabic), adoption of Islam, and acceptance of certain typical dress and social customs. Since military service is regarded as the most prestigious occupation a Nubian can undertake, joining the army can cement one's perceived identity. Thus, certain southern Sudanese can come to Uganda and quickly become Nubians.[47]

Though Nubians have been marginal in the Ugandan system of stratification for the past seventy years, their involvement in trade and the army has been attractive to others without any power or wealth. Thus, other Ugandans have adopted a Nubian identity for many years. The possibility exists of becoming a Nubian intermittently—for example, when in town or in the barracks—while maintaining one's original ethnic identity in the village. Alternatively, a person may make a fuller commitment to a Nubian identity.[48] Amin was thus able to invite other Africans "to become members of the Nubian tribe," and to observe that "in Uganda there are Nubians who are Baganda, Basoga, Banyoro, Acholi, Langi, Batoro and Kakwa. In Kenya there are also Kikuyu, Kamba and Luo Nubians."[49] Support for Amin's statement can be found in the language survey conducted by Pain in Gulu. Consistent with the assumption that many have changed their ethnic status, Nubians knew more languages well than did respondents from any other ethnic unit.[50] In addition, theirs was the only ethnic category in which everyone knew more than one language.

The remarkable changes in the basis on which Uganda's political process now rests and the extraordinary (though probably temporary) reversal in the pattern of social stratification have created new political

[47] The general category of southern Sudanese in Uganda overlaps but is not identical with Nubian: the former includes many non-Muslims as well as persons not attracted to trade or the military.

[48] Whether insiders among the Nubians are making efforts to close the group's boundaries, particularly in light of their current good fortune, would be of great interest. Investigation might also indicate other cultural traits held by outsiders that facilitate (or prevent) their full assimilation into Nubian status. Wanji (fn. 30, 71-72) points out that many Nubian cultural traits are identical to those found in southern Sudan, and unlike those in East Africa.

[49] *Voice of Uganda*, April 23, 1973, p. 1. Wanji (fn. 30, 69-70) found that Nubians discourage marriages with those whom they objectively identify as Baganda—even if Muslims—though not with most other Bantu or Nilotic speakers.

[50] Pain (fn. 34), 19. Nubians also formed the only unit all of whose members could speak Swahili, which has always been the official language of the Ugandan Army. They did poorly, relative to other ethnic categories, in the number of respondents who could speak English well—a further indication of their low access to formal education.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

situations that are likely to have attracted many to adopt a Nubian identity for their own particular purposes. Given the present political and economic advantages in possessing Nubian status, and given Uganda's growing population of unskilled, semi-educated, and disaffected urban dwellers, it is quite probable that more than half of those claiming Nubian identity today grew up with the objective indicators of other ethnic units. Pain's metaphor of the chameleon is strikingly appropriate.

The Nubian case demonstrates the fluidity of ethnic identity and its responsiveness to changes in political situations. The potentially intense yet intermittent focus implied by these characteristics points to the importance of research into the subtle and dynamic interconnections between class and ethnic factors in political participation.

Reification of Ethnicity in Theories of Cultural Pluralism and Consociationalism

In terms of the concept of ethnicity articulated here, the use of ethnic groups in theories relating cultural pluralism and consociationalism to political stability or instability should be reconsidered, since the logic of these theories requires that ethnic groups be conceived as separate communities. These theories therefore cannot cope with ethnic groups that are fluid and intermittent in character. Imposing false concreteness on the boundaries of ethnic solidarity produces a generous measure of unreality.

The concepts of cultural pluralism and consociationalism were developed to explain political and social relations in societies presumed to be deeply divided. They begin from opposite starting points. Cultural pluralists assert that the institutions into which people are segmented are deeply and rigidly unequal so that political stability is ensured through domination.[51] Consociationalists argue that the leaders of institutions from each segment can form an elite cartel that makes political decisions satisfactory to members of all segments, so that political stability is ensured through accommodation.[52] There is not necessarily a contradiction here, since cultural pluralists have focused primarily on authoritarian societies containing highly stratified racial or cultural groups such as colonies in Asia and Africa and countries like South Africa, while the consociationalists have directed their attention to European democracies which exhibit pronounced cleavages.

[51] For a recent statement, see the essays in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

[52] See the useful collection of articles in Kenneth D. McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Carleton Library 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The danger in relying upon the notion of ethnicity developed to support the concept of cultural pluralism is vividly illustrated by two sophisticated uses of aggregate data analysis based on information from 32 black African countries. Both test the proposition that an increase in cultural pluralism is positively correlated with greater political instability. In one case, a positive correlation was found; in the other, no correlation (with one limited exception) could be discerned.[53] Since both studies drew on the same data bank, the differences in the conclusions are somewhat distressing. The test variables are constructed somewhat differently, however, which may explain the variation in findings.

But, no statistical measure can do better than the concepts on which it is based. The data used to construct the concept of cultural pluralism in both studies were differences in cultural traits of groups identified in national censuses and in the ethnographic literature. As a result, the authors of both articles include distortions caused by (1) colonial governmental definitions of ethnic units for census purposes, and (2) idealized accounts by social anthropologists attempting to reconstruct a precolonial description of cultural practices "purified" of colonial influence. In addition, these two analyses based on cultural pluralism assume that in all cases *traditional* cultural traits (which may never have been practiced by contemporary ethnic advocates) somehow "explain" participation in *current* violence or coups d'état. And the writers argue this despite the fact that they cite the literature dealing with the situational nature of ethnicity!

Consociational procedures, on the other hand, have been suggested as an appropriate instrument of government in ethnically divided societies. Arend Lijphart, for example, speaks of separate "subcultures" and makes references to Lebanon, Cyprus, and Nigeria (when those countries were under parliamentary rule).[54] The notion of subculture remains an unexplored concept for Lijphart except where he finds it necessary to elaborate it to develop his theory. To support consociation-

[53] The positive correlation is argued in D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, "Cultural Pluralism, Modernization, and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis of Sources of Instability in African Nations," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, v (March 1972). The absence of correlation (with the exception of the relationship of "ethnic pluralism" and instability when controlling for the category of "civil servants/wage earners") is asserted in Walter L. Barrows, "Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability in Black Africa," *Comparative Political Studies*, IX (July 1976). Indeed, Barrows (pp. 161-62) concludes from the lack of statistical association that researchers ought to examine other variables instead of ethnicity in studying instability.

[54] Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae (fn. 52), 70-89. For one appeal in support of extending this particular approach to ethnically divided societies, see Young (fn. 13), 527-28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alism, subcultures must have distinct boundaries on the basis of which the political cleavages of the society rest; they must also possess a high degree of political cohesion, permitting their leaders to strike compromises with each other without losing their status within the subculture.[55]

Although Lijphart's model was constructed as an alternative to pure majoritarian rule in a typology of *democratic* governments, the concept —in principle—might be used to explain national decision making where democratic institutions are absent.[56] Thus, consociationalism has been taken up with enthusiasm in certain heterogeneous societies in which governments have insisted upon separation of ethnic communities as a matter of policy. In South Africa, for example, a radio commentator recently went so far as to cite Lijphart in support of the principle that it was more important to guard the rights of different communities than to preserve majority rule in order to protect what he called "democratic rights."[57] But the South African notion of separate development, or *apartheid*, is strictly based on the *government*'s definitions of ethnic units and their appropriate boundaries. In view of the immense inequalities that have been legitimated on this basis, this use of the term consociationalism amounts to nothing more than a fashionable façade to hide white domination.

Brian Barry presents a more general argument against the extension of consociationalism to ethnic cleavage; but it is based on the inadequate assumption that ethnic groups are continuous political units.[58] He argues that ethnicity, unlike other cleavages, is not manageable through bargaining by group representatives. In his view, "gross inhumanity" is more likely to occur in ethnic conflicts than in disagreements based on other cleavages. Organizations, and therefore leaders, have less relevance for ethnic groups than they have for religious or class conflict. Ethnic definitions of issues permit greater clarity of goals sought, and

[55] Lijphart (fn. 54), 82-84.

[56] Cf. Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics*, XXXI (April 1979), 334.

[57] "South Africa's Answer to the World," Johannesburg Radio broadcast, October 5, 1977, British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 4B, ME/5634/B/1-2, October 7, 1977. In an extremely interesting paper, "Consociational Authoritarianism: Incentives and Hindrances toward Power Sharing and Devolution in South Africa and Namibia," John Seiler reviews efforts by Afrikaner intellectuals to make use of consociationalism. American Political Science Association Conference, Washington, D.C., September 1977, pp. 21-22.

Lijphart left himself open to this sort of interpretation by referring approvingly to "a kind of voluntary *apartheid* policy as the best solution for a divided society," in his argument that separation of subcultures may reduce conflict (fn. 54), 83.

[58] Barry, "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, V (October 1975), 502-3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thereby reduce the ability of leaders to bargain. Thus, ethnic leaders have a more difficult time agreeing to compromises in the elite cartels that consociationalism requires. Finally, ethnic issues often raise the question of secession, but class and religious issues do not.[59] Thus, Barry insists that ethnic cleavages are too intense for consociational arrangements. But he can succeed in this argument only by assuming (contrary to the analysis presented above) that ethnic groups are necessarily based on deeply held primordial values against which rational calculations are unavailing.

The most serious theoretical problem for most proponents of cultural pluralism and consociationalism is their insistence that ethnic categories be treated as self-contained communities. Any useful concept of ethnicity must embody the possibility that situations evoking ethnic identity may stabilize over a period of time and may give birth to reinforcing institutions. Long-term racial domination is a case in point. But racial attitudes may change, and ethnic identity may turn out to be too evanescent a basis to support political institutions that are separate and parallel, and also durable. The fact that polarization of ethnic identities may in some situations create civil strife does not necessarily mean that ethnic identities have stabilized. Political solutions which remove the factors that evoke ethnic identification may produce greater stability than those which explicitly build upon and reinforce such identification. One of the great mysteries of the post-civil war period in Nigeria is what has happened to Ibo ethnic solidarity. No one would argue that ethnicity is absent from Nigeria now, but the creation of 12 states in 1967, increased to 19 in 1976 (dividing into two the so-called heartland identified with the Ibos), has certainly reduced its political relevance.[60]

The central point of any situational analysis of ethnicity is that the range of possible degrees and duration of ethnic group coalescence should not be converted into a rigid assumption of presence or absence of a continuous subculture. If comparative analysis based on cultural pluralism, or the creation of consociational solutions for ethnic problems, must therefore be narrowly constricted or abandoned, that may be the price that must be paid in order to stay in touch with the complexities of social reality.

[59] Oddly, Barry insists (*ibid.*, 504) that political parties in Northern Ireland are ethnically (rather than religiously) based. In so arguing, he appears to plant the seeds of a tautology by implying that all cleavages too intense to be amenable to consociational solutions are ethnic.

[60] There is evidence that political disagreements produced demands among those objectively identified as Ibos that the 1975 panel considering the number of new states divide the old East Central state into *four* new ones. *Daily Times* (Lagos), June 27, 1977, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ADMINISTRATION OF INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries

By DENNIS A. RONDINELLI*

THE directions of development policy have shifted drastically over the past decade, from a predominant concern with promoting rapid growth in gross national product, through capital-intensive industrialization, export production, and construction of large-scale infrastructure, to ways of stimulating domestic markets, expanding economic participation, and reducing disparities in income and wealth. The new policies, less concerned with the rate of aggregate economic growth than with its composition and the distribution of its benefits, seek to increase agricultural productivity, expand employment opportunities, and meet basic human needs of the poorest groups in society.

Changes in government policy in developing countries resulted in part from the growing realization that post-World War II macroeconomic development strategies did little to reduce the dependence of these countries on industrialized nations, spread the benefits of growth, or improve the conditions of the majority of the poor. The new strategies also emerged from internal social and political pressures: from widespread recognition of the social injustices perpetuated by dual economies and from the realization by national leaders that political stability and national unity could not be achieved or maintained only by narrow support from a small, wealthy, urban elite. The success of experiments with more equitable growth policies in some communist and socialist societies created further pressure on governments with mixed economies to reduce the growing gaps in income and wealth; in some nations it encouraged insurgency movements to challenge incumbent political regimes. The new policies in no small measure reflect pressures for agrarian reform by international funding institutions, whose own strategies place increasing emphasis on reaching the "poor majority."

* An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Seminar Series on Land Management Issues in Developing Countries, sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 1978.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030389-28$01.40/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since the late 1960s, nearly all developing countries have embraced the new strategies in varying degrees, and some governments have established elaborate programs of implementation. Although goals and approaches of Third-World governments differ, their integrated rural development policies and those of international funding institutions are remarkably similar in their basic thrust. They attempt to coordinate a "package" of investments and services that will accomplish the following:

1. Increase agricultural output and productivity, thereby transforming rural regions from subsistence to commercial agricultural economies in order to meet the basic food needs and raise the incomes of the rural poor.

2. Stimulate agro-processing, agri-business, and related rural industries in order to diversify local economies, provide greater employment opportunities, and generate internal demand for domestically produced goods.

3. Increase access of the rural poor to the social services, facilities, technologies, and infrastructure needed to improve health, nutrition, literacy, and family planning—thereby increasing the productivity of individual workers, raising the overall standard of living in rural areas, and stemming the tide of rapid rural-to-urban migration. The intended beneficiaries are small-scale farmers, rural entrepreneurs, migrant workers, shifting cultivators, and landless laborers, as well as squatters and low-income workers on the fringes of the urban economy.

Although Third-World governments and international lending institutions have engaged in agrarian reform for more than a quarter of a century, integrated rural development is a new experiment in terms of its dominant place in development policy, the scope and variety of inputs that must be coordinated, and its administrative complexity. In adopting the new policy, however, few governments or assistance agencies seriously considered the political and administrative preconditions for successful implementation. Instead, most governments focused their attention on the technical components, either assuming the existence of adequate administrative capacity or relying on marginal adjustments in administrative structure and procedures after policies were initiated. But progress in strengthening indigenous capacity to mobilize and sustain political support, build decentralized administrative networks for implementation, and organize the rural poor to participate in productive activity has fallen far behind advances in agricultural research and technology development. Few countries have dealt seriously with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the underlying political forces that maintain poverty and inhibit agrarian reform. In Asia, for instance, Griffin found the causes of the Green Revolution's failure to improve the conditions of most small farmers "not so much in inadequate technology as in inappropriate institutions and poor policy. The explanation for the latter, in turn, lies not in the ignorance of those who govern but in the powerlessness of most of those who are governed."[1] Integrated rural development policies are replete with paradoxes; they pose serious dilemmas for developing nations and generate political tensions and conflicts that are at the heart of complex administrative problems.

Equitable growth policies, for instance, require strong national political support. Socialist regimes see them as a way of consolidating ideological commitment, and therefore provide a basis for economic redistribution and political reform; but in most mixed economies any meaningful dispersion of economic and political resources to rural groups is considered potentially subversive of central authority. It is equally paradoxical that the strong commitment by the central government which is needed to initiate rural development is not sufficient to ensure implementation or effectiveness. Most governments in developing countries have been unwilling or unable to create the decentralized institutional structure that seems essential to meet the needs of the rural poor. Unless control is decentralized, functions are devolved, and a strong institutional network is created within rural areas to deliver services and elicit participation, there is little hope of sustaining rural reform. But in almost every country pursuing rural development, central administrative control has been carefully protected and reluctantly dispersed.

Nearly all analyses of rural poverty and underdevelopment have concluded that well-designed, closely coordinated, multiple-policy interventions, sustained over long periods of time, are essential for stimulating equitable growth. Still, integrated rural development programs often depend for their success on those political and administrative resources that are least likely to be found in developing countries and least susceptible to rapid development. Indeed, the problems of rural poverty persist in most developing countries precisely because of the weakness of political commitment to change, and because administrative structure and coordinative capacity are inadequate for expanding participation in economic activity.

[1] Keith Griffin, *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1974), 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Emergence of Integrated Development Policies

Integrated rural development emerged as a focus of international assistance strategies in the late 1960s for a number of related reasons. One motivation for change undoubtedly was the growing realization by government leaders and development analysts that the "trickle-down" effects promised by conventional economic theory had not materialized in most of the developing world and could no longer be used as a basis for planning or as an excuse for governmental inaction. By the mid-1960s it had become clear that the emphasis on rapid macro-economic growth through capital-intensive industrialization had neither improved economic conditions in most developing nations nor reduced the growing disparities between rich and poor. Despite the growth of GNP in many countries over the past two decades, nearly half of the 187 nations surveyed by the World Bank in 1974 had a per capita GNP below $500 a year, only 19 reported levels above $5000.[2] The majority of countries with a per capita GNP below $300 during the 1960s also had an annual growth rate of less than 5 percent.[3] About 30 desperately poor countries with intransigent social and economic problems, and with a substantial portion of the world's population, had been totally bypassed by economic and social progress. Moreover, the distribution of income and wealth, even within growing economies, remains highly inequitable. In 35 of the 43 developing nations examined by Adelman and Morris, less than 20 percent of the population received 50 percent or more of total income, with concentrations among the upper fifth rising as high as 90 percent. In many countries, the poorest 40 percent of the population received less than 20 percent of income; in some, only 10 to 15 percent of income went to the poorest half of the population.[4]

The new directions in development policy were also shaped by the realization that gaps in income and wealth among nations and within them were growing rather than diminishing. Even countries with high levels of growth have large concentrations of poor that remain relatively untouched by, or entirely excluded from, the benefits of development. The World Bank estimates that nearly 85 percent, or more than 750 million, of the people in developing nations live in relative poverty, earning less than $150 a year, and that two-fifths survive in absolute

[2] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *World Bank Atlas 1976* (Washington: World Bank 1977).

[3] See Gerald M. Meier, "The Dimensions of Development: Indicators of International Poverty—A Note," in Meier, ed., *Leading Issues in Economic Development* (3rd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press 1976), 12-18.

[4] See Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1973), 152.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poverty on annual incomes of less than $50.[5] The U.S. Agency for International Development, using both social and economic measures, calculates that 800 million people live in poverty in the nations it assists.[6]

Not only did capital-intensive industrial investments in urban centers fail to produce the "trickle-down" benefits promised by economic planners but, as Myrdal expected, the "backwash effects" far exceeded the spread effects: in many countries the urban centers drained their rural hinterlands of resources, capital, and productive manpower.[7] Rural areas were left without the preconditions or resources needed to benefit from potential backward and forward linkages of urban industrialization. Areas with high concentrations of poverty provided little internal demand for domestically produced goods, and received inequitably small portions of national investments in infrastructure and services that would enable them to increase their agricultural output or attract private investment. Urban centers became modern enclaves, tied to industrialized nations by dependence on imports, exports, and capital and technical assistance, while their rural hinterlands remained isolated subsistence economies, unable to provide for even the basic human needs of a majority of their populations.[8]

Without sufficient economic, social, political, and human resources, moreover, leading sector, or "unbalanced," investment strategies cannot work in rural regions of developing nations. Entrepreneurs are not readily available, savings are low, capital is scarce and expensive. Without sufficient collateral for loans, small-scale businessmen and farmers are considered high-risk borrowers and rarely can obtain credit or investment capital. The infrastructure and the services necessary to operate profitable ventures either do not exist or are not reliable. Land tenure is uncertain for many small farmers; ownership is concentrated among wealthy elites who generally reinvest their profits in urban centers where returns are higher and risks are lower. Markets are often inaccessible to small producers, or the terms of trade are adverse. Government subsidies and services that help make private investment profitable in more developed areas are either not provided in rural regions, or access to them is highly restricted.

[5] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Rural Development Sector Policy Paper* (Washington: World Bank 1975).

[6] See *Implementation of the "New Directions" in Development Assistance*, report prepared by the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Committee Print 1975), 63-64.

[7] Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York: Harper 1957).

[8] See Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, *Urbanization and Rural Development: A Spatial Policy for Equitable Growth* (New York: Praeger 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Attempts to stimulate agricultural productivity through single-purpose government programs also yield poor results. Subsistence and small-scale farmers—especially those in the economically most depressed regions—simply will not increase agricultural production unless many or all of the conditions necessary to make low-risk profits are at hand. In order to increase output, the government must make simultaneous investments in services, facilities, technical inputs, and marketing in rural areas. The failure of agrarian reform in countries such as Sri Lanka, for instance, has been directly attributed to fragmented programs. "The segmentary approach has resulted in attention being paid to particular aspects of a problem to the neglect of others," one Sri Lankan analyst complains. For example, "new lands have been developed without provisions for irrigation; production of diversified crops has been stimulated without developing agro-based industries; mechanized cultivation has been promoted without ensuring adequate supplies of tractors."[9]

Adelman, Morris and Robinson, in a historical review of development policy, confirm this finding on a larger scale. They maintain that even quite extensive single-policy interventions do not have lasting effects on the rural poor. Transfer policies are somewhat more effective, but their impact is limited in most countries. They conclude that "only when a significant number of different interventions are applied simultaneously so that there is, in effect, a change in development strategy, are more sizable or lasting effects possible."[10] The benefits of single-purpose programs have usually gone to richer farmers or the middle class, only temporarily increasing the incomes of smaller farmers and largely bypassing landless laborers and shifting cultivators.

By the late 1960s, it became apparent that the only hope for achieving more socially equitable economic development would lie in increasing agricultural productivity and diversifying rural economies through integrated development programs. Under Mao, for instance, Chinese economic policy sought to balance sectoral and regional development. It focused on agricultural production as the basis for both small-scale rural and capital-intensive urban industrialization. Reduction of disparities in urban and rural wages and dispersal of infrastructure, technology, and services to the countryside were an integral part of the strategy. By establishing a "consumption floor"—a standard of living

[9] V. Kanesalingham, "The Impact of Government Policies and Programmes on Villages in Sri Lanka," in Asian Centre for Development Administration [hereafter cited as ACDA], *Approaches to Rural Development in Asia*, III (Kuala Lumpur: ACDA 1975), 145.

[10] Irma Adelman, Cynthia T. Morris and Sherman Robinson, "Policies for Equitable Growth," *World Development*, IV (July 1976), 561-82, at 575.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

below which no one was allowed to fall—China has been able to satisfy basic human needs, eliminate abject poverty, distribute income more equitably, and provide the organization for expanded participation in economic activity.[11]

Requirements for Integrated Rural Development

Equitable growth strategies were adopted by international assistance agencies and by governments in most developing countries without a clear understanding of the ways in which poverty might be alleviated and rural economies stimulated, and without the political and administrative commitment to make the drastic changes in economic structure which were needed to implement these policies. The U.S. Agency for International Development, perhaps more frank in admitting the limits of knowledge than most other assistance organizations, reports that "determining the precise application of general development approaches in specific cases remains, despite all our efforts and those of thousands of practitioners and scholars alike, a very murky, difficult, uncertain, complex and intractable business."[12] Few governments have had much experience with programs of the magnitude and complexity of integrated rural development, and fewer still seem intent on providing the economic and political resources required to make them effective. The ultimate beneficiaries, in many cases, have not been clearly identified; their characteristics, behavior patterns, institutional practices, and motivations are rarely understood by national planners and administrators. The drastically different conditions found among countries, and among rural regions within them, make prescription of universally applicable strategies nearly impossible.

At the same time, experience with single-purpose development programs and with larger-scale, more complex agrarian reforms, with land development and resettlement schemes, and with multi-purpose community development activities, points to specific elements essential to the success of integrated rural development.[13] Those elements include:

1. *Strong national political commitment.* Experience with rural development and agrarian reform indicates that they simply will not

[11] See Suzanne Paine, "Balanced Development: Maoist Concept and Chinese Practice," *World Development*, IV (April 1976), 277-305, and John G. Gurley, "Rural Development in China," in E. O. Edwards, ed., *Employment in Developing Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974), 383-403.

[12] *Implementation of the "New Directions" in Development Assistance* (fn. 6), 4.

[13] See Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, "Local Organization for Integrated Rural Development: Implementing Equity Policy in Developing Countries," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XLIII (January 1977), 20-30, and Rondinelli and Ruddle (fn. 8), chap. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

succeed without strong and sustained commitment by national political leaders to the goals of equitable economic growth. High-level political commitment is necessary for at least three reasons. First, it is required to articulate strategy in national policies, legislative declarations, national plans, and administrative orders. The history of rural development in Asia and Africa indicates that political initiatives, often by charismatic leaders and ideological movements, were prime forces in articulating the need for and setting the goals of rural development. In Tanzania, Pakistan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the People's Republic of China, widely varying yet equally forceful political commitments were needed to generate national policies for rural development.[14]

Political commitment is needed, in addition, to ensure high priority for rural development in resource-allocation decisions over a long period of time. A steady and reliable flow of budgetary resources is one of the most important inputs for rural development. Even in countries where agriculture is the sector of the economy that contributes the most to national production, and where the population is overwhelmingly rural, budgetary allocations for agriculture have often been low. In Ethiopia, for instance, less than 10 percent of the expenditures of the central government are for agriculture.[15] In Nicaragua, the agricultural sector's share of public funds declined during the 1960s, while overall governmental spending was increasing.[16] It is often assumed that financial support will be automatically provided by the national government once it commits itself to rural development, but agrarian reforms have regularly been beset with budgetary problems. Between 1965 and 1971, the Philippine Government released less than one-third of the amount authorized for agrarian reform and, since 1972, high rates of inflation have reduced the value of allocations to rural development.[17] In the Dominican Republic, an average of less than 70 percent of budget allocations was released to the Secretariat of Agriculture between 1966 and 1973, with over $40 million withheld during that period.[18]

Finally, political commitment is required to motivate groups and

[14] See David F. Roth, "Political Structure, Policy Adaption and Rural Change: The Cases of Thailand, Malaysia and the Peoples' Republic of China," and A. N. Seth, "Agrarian Changes in Asia," both in ACDA (fn. 9), II, 162-264, 266-316.

[15] Jacob Meerman, "Evaluation of the Agricultural Sector Loans Funded by USAID Ethiopia" (Washington: USAID 1973), mimeo.

[16] U.S. Agency for International Development, *Nicaragua–Rural Development Sector Loan, Capital Assistance Paper* AID-DLC/P-2091 (Washington: USAID 1975), Annex V-C.

[17] J. E. Rocamora and C. Conti-Panganiban, "Rural Development Strategies: The Philippines Case," in ACDA (fn. 9), II, 267-68.

[18] J. B. Robinson and J. M. Stone, *Agricultural Sector Assessment for the Dominican Republic* (Washington: USAID 1974), V-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations throughout society to reverse or eliminate centuries-old practices and behavior that have kept rural people in poverty. Observers of Tanzania's rural development have noted the intensity of political pressure needed to achieve reform: the unrelenting pressure by President Nyrere who "pushed, prodded, cajoled, persuaded and led the people" in order to reorganize the economic and political structure of that nation.[19] Such steadfast commitment is needed to achieve results even in centrally controlled societies. Thirty years of forceful leadership by Mao were required to achieve more equitable development in China, in the face of political opposition from national and provincial leaders and powerful landowners before the revolution, and in order to overcome conflict among party officials over appropriate means of establishing a communist society after the revolution.[20] In India, without the political commitment to break the barriers raised by entrenched interests, national and local elites were able to distort and redirect rural reform programs to their own advantage, successfully "insulating the poor from the benefits of development."[21]

2. *Pervasive administrative support.* It cannot simply be assumed that national officials and lower-level administrators will support programs of rural development even after they have been enacted. Indeed, it has often been the national administrative agencies that have blocked or delayed reforms. High-level officials may themselves be large landowners, and technical personnel within rural development agencies may be subjected to the influence of or to threats by landholding elites.[22] Without pervasive administrative support or the mobilization of sufficient political power among rural beneficiaries to maintain steady pressure on ministries of the national government, reform will slowly dissipate.

Integrated rural development, in addition, requires strong central coordination. Evaluations of rural development programs in Africa note that their "multiple, and at times, conflicting objectives have rendered overall rural development strategy inconsistent and even self-defeating."[23] In the Philippines, for instance, programs to improve land

[19] Richard N. Blue and James H. Weaver, "A Critical Assessment of the Tanzanian Model of Development," *Agricultural Development Council Reprint,* No. 30 (July 1977), 18.

[20] See Gurley (fn. 11), 385-89.

[21] Kuldeep Mathur, "Administrative Institutions, Political Capacity and India's Strategy for Rural Development," in ACDA (fn. 9), III, 1-62, at 52.

[22] Judith Tendler, "What Happens in an Agrarian Reform," *Inter-country Evaluation of Small Farmer Organizations: Honduras* (Washington: USAID 1976), mimeo.

[23] Uma Lele, *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1975), 142.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tenure, develop agriculture and physical infrastructure, strengthen marketing and cooperative institutions, and deliver credit to farmers must be coordinated among the following: the Departments of Agrarian Reform, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Local Government and Community Development, and Public Works; the Bureaus of Lands, Public Schools, and Agriculture Economics; extension programs in at least three different agencies; and more than a half-dozen government or semi-independent financial institutions. Even under a martial-law government, the agencies often are at odds with each other on administrative and budgetary matters, and rarely integrate their activities within rural areas. Coordinating committees have been established to coordinate the coordinators.[24] Israel's experience with integrated agricultural development—one of the more successful models—reveals that coordination can only be achieved when planning is closely related to budgeting and programming. "Planning and implementation must be closely interwoven," Israeli analysts note, "with the plan continuously modified to fit real conditions. The institutional framework must be such that this dynamic interaction can proceed smoothly."[25]

3. *Complementary domestic and foreign trade policies.* The International Labor Organization's analysis of development problems in Kenya, Colombia, Liberia, Sudan, the Philippines, and Ethiopia, all indicate that successful rural development depends heavily on national policies that seek to expand participation in economic activity.[26] Domestic economic policies and foreign trade strategies must be clearly and deliberately formulated to reinforce rural development. Generally included in such policies are land reform measures that promote an equitable distribution of ownership, with opportunities for rural workers to acquire enough land to support their families and produce a surplus; investment incentives that will promote small- and medium-scale manufacturing as well as craft and cottage industries; noninflationary wage policies that encourage and protect labor-intensive industries while assuring adequate levels of income for individual workers; and ade-

[24] See Russell Cheetham and E. K. Hawkins, *The Philippines: Priorities and Prospects for Development* (Washington: World Bank 1976), chap. 13.

[25] Raanan Weitz and Avshalom Rokach, *Agricultural Development Planning and Implementation: An Israeli Case Study* (New York: Praeger 1968), 329.

[26] See United Nations, International Labor Organization (ILO), *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: ILO 1972); *Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colombia* (1970); *Total Involvement: A Strategy for Development in Liberia* (1972); *Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan* (1976); *Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth for the Philippines* (1974); *Employment and Unemployment in Ethiopia* (1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quate price supports for essential agricultural commodities so as to provide incentives for individual farmers to increase output, adapt improved practices, and experiment with new techniques without fear of catastrophic losses in income owing to drastic fluctuations in price. National programs for family planning, public works, and social services must be designed specifically to reach the rural poor. And a complex set of international trade policies, creating exchange rates, import and tariff regulations, and export practices favorable to rural production, must be established. Both domestic and foreign trade policies must be aimed at reducing a nation's reliance on external resources and at building a viable internal economy.

4. *Integrated package of technical inputs.* An effective combination of technical, organizational, and service inputs within rural areas is required to stimulate agricultural production. The technical components must be tailored to the needs and conditions found in rural regions. They usually consist of improved seed varieties, marketing assistance, credit, extension services, nonformal education, technical training, and rural savings mobilization. Schemes for land reform, improvement, and settlement are an integral part of many rural development projects; most countries emphasize the extension of farm-to-market roads, provision of utilities and rural electrification, dissemination of appropriate technology for rural industrialization and agricultural processing, as well as irrigation and flood control where they are required. Projects dealing with health and social services, family planning, and nutritional improvement are part of integrated rural development in some countries, as are technical assistance to local governments and promotion of agricultural research and experimentation in others.

5. *Investments in productive activities.* In mixed economies, the aim of governmental intervention is to stimulate private investment or to provide goods and services directly where private markets are weak or nonexistent. Nearly all countries pursuing integrated rural development also attempt to promote small-scale, labor-intensive industrialization—either on a communal basis in socialist societies, or through entrepreneurial development in mixed economies. Where such programs have been successful, small-scale industrialization has significantly stimulated resource mobilization, capital investment, and entrepreneurship. Smaller industries are usually the primary, and sometimes the only, means through which rural people, serving as apprentices, can obtain specialized skills and vocational training. Smaller industries are also considered important generators of off-farm employment opportunities. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan, which strongly supported such entrepreneurial efforts during its period of development, small- and medium-size firms now account for more than 90 percent of all manufacturing establishments, employing almost 70 percent of the nation's nonagricultural industrial workers. Small industries provide a greater quantity and diversity of goods in smaller cities, towns, and villages in rural areas, at prices within the reach of lower income groups, and in India, Korea, and Japan they also contribute to production for export. Where they have been successful, small-scale industries usually require lower investment costs per job, use labor more intensively, have lower capital requirements, and make use of more local resources and materials than large industries would.[27]

Even in communist countries, where private enterprise is not officially encouraged, a good deal of small-scale private activity is tolerated. Privately controlled family enterprises carried on within Chinese communes through "sideline production"—farming on private plots, raising animals, fishing, handicrafts, selling firewood, and so forth—provide rural families with an important part of their annual incomes.[28]

6. *Local political support and administrative capacity*. The success of integrated rural development depends heavily on the creation of a strong network of local institutions to support and implement projects and programs. Evaluations of rural development in China, India, and Pakistan indicate that local governments can mobilize political support and induce popular participation by extending institutional procedures for local involvement in planning and decision making; strengthening communications between rural areas and urban centers, and with higher levels of government; expanding opportunities for local leadership; and supporting politically responsible and socially conscious bureaucracies in rural areas.[29] But in few developing nations do local governments perform these functions effectively. Social and economic transformation requires that the local government's capacity to plan for and manage public facilities and to deliver basic social services be strengthened. It must be able to raise revenue; plan, budget, and imple-

[27] See Rondinelli, "The Importance of Project Management in Asian Development: An Integrated Framework for Planning and Implementation," paper prepared for delivery at Project Management Seminar, Manila, 1977; processed by Asian Productivity Organization, Tokyo.

[28] Benedict Stavis, *People's Communes and Rural Development in China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Center for International Studies 1974), 54-55.

[29] G. S. Cheema, "Rural Local Government and Rural Development in China, India and Pakistan," in ACDA (fn. 9), I, 149-50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment programs; and maintain facilities and equipment. Local political leaders must be committed to the goals of rural transformation, and the adverse influences of those elites who oppose the expansion of participation in economic activity must be countered or neutralized.

In addition, either through regional decentralization or local devolution, organizational capacity must be expanded within rural areas to plan and manage individual projects. Innovative attempts at integrated rural development in East Africa clearly show that success depends on the assignment of projects to strong, well-staffed organizations, with sufficient resources to coordinate and integrate a variety of technical and administrative inputs within the project area. Lele describes projects in Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi that required effective procedures for programming, monitoring, and control, and for mobilizing the support and participation of beneficiaries.[30] But since such projects are, by their very nature, temporary and narrowly focused, they depend on and should contribute to the administrative capacity of public and private institutions in rural areas.[31]

7. *International financial and technical assistance.* Finally, appropriate forms of international funding and technical aid are also needed in many countries to supplement and reinforce the government's efforts to assist the rural poor. Although international agencies have been a primary source of pressure for adopting integrated rural development, their lending policies often fail to reinforce governmental programs. Because of the tendency of aid agencies to support large-scale, capital-intensive projects; their lack of concern, in appraising projects, for income distribution and social impact; and their unwillingness to take risks in making loans, national governments often have little flexibility for experimentation. In some countries, block grants, continuous financing, and general budgetary support may be more appropriate for agrarian reform than project-funded assistance. Most importantly, aid should be used to build administrative capacity and technical expertise within developing countries to identify, design, appraise, finance, implement, and evaluate their own projects rather than to create greater dependence on foreign consultants and experts. Increased use of sectoral, block-grant, and untied concessional lending might greatly encourage developing nations to be more innovative and responsive.

[30] Lele (fn. 23), chap. VIII.

[31] See, for instance, experiences with Kenya's Special Rural Development Program: Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, "An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme," Occasional Paper No. 8 (Nairobi: Kenya: IDS 1972), mimeo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Administrative Implications of Integrated Rural Development

Ultimately, the success of integrated rural development depends on the ability of governments and international assistance agencies to solve three sets of problems that create serious tensions, if not outright conflicts, in most developing societies. They are the paradox of power, problems of national administrative structure, and strategies for delivery of local services.

THE PARADOX OF POWER: CENTRAL POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND DIFFUSE POLITICAL SUPPORT

A paradox inherent in agrarian reforms is that, although strong central political commitment is unquestionably necessary to initiate them, they cannot be effectively implemented or sustained without diffused political support and widespread participation by the intended beneficiaries. But those whose political commitment is necessary to initiate the reforms often consider such a diffusion of participation and power as a serious threat. Rural development programs that reallocate economic resources, increase income, and expand participation in the economy also create new and potentially more powerful interest groups that can make claims on and challenge central authority. Indeed, the creation of countervailing power is often a *precondition* for sustaining rural development in market economies. The success of agrarian reform in India's Punjab during the late 1960s, for instance, not only tended to equalize political power between peasants and former landowners, but also provided a new and more powerful political base that allowed a unified state government, committed to development, to bargain with the central government from a position of strength. It succeeded in obtaining financial and technical resources for agriculture, as well as highly favorable grain prices.[32] Rural development may not only intensify conflicts between peasants and elites, but also generate new cleavages among various beneficiaries of reform. In Tanzania, for instance, the government's attempts to assist landless peasants and poor farm workers are often opposed by small-scale commercial farmers and landholding peasants who fear loss or diminution of government benefits, and who join with some technical personnel in national ministries to oppose further expansion of *ujaama* villages or collectivization projects.[33] In many countries, the fear of loss of power and control inhibits

[32] See A. Hague, N. Mehta, A. Rahman, and P. Wignaraja, *Towards A Theory of Rural Development* (Bangkok: U.N. Asian Development Institute 1975), 20.

[33] G. K. Helleiner, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tanzania," *Journal of Development Studies*, VIII (No. 2, 1972), 183-204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

central authorities from creating the political organization necessary for successful rural development.

The history of agrarian reform clearly shows that, in order to mobilize widespread political support for rural development, two tasks must be successfully carried out: first, the hold of clientelist politics in rural areas must be broken; and second, it must be replaced with organizations or coalitions strong enough to represent the interests of rural people when decisions on development are made.

1. *Breaking the hold of clientelist politics.* Little can be done to reorder the economic structure in areas where peasants are dependent on wealthy landowners or elites for their livelihood and survival, and where such dependence manifests itself in the patrons' domination of local and national politics through personalism, favoritism, and the manipulation and control of large peasant voting blocs.[34] In places where rural people depend on patrons to purchase their labor and products, provide shelter, offer credit, loans, and aid in emergencies or crises, and assist in paying for marriages and funerals, those government programs that threaten to weaken or destroy the patron-client relationship will receive no sympathy from the elite and little support from the peasants. In many rural areas, the patron-client relationship provides whatever small amount of security the peasants can expect in an uncertain and precarious life. Rural development programs will have little impact unless they are accompanied by massive political reorganization, and unless the government can displace the functions performed by patrons by providing demonstrably better, more reliable services, with little risk for the peasant.

2. *Creating an organizational base of political support and local participation.* The difference between more effective and less effective rural development has been the willingness and ability of the government to assist in creating an organizational framework for the mobilization of leadership, sharing of power and decision making, and expansion of economic participation. Gurley notes that communist land reform in China during the late 1950s not only redistributed the productive assets by which the peasantry could economically sustain itself, but also—and perhaps more importantly—organized rural people to break the hold of the landlord-gentry class:

[34] See J. D. Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (June 1970), 411-25, and J. C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (March 1972), 91-113.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The Chinese land reform did not *give* land to the poor peasants. It encouraged them to organize themselves to *take* it, and in the process to crush their former oppressors. This was the prerequisite for later social development in the countryside, for, without it, the old class structure and wealth ownership patterns would have been regenerated by the persistence of old attitudes and of institutions favorable to the rich.[35]

Similarly, in Taiwan and Japan the success of agrarian reform depended on first breaking the control of wealthy landowners and then substituting strong local government and a network of farmers' associations, irrigation associations, land reform committees, and cooperatives that allowed participation by rural people and provided a channel of communication and influence. In both China and Taiwan, as well as in Tanzania and under other one-party political regimes, a strong, integrated, and responsive party system extending down to the village level has been a necessary adjunct to government agencies in mobilizing political support, eliciting participation, generating leadership, and ensuring administrative compliance with rural development policies. Countries without either a strong party structure or effective local organizations have made little headway in rural reform.

Perhaps the most carefully planned dispersion of political power and mobilization of support has been in China, where more than two decades of experimentation were necessary to create workable arrangements. The Chinese system, as Stavis notes, is based on two principles of political organization—inclusiveness and integration. Each level of government and all levels of the communist party are involved in development, and all are mutually dependent:

> The result is a very complex situation in which power is decentralized to different levels with regard to different policies. Moreover, the distribution of power changes from time to time. Always, no matter where power is focused, no level of administration is autonomous, and each level will interact with and respond to demands from the other levels.[36]

In China, Vietnam, and a few other communist countries, rural development depends heavily on the use of political cadres to mobilize and control the participation of the rural poor. Cadres are carefully chosen young volunteers, often high school or college students of peasant stock, who are intensively indoctrinated, and are highly motivated to suffer the deprivations and hardships of working and living in the poorest rural areas for long periods of time.[37]

[35] Gurley (fn. 11), 389; emphasis in original.
[36] Stavis (fn. 28), 53.
[37] Antonio J. Ledesma, "Land Reform Programs in East and Southwest Asia: A Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In nearly all countries, the tensions and conflicts over control and distribution of political power are an underlying factor in the planning and administration of rural development. The tensions between the desire to maintain central control and the need to diffuse support and elicit participation are evident in all societies attempting to cope with rural poverty. China's ambivalence toward decentralization, and the recurring shifts during Mao's regime between delegation of authority and recentralization, resulted from fear of the growing power of provincial leaders during periods of decentralization and from their pursuit of regional self-sufficiency in economic development—sometimes in conflict with national plans and policies. In the 1960s, when decentralization threatened to give provincial leaders the power to challenge national policies, communist party leaders pressured Mao to recentralize because "it became more difficult for the central leadership to elicit compliance from the provinces." As Parris Chang points out, "the center [had] increasingly found itself compelled to use negotiations, bargaining, cajoling and manipulation in dealing with province authorities." Central control was re-exerted because, on a number of occasions during the 1960s, "the provincial leaders appear to have exercised an effective veto power over policy decisions made in Peking."[38]

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Within developing nations, rural development policies also create a set of administrative problems that are related to, or indistinguishable from, conflicts over the distribution of power. In addition to the strong and pervasive administrative support that is needed to initiate and sustain rural reform, a highly dispersed structure of participation, coordination, supervision, and management is essential for successful implementation. Agrarian reforms controlled exclusively from the center often become bogged down in national political conflicts, interagency rivalries, serious disagreements between national and local interests, and the inefficiencies of large-scale bureaucracy. Moreover, conventional principles of administration—especially Western, and particularly American, standards of management—that are adopted by developing countries or imposed on them by international assistance agencies are usually inappropriate for organizing integrated rural development. Short-range inefficiencies and seemingly irrational arrangements must

parative Approach," University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, Research Paper No. 69 (Madison 1976), mimeo.

[38] Chang, "Centralization vs. Decentralization in the Chinese Political System, 1949–1971," *Asian Forum*, IV (1972), 14-36, at 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

often be accepted as the price of social reorganization. Relationships among efficiency, redundancy, and the role of central coordination must be seriously re-examined in the light of the low levels of administrative capacity in much of the developing world.

1. *Central control and decentralized implementation.* Although rural development programs need central guidance and support, their implementation must be localized to meet the needs of subsistence and small-scale farmers, either by decentralization through field organizations, or by devolution of functions to local institutions. Evaluations of rural development suggest that devolution has generally been more effective in reaching the intended beneficiaries. In his review of land reform in 25 countries, Montgomery concludes that devolution of administrative functions to local, non-career officials "produced significantly better results for peasant welfare than arrangements using professional administrators, whether in a centralized or decentralized administrative system."[39] Nelson's study of 24 land development and colonization projects in 9 Latin American countries seems to reinforce Montgomery's conclusions. Nelson finds no projects with "dynamic performance" among those undertaken by the national government: all economically viable projects were spontaneous colonizations, private efforts, or publicly supported but privately executed ventures. On the other hand, Nelson contends that "practically all recorded failures have been state-directed projects. The inadequate technical and administrative capacity of government agencies has been evident in all phases of the process. . . ."[40]

The inability of national ministries to control rural development from the center or to coordinate their efforts in the field has contributed to the failure of Nepal's agrarian reforms. One Nepali's assessment voices a familiar refrain of evaluations in many other countries:

> . . . the field offices of relevant agencies could not work together as a team and in the spirit of cooperation. It is evident that there were many instances where critical inputs, especially credit, were not provided in time and in sufficient amounts. Since credit was extended through activities of various agencies, coordination among these agencies was vital for effective implementation of the program. Due to the long processing

[39] John D. Montgomery, "Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Process and Outputs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XVII (March 1972), 62-75, at 62.

[40] Michael Nelson, *The Development of Tropical Lands: Policy Issues in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1973), 267.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

needed and because of inadequate coordination, private moneylenders continued to dominate.[41]

In most countries of Asia and Africa that made an attempt at decentralization, poor motivation, high turnover, inadequate equipment and funds, poor communication between headquarters and the field, and shortages of trained manpower have limited its effectiveness.[42]

The record of devolution is also mixed, but there are some clear examples of success. To the extent that communes were given responsibility for a wide variety of local decisions in China, devolvement seems to have created motivation and interest on the part of local leaders; it allowed national programs to be tailored to the needs of villages, and gave rural people more control over selecting and implementing small-scale social service projects and programs. Taiwan and Japan both successfully implemented agrarian reform through a network of local institutions.[43] Montgomery observes of land reforms in 10 Asian and Latin American countries that devolvement seems to have worked better because it allowed easier access to knowledge, better communications among various levels of organization, and increased community solidarity and support.[44]

Other countries have also attempted to decentralize or devolve functions to the regional level. Regionalization can have a number of advantages: it often allows rural programs to be designed to exploit unique resources and opportunities, provides convenient units of analysis for disaggregating national plans, extends greater opportunities to develop local leadership, and permits the testing of experimental or pilot projects. Regions with well-defined geographical boundaries facilitate the monitoring, supervision, and evaluation of national programs and the coherent integration of sectoral investments.[45]

But serious obstacles to decentralization and devolution have appeared in most developing countries. Few governments have been willing to establish regional development authorities or administrative units with sufficient autonomy and resources to carry out their tasks,

[41] Kiran Nath Pyakurayal, "Paddy Production Program in the Third Plan (1967–1970): A Nepalese Experience," in G. U. Iglesias, ed., *Implementation: The Problem of Achieving Results* (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration 1976), 35-61, at 57.

[42] See Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, "Political Commitment and Administrative Support: Preconditions for Growth with Equity Policy," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, XVII (January 1978), 43-60.

[43] Theodore Reynolds Smith, *East Asian Agrarian Reform: Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines* (Hartford, Conn.: John C. Lincoln Institute 1974).

[44] Montgomery (fn. 39), 73.

[45] Rondinelli and Ruddle (fn. 8), chap. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or with sufficient power to coordinate the work of different ministries operating within their jurisdictions. The fear of loss of central control and the threat of political fragmentation and rivalry block decentralization. In most countries, moreover, devolution is inhibited by the weakness of local governments, their lack of independent sources of revenue, their dependence on the central ministries for trained manpower and expertise, and their subservience to local elites unsympathetic to the cause of small-scale farmers. Experience in India suggests that even when functions were delegated, diffidence on the part of local leaders in exercising authority and in making legitimate claims allowed higher-level officials to maintain control.[46] In other cases, local elites managed to maintain their domination because of political conflicts at the local level and squabbles among contending factions over government allocations.[47] Studies of local government in Central Africa and Southwest Asia, moreover, found that the attitudes and behavior of traditional tribal leaders or village elders were often obstacles to effective participation in government development programs: feelings of helplessness concerning their ability to solve local problems through deliberate action, acceptance of "fate" rather than belief in their ability to control their environment, and disinterest in problems beyond their immediate concern or the boundaries of their villages. In addition, the deep mutual distrust between rural people and government officials often makes decentralization and devolution difficult.[48]

2. *Efficiency, redundancy, and effectiveness.* National governments and international agencies have paid relatively little attention to alternative ways of organizing for rural development. The funding agencies have either left governments to their own devices or insisted on administrative arrangements that conform to Western management practices. But the application of Western administrative principles—emphasizing economic efficiency, technical rationality, avoidance of "overlap" and "duplication," and central coordination—may seriously inhibit innovation and be inappropriate for serving the rural poor.

Programs that depend on cooperation among government agencies are vulnerable in any country, but in much of the Third World they are

[46] See R. Hooja, "The District as a Planning Unit: Style and Locus," and N. R. Inamdar, "District Planning in Maharashtra," both in *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XIX (July-September 1974), 393-406, 320-27.

[47] See J. M. Cohen, "Rural Change in Ethiopia: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XXII (July 1974), 580-614.

[48] African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development, "Regional Conference on Management of Rural and Urban Development in Africa," *African Administrative Studies*, IX (January 1973), 33-41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simply doomed to failure. The creation of rural development programs that require large numbers of inputs from different ministries and the coordination of their activities in rural areas imposes insuperable administrative burdens on governments in most developing nations. Formal mechanisms of coordination rarely work in traditional cultures. In much of Asia and Africa, interaction among various levels of the bureaucracy is often highly constrained: evaluation or "feedback" from subordinates is often construed by superiors as criticism, and is neither expected nor encouraged in bureaucracies where hierarchies reflect and reinforce differences in social status. Time is valued differently in most developing nations than in the West: promptness is not necessarily considered a virtue; deadlines or schedules are met "in good time" rather than on time. The seeming rigidity of hierarchical organizational structures, however, may belie the lack of real control at the top and mask the informal processes of interaction through which tasks are actually performed. Corruption, favoritism, dependence on political authority outside the bureaucracy, and the inability to match skills with job needs, may all undermine the capacity of governmental organizations to coordinate.[49]

In her evaluation of agrarian reform projects in Latin America, Tendler found that those requiring a great deal of coordination were often quickly stymied, and that better results could frequently be obtained by assigning all rural development activities to a single organization with sufficient resources and personnel to perform its functions, even if it duplicated existing activities.[50] In making a choice of organizational structure in developing countries, the cost of redundancy and duplication must be traded off against increased probabilities of success in meeting the program's objectives. Some analysts argue, in fact, that the creation of redundancy, far from being inefficient and wasteful, is essential for increasing the reliability of service delivery. Caiden and Wildavsky contend that the ability of rich countries to obtain resources needed for production, and to deliver services, owes less to efficiency of management than to complex redundancy—that is, to a large number of organizations with an overabundance of resources and skills, which perform the same or similar functions; if one organization fails, others

[49] See Jon R. Moris, "The Transferability of Western Management Concepts and Programs: An East African Perspective," and Gabino A. Mendoza, "The Transferability of Western Management Concepts and Programs: An Asian Perspective," both in L. D. Stifel, J. S. Coleman, and J. E. Black, eds., *Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation 1977), 73-83 and 61-71, respectively.

[50] Tendler (fn. 22), 25-30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the institutional network fill the gap, thereby greatly increasing reliability and reducing uncertainty. "Arrangements in poor countries," they note, "lack the benefits of redundancy—the surplus, the reserve, the overlapping networks of skill and data—to cushion the reverberating effects of uncertainty."[51]

3. *Diffusion of administrative capacity*. Some governments and international assistance agencies, such as the World Bank, hedge against risk and avoid the weaknesses of central coordinating mechanisms by creating autonomous implementation units for each large-scale project. These institutions are usually outside of the formal structure of government, and are given all the resources needed to carry out their functions. To the extent that these autonomous units add to national organizational capability, are highly visible and therefore held responsible for achieving results, can obtain the resources and manpower needed to perform their functions, are able to work compatibly with other government agencies, and can focus their attention on specific objectives, they may have significant advantages over regular ministries in implementing rural development, even when they duplicate, or overlap with, existing agencies. They often have other advantages, such as the ability to offer higher salaries, better benefits, and sufficient amenities to attract the most competent personnel; in addition, they may have greater flexibility to innovate and make decisions expeditiously, and to act as training grounds for young administrators.[52]

Tendler suggests that a key factor in determining whether to establish an autonomous unit or to assign integrated rural development to existing ministries is the degree to which the latter are committed to reaching the rural poor. "The institution should be hand-picked for its commitment to small farmers rather than only for its ability to carry out a certain conventionally defined task."[53] If existing agencies are captured or influenced by elite or large-farmers' groups—as are many development banks and ministries of agriculture in the Third World—there is little hope that they can be reoriented toward serving the rural poor; they should therefore not be used to implement rural reform programs. In these cases, the creation of a new agency or the assignment of tasks among agencies in such a way that little coordination is required may be better alternatives.

Creation of large numbers of semi-independent development authori-

[51] Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries* (New York: Wiley 1974), 63.
[52] See Rondinelli and Ruddle (fn. 13), 22-24.
[53] Tendler (fn. 22), 33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties may also have serious disadvantages, of course, which must be weighed in the balance. Too often such authorities become powers unto themselves, and over time amass enough political influence to pursue their own interests—as did *Pertamina* in Indonesia—sometimes in conflict with national development policies. Or they may become so dependent on external financial and technical support—as did the Water and Power Development Authority in Bangladesh—that they respond more readily to international priorities and technical and professional standards than to the needs of their own clientele, and become involved in damaging conflicts with government ministries. A serious problem arises in countries with limited technical and managerial manpower, where autonomous implementation units compete with regular ministries for the same people and resources, draining existing agencies of their best talent. On the other hand, they may become dependent on expatriate personnel and not develop indigenous administrative capacity at all.

Thus, integrated rural development may create serious tensions and potential conflicts over the organization of national administrative structure. If rural reform is to be effective, those problems must be anticipated and resolved.

STRATEGIES FOR DELIVERY OF LOCAL SERVICES

Although creation of semi-autonomous institutions may effectively solve immediate administrative problems in developing nations, the ability to sustain rural development depends on a complex, integrated, and appropriate organizational network in rural areas. Thus, the third problem facing development planners is to establish or stimulate the growth of an effective institutional structure for delivering services and technology to the rural poor.

To a large extent, subsistence farmers and landless laborers are poor because they lack access to public and private institutions that have the resources needed to increase productivity and thereby raise incomes. In many rural regions, organizations that provide public and private services are missing altogether or are found only in traditional forms. The institutions that do exist may not serve the majority of the poorest people, and indeed may severely exploit them. Moreover, institutions in rural areas are rarely linked into a network or "hierarchy" of supporting institutions in such a way as to provide continuous, reliable, and efficient flows of services; others have low levels of administrative capacity to deal with the complex problems facing the rural poor. And new institutions introduced by government or international agencies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are frequently so incompatible with traditional practices, customs, and behavior that they not only fail to serve, but may further alienate rural people.[54]

Analysts attribute the failure of past attempts at integrated rural development to the absence, or weak linkage, of rural organizations. The design of future strategies, Ruttan argues, must be aimed at "a unique combination of technical and institutional change." Private markets are inaccessible or exploitive, and the public markets "through which political resources are brought to bear on institutional performance in rural areas are often more imperfect—more biased against rural people—than the credit and product markets."[55] Although the concept of *appropriate technology* is well established, relatively little attention has been given to its organizational dimensions or, more importantly, to the characteristics of *appropriate institutions* for delivering social services and technological improvements to rural areas.

Appropriate institutions for integrated rural development have a number of important characteristics:

First, like appropriate technology, they must be highly adaptable to the wide variety of problems and conditions found in rural areas. Beneficiaries are often quite heterogeneous; small farmers have needs different from those of shifting cultivators, and both have problems and characteristics that differ from those of landless laborers. Moreover, their patterns of settlement are usually so unalike that a delivery system designed to meet the needs of only one group will overlook others or serve them inadequately. Organizational solutions can no more be designed and universally prescribed for all rural areas than they can for all developing countries.

Second, rural institutions must be complementary and integrated. Services and technologies in support of rural development must be mutually reinforcing and interlocking in order to stimulate local economies. Credit delivered without the provision of technical assistance in improved agricultural methods, higher-yielding seed varieties, fertilizers, irrigation, and improved marketing, will, as noted earlier, have little impact on production and income in rural areas. Institutions must be linked both vertically and horizontally to provide a hierarchy of services and to increase the quality and reliability of delivery. In their study of

[54] For a detailed description, see Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle, "Appropriate Institutions for Rural Development: Organizing Services and Technology in Developing Countries," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, XXI (January 1977), in press.

[55] Vernon Ruttan, "Integrated Rural Development Programs: A Skeptical Perspective," *International Development Review*, XVIII (1975), 9-16, at 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

16 countries in Asia, Uphoff and Esman "found no case where only one institution was carrying the full responsibility for rural development or where *complementarities* among institutions were not as important as what the institutions themselves did."[56]

Third, appropriate institutions must be built on culturally accepted arrangements, practices, and behavior. Understanding the operation of traditional institutions that have served rural people for decades or centuries, and accepting their strengths, inadequacies, limitations, and potentials for transformation, is essential for modifying old arrangements and introducing new ones. The success of agrarian reform in Taiwan and Japan was largely attributable to the adaptation of traditional farmers' associations to new functions in land redistribution and community development. Even after the revolution on mainland China, Mao's planners were careful to adopt acceptable local arrangements as the basis of communal structure. The communal system, as Stavis points out, "did not emerge from an historical and social vacuum; it was not simply proclaimed according to a vision of society." On the contrary, the communes were "intimately related to centuries of economic and political history and to almost a decade of gradually expanding organs of economic cooperation, slowly increasing in size, complexity, responsibility and degree of socialization."[57]

Fourth, as the Chinese experience demonstrates, the institutional network must be designed to transform traditional practices and behavior into procedures more suitable for economic growth and equitable income distribution. Although they must be based on and compatible with rural custom and tradition, they must also be catalysts for change, transforming developmentally inadequate practices and behavior at a locally acceptable pace. Moreover, they must gradually displace those traditional institutions that are incapable of change, while remaining flexible enough themselves to adapt to changing conditions as development occurs.

Fifth, appropriate institutions must tailor arrangements for service delivery to the locational requirements of their rural clientele; in most cases, that means modifying the "central service point" locational bias of large-scale organizations. Rather than locating operational and distribution units at large cities, provincial capitals, or district towns—which are usually not very accessible to rural people—appropriate insti-

[56] Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, *Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Center for International Studies 1974), xi; emphasis in original.

[57] Stavis (fn. 28), 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tutions would deliver services to rural clients through mobile or widely dispersed delivery mechanisms. Rural people would be sought out at farmsteads, or services would be brought to marketplaces; officials would travel to the rural areas rather than requiring rural people to go to centrally located government offices. Taiwan, Korea, and to some extent the Philippines have been able to mobilize rural savings and provide financial services by extending banking functions through widely dispersed branch offices, the use of mobile and temporary facilities in villages on market days, and the creation of agricultural and fishing financing associations and credit cooperatives in rural areas.[58] The short-term costs of these arrangements undoubtedly are higher than they would be for service delivery at fixed points, but their impacts are more widespread and effective in reaching small-scale farmers and rural workers.

Finally, appropriate institutions for service delivery must be designed in conjunction with beneficiaries and open to local leadership and participation. Studies of small-farm rural development projects in Latin America and Africa show that participation by farmers can lead to ideas for more effectively designed projects—particularly those components dealing with agricultural production techniques. Local people can help to adapt components that have been tested and proven successful in other projects to local conditions, and they can test new technologies and organizational arrangements prior to introduction on a broader scale. Surveys of more than 80 development projects for small farmers found that the following factors contributed to increased local participation: (1) Geographical boundaries of the projects were well defined, and the client population easily identifiable. (2) The project staff held a series of meetings with local leaders and farmers, delegating to them control over or participation in specific decisions in the design of the project. (3) Farmers were involved jointly with project staff in testing technological packages and organizational arrangements to be used in the project. (4) Participants were generally homogeneous in terms of social group and economic class. (5) The project staff developed an effective process of communication with and among local participants. (6) Organizational arrangements were created to give farmers a voice in decisions concerning management of the project. (7) High priority was placed on the technical training of participants;

[58] See D. P. Villanueva, "A Survey of the Financial System and the Saving-Investment Process in Korea and the Philippines," *Finance and Development*, II (1971), 16-19, and B. Maithreyan, "Savings in a Developing Economy—Certain Suggestions for Reform and National Coordination," *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific*, XXVI (1975), 188-201.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many were used as paraprofessionals to teach technical skills to others. (8) Involvement was related initially to single-purpose activities, such as credit or crop promotion, and was broadened only after success with initial activities. (9) Systems of accountability were established to permit changes in leadership among local participants and to ensure that services were provided efficiently. (10) Opportunities were offered initially for participants to engage in income-generating activities.[59]

In short, efficient and effective delivery of services to the rural poor can rarely be attained through standardized locational criteria or by mechanisms designed by professional technicians and administrators. It depends on an intimate understanding of rural life, behavior, and motivation, which is unlikely to be brought to bear on the planning and implementation of integrated rural development programs without participation by the intended beneficiaries.

Conclusion

Ultimately, equitable growth is a matter of political will and effective organization. Technology is merely a means to an end; in most cases even sophisticated, proven technologies will be unable to stimulate growth or alleviate poverty if a developing nation cannot mobilize political commitment, break institutional barriers to economic participation, and structure administrative agencies in such a way as to serve rural beneficiaries.

Equitable growth requires expanding participation in economic activities. It involves drawing larger numbers of people into processes of production, exchange, and consumption, as well as mobilizing savings and investing them in directly productive activities and social services. It also means expanding the administrative capacity of public and private organizations, and increasing the access of individuals to resources and opportunities needed to meet basic human needs, raise productivity, and develop human potential. The solution of these societal problems depends, as Lindblom has so forcefully argued, on an understanding of the fundamental political and economic mechanisms of authority, exchange, and persuasion, through which governments and political groups committed to a policy of equitable growth must influence development decisions.[60]

In order to solve social problems, development planners and administrators must not only understand the characteristics of these mecha-

[59] Development Alternatives Inc., *Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects*, I (Washington: USAID 1975), 95-96.
[60] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nisms; they must also be able to combine them in new ways. Lindblom's observation on India applies to most developing countries: "India's difficulties in economic development are in part the consequences of her leaders' inability to understand that growth requires a growth mechanism: if not the market, which Indian policy cripples, then the authority of government, which India has never chosen to mobilize."[61] The success of integrated rural development policies depends not so much on the technical inputs that international agencies and Third-World governments have so strongly emphasized, as it does on the ability of governments to expand domestic markets and mobilize authority in order to increase participation in productive activities. Unless means can be found to resolve the paradox of power, solve the problems of national administrative structure, and create institutional networks of service delivery, neither integrated rural development nor any other policy of rural reform will have much impact on economic conditions in the developing world.

[61] *Ibid.*, 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FADING DIALECTIC OF WAR

By PETER R. MOODY, JR.

CARL von Clausewitz, as everyone must know, holds war to be a continuation of politics by other means.[1] This concept—that war is and properly should be an instrument of policy—has been generally repugnant to the liberal, and particularly to the American, temper. Since the Second World War, however, certain influential American theorists have argued that the Clausewitzian point of view provides a coherent guide to the making of rational national security policy.[2] The stress here is on Clausewitz's analysis of the limitations on violence: if war is an instrument of policy, then it is a means to an end, and must be used only to the extent that it is an appropriate means. Clausewitz is also associated with a seemingly contradictory point of view: he is the prophet, if not the apostle, of total war. His American admirers, when not dismissing Clausewitz's talk of total war as the product of a personality kink,[3] treat this element of his thought as part of a dialectical unity: war in itself, as such, is unlimited violence; but in the concrete, war is always undertaken to serve the aims of policy, and the conduct of war is thus subordinated to the larger considerations of policy.

I shall argue here that the apparent contradiction is in fact a real one —and not completely a dialectical one. Clausewitz does not identify two aspects of one phenomenon—war—but, rather, two separate phenomena: limited, political war, and total war. Clausewitz lived in an age of transition, when limited war was giving way to total war, and the difference in kind of the two phenomena is obvious only in retrospect. Today, at least in liberal societies, war is no longer an instrument of policy.

[1] Karl von Clausewitz, *War, Politics, and Power*, translated and edited with an introduction by Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1962). My citations of Clausewitz are taken from this useful and convenient compilation, one which emphasizes Clausewitz's analysis of the relationship between war and politics.

[2] For example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books 1964; originally published by Harvard University Press 1957); John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1965; originally published by Harvard University Press 1959), esp. chap. XIV; Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan 1973).

[3] Bernard Brodie, "On Clausewitz: A Passion for War," *World Politics*, xxv (January 1973), 288-308, at 302.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030417-17$00.85/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two sorts of criticism of Clausewitz will not be considered here. The first is the liberal moralism implicit in, say, the Kellogg-Briand pact, which implies that it is wicked to treat war as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz's answer to this argument would be that, if war is not an instrument of policy, then what is it—a sport? For Clausewitz, to say that war is an instrument of policy is to say that war is serious business, to be undertaken only for a reason: "No war is begun, or, at least, no war ought to be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war? The first is the final object; the other is the intermediate aim."[4] War is fought for a *reason*; what is to be attained *in* war is subordinate to and conditioned by what is attained *by* war. Actual decisions, perhaps, are never made in quite this cold a way, but that does not affect the normative question. The basic difference between Clausewitz and the moralistic liberal lies in their assumptions about how the world works. The liberal assumes that wars can be avoided, that they are not a necessary part of international intercourse. War, in his view, is not a continuation of policy, but a sign that policy has failed; and a commitment to use war as an instrument of policy is an automatic assumption of a posture of bad faith. Clausewitz, on the other hand, assumes that sooner or later war will come in any case; his problem is how to use war rationally.

The second kind of criticism that is not considered here is, in fact, very close to the one I shall use. One form of it is given by Senator Fulbright:

> There is no longer any validity in the Clausewitz doctrine of war as a "carrying out of policy by other means." Nuclear weapons have rendered it totally obsolete because the instrument of policy is now fully disproportionate to the end in view. Nuclear weapons have deprived force of its utility as an instrument of national policy. . . . So long as there is reason—not virtue, but simply reason—in the foreign policy of great nations, nuclear weapons are not so much an instrument as an inhibition of policy.[5]

There is obviously a great deal to this, but the statement does not go far enough. Nuclear weapons, together with other contemporary artifacts, may determine the military posture and policy a country takes, and to that extent the weapons cannot be said to be *instruments* of policy. Fulbright's point is rather different. In Clausewitzian terms he is saying that what can be achieved *by* war is negated by the means used *in* war:

[4] Clausewitz (fn. 1), 202.

[5] J. William Fulbright, "The Foundations of National Security," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *Great Issues of International Politics* (2d ed., Chicago: Aldine 1974), 255-65, at 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war no longer pays. But this does not show that Clausewitz is obsolete: it is precisely on Clausewitzian grounds that war is to be avoided. Even on this level, Fulbright's contention is dubious: it is hardly proven that the consequences of nuclear war would be disproportionate to *any* end it might serve (at the extreme, "better red than dead" may be perverse, but it is not self-evidently so; few ethical systems claim that life is always to be chosen over *any* other alternative); even if it is always irrational to fight nuclear war, it may not be irrational to *risk* nuclear war; and, most obviously, not all wars are nuclear wars, even in the nuclear age.

While not couched in openly moralistic terms, Fulbright's hostility to Clausewitz seems to derive from the same source as the usual liberal hostility to that thinker. Some Americans, including many of the more influential civilians associated with the study and implementation of national security doctrine since the onset of the cold war, have a higher opinion of Clausewitz—at least in part because his doctrine can be made to serve their ideological interest. Clausewitz is a subtle thinker, and thus subject to many different interpretations. His German admirers of the last century found in him a justification for the waging of total war by soldiers without hindrance from civilians; his American admirers find in him a defense of civilian supremacy and limited war.

Just as the old German view of Clausewitz is too simple, so is the current American one. Clausewitz certainly supports the unconditional supremacy of *policy* over "purely military" considerations (and even affects to find it difficult to understand what these last might be). "The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse."[6] Policy control, however, is not a literal synonym for civilian control. Clausewitz seems to feel that civilian control over the military is more a matter of empirical historical fact than a normative ideal,[7] and he even says that the true ideal would be that of the "statesman and the soldier . . . combined into one person"[8]—which could obviously mean either a military man determining the policy or a civilian determining the strategy. Lacking this, the "only one satisfactory course left" is to "make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet."[9] By commander-in-chief, Clausewitz clearly does not mean the king or president or prime minister or other top civilian chieftain, but rather the top soldier—that is, a person who might not ordinarily be part of the cabinet. If American

[6] Clausewitz (fn. 1), 259, 260.
[7] *Ibid.*, 262.
[8] *Ibid.*, 263.
[9] *Ibid.*, 263-64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

practice followed Clausewitz, the Secretary of Defense would be a career military officer on active duty. That is the practice in the Soviet Union, but not in the United States; nor is it what the civilian admirers of Clausewitz recommend.

This American simplification of Clausewitz no doubt has ideological roots; but the American appreciation of Clausewitz clearly is based on more than ideology alone. For a generation following the Second World War, the United States was, like it or not, the major—even the only—world power, unavoidably in confrontation with the second-ranking power. It was an unfamiliar condition for Americans. Meanwhile—given the presence of nuclear weapons in the international system—conflict, while unavoidable, had more than most times to be handled rationally. Clausewitz seemed to be a guide under these unfamiliar and dangerous conditions. The most brilliant exposition of American Clausewitzism, Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, argues for Clausewitz's view as an antidote to the typical American attitudes which deprive us of the *virtù* required of responsible citizens of a world power. Huntington accepts with Clausewitz the inevitability and normality of international conflict, as against the more typical American attitude that war is either a crime or a crusade. American liberal thought—which, for Huntington, is simply American thought—is hostile both to the perception of the military dimension of problems and to the military profession itself. Formerly, the weakness of America's neighbors, in conjunction with the British Navy, allowed us to indulge our antimilitaristic liberalism. That attitude changed with World War II and its consequences: "Previously the primary question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplemented by the more important issue: what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?"[10]

In its tone this statement rings of the 1950s, and it is, of course, an ideological statement. Also, as I hope to demonstrate below, its implications contradict the Clausewitzian doctrine, or at least show that doctrine itself to be contradictory when applied to the current situation. On the other hand, to assert that democracy or liberty must take priority over security (the survival of our political structure?) is also ideological; and it cannot be said that Huntington's position lacked objective foundation at the time, or has entirely lost its objective foundation now. The fact that his position of two decades ago was never really fashion-

[10] Huntington (fn. 2), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able and has become ever less so, perhaps demonstrates the validity of Huntington's analysis of the American style.

Huntington derives from Clausewitz the notion of military professionalism. The United States should expect conflict as a part of life, and should be prepared to use military means in a rational manner to obtain its goals. The military should embrace a military ethos, part of that ethos being the subordination of the military to policy control. Such professionalism would "maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values."[11] Americans, influenced by liberal values (and also by the peculiar nature of our constitutional structure), wish to control the military, but prefer what Huntington calls "subjective control" to the objective control resulting from professionalism. That is, the civilian rulers desire the soldiers to adhere to the liberal commonplaces of the larger society, and even to the specific policy preferences of the specific civilians in power in the executive branch.[12] The consequence of these attitudes during a period of rapid engrossment of the military has been a kind of fusion of the military and the political in the United States. The result has not meant civilian control. If, according to liberal ideology, war indicates a failure of policy, then policy has no business meddling in war. In the Second World War, what were in fact political decisions were made by American generals—not on political grounds, but, rather, on narrowly technical military grounds. General MacArthur was later able to assert a political position at odds with that of the Truman Administration, but, again, in the process deluding others and no doubt himself that his own position was simply apolitical military common sense. During the cold war, professional soldiers continued to participate in the formulation of foreign policy.[13] The MacArthur pattern was not typical, however. The military did grow, but at the price of coming to terms with the standards imposed by the liberal society. Foreign policy became militarized, but by the same token the military became civilianized. The assertion of Clausewitzian principles may be a way out of this morass.[14]

[11] *Ibid.*, 2. Huntington's analysis is not as convincing as it might be, in that he does not demonstrate that the armies he considers to be professional are any better at fighting wars than the armies he considers not to be professional.

[12] Spanier (fn. 2), 274, even advocates outright that the field commander in a limited war be a political ally of the President. This hardly seems a shrewd way to depoliticize the military.

[13] See, for example, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Signet 1969), 573.

[14] For the extended analysis, see Huntington (fn. 2), 315 ff. See also the interesting essays in Bruce Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Military Force and American Society* (New York: Harper and Row 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Clausewitz could also help to provide a justification for a new approach to military doctrine. Senator Fulbright was not the first to realize that the new weapons had too much power actually to be used, at least in most circumstances. This became particularly true once Russian nuclear development deprived the old massive-retaliation doctrine of any utility it might have had. By the late 1950s, defense civilians, along with some soldiers,[15] had begun to react against a way of thinking that left American interests vulnerable to low-level military force. In the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy years, the United States began to gear for limited wars. We moved from the determination to have no more Koreas to the assumption that Koreas would come thick and fast. We would be fighting wars for well-defined political aims, under constraints the American people would not easily understand, and which American soldiers had not been educated for and would inevitably resent.

From the perspective of the late 1970s, all of the foregoing seems unreal. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is a shambles and limited war has been discredited. The United States seems to have moved from bad military doctrine to no doctrine at all. The Clausewitzian paradigm may have retained its aesthetic appeal, but Americans have not applied it. It is both easy and accurate to say that Americans lack *virtù*, but that is not enough. There are perhaps objective reasons for this lack: the reason Americans have not applied the Clausewitzian paradigm may be that, under American conditions, it cannot be applied.

Clausewitz thinks war has a dual aspect. War in itself is "an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will." As an act of force, it is "theoretically without limits":[16] in conflict treated in the abstract, the only relevant consideration is which force is greater or more skillfully applied. On the other hand, "the theoretical tendency toward the utmost is modified in practice . . . everything assumes a different shape if we pass from this abstract world to the real."[17] In the concrete, as opposed to theory, "war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself."[18] This *Ding an sich*, of course, is part of the philosophical jargon popular in Germany in Clausewitz's

[15] Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon Books 1974), 288-91; Spanier (fn. 2); Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper 1960).

[16] Clausewitz (fn. 1), 63, 64.

[17] *Ibid.*, 67.

[18] *Ibid.*, 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time. The *Ding an sich*, the noumenon, is total war, abstract violence. But we never see this noumenon, any more than we ever see *any* noumena: we know only the phenomenon, war in the concrete. War in the concrete is always limited, not only by questions of policy but also by technical factors such as the superiority of the defense and the "natural inertia and friction of [war's] parts, all the inconsistency, the vagueness, and the timidity of the human mind."[19]

American students of Clausewitz tend to stress, sometimes to the point of tedium, his insight that war in the concrete is always a political act; and at least some of the time Clausewitz agrees that this is his most important contribution to the study of war.[20] Elsewhere, however, Clausewitz seems to consider it as a triviality, a truism, and implies that his original contribution is the recognition of the theoretically unlimited nature of war. Thus, he says that military theory in his day tended to ascribe "war among civilized men to a purely rational act of governments" until "the events of war with Napoleon taught us better."[21] With "Bonaparte," as Clausewitz usually prefers to call him, war has "taken on its absolute character"[22]—or, at least, has approached it. While Clausewitz's work is today used to demonstrate the propriety of fighting limited wars, his general taste was toward the intensification of the violence: "As the greatest use of force does not exclude the cooperation of intelligence, the ruthless user of force who shrinks from no amount of bloodshed must gain an advantage if his opponent does not do the same."[23]

Clausewitz's brilliance is shown in his recognition both of the political aspects of war and of the potentially unlimited nature of war. The latter, whatever he may have thought, Clausewitz only inferred; he did not witness. Napoleon was a transitional figure. His army was sociologically similar to contemporary ones: huge, conscripted, professionally staffed, ideologically indoctrinated. But it fought with pre- or early-industrial technology and even, to some degree, with 18th-century attitudes. Thus, Napoleon's enemies could afford to lose: Prussia could lose the war, but its king would keep his crown. Even Napoleon him-

[19] *Ibid.*, 76, 204.

[20] Brodie (fn. 3), 306. It would appear that Clausewitz did not recognize the importance of this insight until late in his life, and thus it may not be as well integrated into his work as he might have liked.

[21] Clausewitz (fn. 1), 65. [22] *Ibid.*, 204.

[23] *Ibid.*, 64. The point seems obvious. But Sun-tzu, perhaps Clausewitz's only real peer as a military thinker, does not agree with Clausewitz here. See *The Art of War*, translated with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press 1963); for example, p. 87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self was treated with shameful leniency by the standards of the present century. Today, rulers who are defeated on the scale on which Napoleon was defeated are not given two chances and then sent to comfortable exile; they are hanged.

Since the time of Napoleon and Clausewitz, war has lost much of its "friction." The French revolutionary movement removed the moral and social limitations to warfare, although in Napoleon's day their residues still had some effect. The technical limitations were still there. Today both are gone. While Clausewitz correctly perceives the nature of both total and limited war, I think he is mistaken on the nature of the relationship between them. They do not stand to each other as noumenon to phenomenon, but, to continue with this heavy language, as two distinct phenomena. Total war is not the ideal type of all wars, but a concrete fact; it is a leading pattern of war in the contemporary world. It is the product of mutually reinforcing social and technical changes that have emerged since the early 1800s. Total war is no longer an instrument of state policy, a means whereby those who rule the state attain their values; instead, it is the fact or the possibility of total war that determines the values of the state.

Total war, then, can be treated as the product of technological determinism—and in this sense the word *total* is not completely appropriate. Total war is limited by the techniques available. Thus, in five years or so, it may be possible for the United States to fight a "limited"—i.e., successful non-nuclear—war in Europe, although the nature of our weapons systems does not permit this just yet. But although total war is limited by technique, and will vary in destructiveness with variations in technique, it is not significantly limited by policy and is hard to put to political use. The assumption—or rather, observation—here is that, although techniques are themselves means to ends, or ways in which we attain our values, they can—and in the contemporary world largely have—become autonomous as well, shaping and determining our values.[24] For example, in the United States the automobile is for many people not simply a convenient means of transportation; rather, society has so adapted to the presence of the automobile that that machine has become a necessary means to so many other ends that it is, in effect, a good in itself. Moreover, the health of the economy depends to a considerable degree upon a certain number of automobiles being manufactured and sold each year, whether anyone wants them or not. Hence, indoctrination is necessary to create a moral climate approving of auto-

[24] I am influenced on this point by the works of Jacques Ellul; see especially *The Technology Society* (New York: Knopf 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mobile consumption, and the state must take care of the problems entailed by having a large number of cars around.

War depends upon technique and is a spur to technique. Even prior to the French Revolution, the modern state, that innovation in political technique, had evolved in large part in response to the requirements of war.[25] Since that time, the progress of warfare has been bound up with progress in numerous other areas of physical and social technique: industrialization, nationalism, mass democracy, women's lib,[26] the welfare state. There is a kind of artificial on-going argument over whether technology is a *Good Thing* or a *Bad Thing*, or a *Neutral Thing* that becomes good or bad depending upon who uses it. Morally there may be some point to this argument; politically there is none. In a technological society, technique is by definition good. Technology produces changes that are beyond human control in the sense that, although they are brought about by human beings, they are not under the control of anyone in particular. It also produces changes that are inevitable, not in the sense that they cannot be physically avoided, but in that the cost of avoiding them is unrealistically high. Given a certain technological structure, its needs are transformed into human needs. "It was possible; therefore, it was necessary," as a French general is supposed to have said about his country's nuclear force.

Autonomous technology shapes the way we live, and in particular the way we fight wars. As the constraints on warfare become increasingly technical, warfare ceases to be an instrument of politics. In the face of total war, politics itself becomes subordinate to the constraints imposed by war, or at best a means of coping with the fact of the possibility of total destruction.

The First World War was perhaps the first real total war, although the American Civil War and the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion provided foretastes. World War I is commonly seen as the embodiment of military stupidity, with the utter abdication of the civilian policy-making function and the mindless use of violence by the soldiers—not at all the sort of thing Clausewitz would have approved of.[27] Yet it would also seem

[25] Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 42.

[26] Richard Morris, "Class Struggle and the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., No. 19 (1962), 3-29, at 26.

[27] On the other hand, that war also saw unprecedented civilian embroilment in the making of military strategy. War was too important to leave to the generals—but how much better did the politicians do? See Harvey A. DeWeerd, "Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (New York: Atheneum 1966; originally published by Princeton University Press 1941), 287-305.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the structure of the situation in that war worked to limit political control over the conflict. True, there were few giants on the earth—at least in positions of power—between 1914 and 1918. But even if there had been, what could they have done? One thinks of the famous mobilization plans which, once started, could not be halted, and which no government could afford not to start if it suspected that the enemy might mobilize—which in itself provided the enemy with a motive to mobilize. The cost in lives was no doubt greater than any of the powers would have been willing to pay to achieve its interests, had those costs been known in advance. But, given the efficient systems of conscription and logistics and the advanced technology of high explosives, coupled with the primitive technology of motorized combat, it is hard to see how the war might have been fought differently. The virtually absolute advantage of the defensive did not give either side much incentive to compromise, despite the horrendous cost in lives; possibly, a more accurate appreciation in 1914 of the advantages of the defensive might have prevented the war from starting.[28] Also, one thinks it should have dawned upon the various statesmen by, say, the spring of 1915, that there was no point in continuing the fight. But even if more imagination had been shown, and if the war had been brought to an end earlier, it would not constitute an example of the use of war as an instrument of policy, but rather a recognition that under prevailing conditions, war was not a good instrument of policy.

World War I was a total war that was actually fought. The possibility of total war may dominate policy, however, even when there is little prospect of actual fighting. Under current conditions, peacetime military "postures" are partly autonomous from any reasonable policy goal. Thus, the orthodox American strategic doctrine, Mutual Assured Destruction (as it is aptly called by those who dislike it), emphasizes that our strategic weapons systems must be rendered invulnerable; after absorbing any attack an enemy might launch against us, we must be able to retaliate by killing a sufficiently large proportion of his population to make him wish he had thought twice about attacking us in the first place. Knowing we have the capacity to retaliate, the enemy will in fact think twice. As Senator Fulbright points out, nuclear war is thus not an instrument of policy, and neither are nuclear weapons. The weapons are to be used only to prevent wars, not to fight wars. Also, as nuclear weapons become useful for fighting wars, they become

[28] George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley 1977), 114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less useful for preventing wars: in actual war, the first target would have to be the enemy's weapons system; if his weapons system is vulnerable, we are not deterred; thus he is tempted to get our weapons before we get his.

Assured destruction must be *mutual*. The enemy is supposed to feel safer, and thus less inclined to attack us, if he knows he can survive our first strike and then destroy us. But in this case, in the full MAD situation, nuclear weapons serve no purpose except to deter the other side's use of them—a problem which would not arise if neither side had nuclear weapons. Also, the weapons do not deter any war except a full-scale nuclear war, or a conventional war which has reached the point where one of the MAD-men is about to be annihilated. Can one imagine a war of a scale close to that of World War II being fought under MAD conditions, with the *1984* provision that no MAD regime be endangered by the war? In effect, nuclear weapons serve no purpose whatsoever. But neither are they going to be given up. Like pleasure, justice, honor, and cars, they have become goods in themselves.[29]

Although MAD imposes itself as a consequence of the technical structure as it operates in American society, there is some reason to believe that it may not be very good military doctrine. The MAD logic assumes that both sides that are (so far) involved see things in the same way. The use of nuclear weapons is supposed to be unthinkable, and therefore the threat to use them only for retaliation, coupled with the ability to retaliate successfully, eliminates the possibility of strategic first use of nuclear weapons by either side. But the evidence is that, while the Russians accept MAD as a fact, they do not have quite the same ideological commitment to it that the Americans have; that to the Russians, nuclear weapons are weapons like any others, only bigger; and that like other weapons, they are to be used not only to deter wars but also to win them.[30] Given this asymmetry, the assumptions that should underlie MAD do not in fact hold, and the doctrine thereby loses credibility and, thus, validity.

On the problem of credibility, it should be pointed out that, truth be told, we do not believe MAD either. As Donald Brennan shows, if we were serious about MAD, we would try to get the Russians to agree to

[29] Schurmann (fn. 15), 11.

[30] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 21-34. The Russians are not necessarily on to something clever that we are missing. Rather, in the Soviet Union, military strategy is worked out by career officers, and their doctrine is much what ours would be if it were determined by soldiers rather than civilians. See Aaron Wildavsky, *The Revolt Against the Masses and Other Essays on Politics and Public Policy* (New York: Basic Books 1971), 159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an arrangement whereby each side would place thermonuclear mines under the cities of the other side, to be set off whenever it so chose.[31] Such a program would have its own technical problems, but probably no more than the current one, and it would be much more reliable and credible. But, of course, no such program is going to be seriously proposed—and not simply because the Russians would never agree to it. It seems that deep down we are afraid that MAD might not work, and therefore we hedge: if deterrence fails, we would at least like a chance to *win* the ensuing war. But the more deterrence is hedged, the less credible it becomes; and the more nuclear weapons are treated as ordinary weapons, the less they deter nuclear war.

The fact that MAD is intellectually suspect as well as morally grotesque underlies the lack of autonomy of policy from military requirements. MAD imposes itself not only upon the United States, where it is considered a good policy, but upon the Soviet Union, where it is not. Policy seems incapable of removing us from MAD. Since America's loss of distinct strategic superiority, our policy has been one of arms limitation: from our point of view, the purpose of the SALT talks is to institutionalize MAD. Thus, our policy is to institutionalize our abdication of policy.

MAD, therefore, is—like love, cars, and H-bombs—another good in itself. But, of course, this is merely a conceit, a manner of speaking. Few people really *like* MAD, or H-bombs, or even cars for their own sakes; they impose themselves as a result of technological constraints. MAD is a consequence of weapons technology coupled with the technical considerations of cost accounting, the concern for the ratio of bank to buck. Thus, the posture should change with technology; and this may mean that SALT, in its present conception, is futile. One can, of course, exercise policy autonomy of a sort by attempting to block technological advance. The successful fight against the ABM (but perhaps not against the B-1, which came at the end of a technological line) may be an example. Whether policy can in the long run remain autonomous from technology is dubious. Would the fight against the ABM have been won, for example, if that system had been cheaper and technically less problematic? If some cheap and effective defense against ballistic missiles were found, such as the ray gun the Russians are rumored to be developing, could we really avoid deploying that defense? The cruise missile—if it works—is likely to render obsolete the technical basis of MAD; so, in a more dangerous manner, will advances in antisubmarine warfare. We seem likely to drift from the orthodox "counter-

[31] Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," in Kaplan (fn. 5), 548-64, at 557.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

value" strategy into a "counterforce" strategy, something the Pentagon has long been flirting with in any case. This change will not mean that nuclear weapons will become instruments of policy. Although directed mainly against the enemy's weapons systems, they will continue to function basically as deterrents. The consequences of a failure should in theory be mildly less horrendous than they are at present, and the subjective probability that deterrence will in fact fail, mildly higher. But the change to counterforce is not likely to come as a rational choice based upon considerations of this trade-off; rather, it is likely to impose itself as a result of technical change.

It is perhaps unfair to put too much stress on MAD as a test of the continuing validity of Clausewitz's ideas. American Clausewitzians more or less admit that nuclear war is not an instrument of policy; one purpose of the development of the doctrine of limited war in the 1950s was precisely to restore policy control over the use of violence. With hindsight, however, limited war seems as much a failure in this respect as MAD. There are two reactions possible in the face of total war: we may let the weapons determine policy, or we may abandon war altogether, at least until faced with a threat that cannot but provoke a violent response. Strategically, we have taken the first way; tactically, we seem increasingly inclined to take the second.

The nature of the weapons system does, of course, impose immediate limitations on the choice of policy even in the sphere of limited war; that is precisely why there has been so much talk of *limited* war. Not only is this warfare limited in scope; there are severe limitations upon just what policy we can pursue. The communist powers have perhaps on the whole been more successful than the United States in bringing force to bear for political ends, but their success has been greatest when they have not fought directly against the U.S., and it has always been contingent upon American restraint. Limited wars between soldiers of the major powers seem, abstractly considered, much too dangerous to serve as effective political tools—in the past because MAD was both incomplete and incredible, and at present because strategic policy seems to be tending to counterforce. On the American side, the strategic structure of the world dictates that limited war can be fought only for purposes of containment; and from the point of view of the American temperament, a war fought only for containment ought not be fought at all. There is no freedom of policy in the use of limited war; the only choice is whether to fight or not. If we do decide to fight, the objectives are already set for us; and the objectives are not what Americans generally think it worthwhile to kill and die for.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the difficulties in exerting political control over limited war were only partly attributable to the structure of the strategic system, this kind of war would still violate American liberal principles, say, or disrupt the hedonism necessary for the perpetuation of a society based upon luxury consumption. We may assume that, if the American state were less liberal, or American society less degenerate, we would be able to use force more effectively. But to say that war is an instrument of policy means that it is fought to achieve certain values—one value presumably being the survival of the regime that fights the war, and also the survival of the value structure that supports the regime and that the regime supports. If values are changed for the sake of war, it is hard to see how war can be an instrument of policy. It is the policy that changes to become an instrument of war. There has, I think, been a general tendency in the world toward the evolution of value systems that support the fact of total war, although this evolution has certainly not reached completion in the United States. But no matter what, Clausewitz would not seem to apply: limited war cannot be (or has not been) fought efficiently under liberal values; and if the values are changed for the sake of war, policy control over the war has, at the least, been attenuated.

This last problem is implicit even in Clausewitz's own work. He attributes Napoleon's success to his ability to mobilize the French people behind the war effort. It would follow that the way to defeat France was to act like France—to fight a people's war.[32] The conservative powers of the time did in fact mobilize their populations somewhat, although only slowly and reluctantly. They were in a bind: the rule of the legitimist dynasties was safest when most questions pertaining to authority and government were not politicized. The ideal relationship between rulers and ruled was one in which the latter paid taxes to the former, and otherwise the former left the latter alone. Furthermore, the ruled should not be too particular to whom they paid their taxes. The warfare that maintained this kind of system involved the people as little as possible: war was fought between mercenary armies, with little loss of life, and less of property.[33] The conservative powers were thus offered the choice of being conquered by the French, or of imitating the French and risk being overthrown by their own people. Clausewitz himself, in advocating people's war, seems to be mindlessly carried away by the logic of war, rather than articulating a set of policies that would guide the war.

In this connection, one thinks of the peculiar conclusion to Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, his comparison of West Point and

[32] Clausewitz (fn. 1), 225, 228.

[33] *Ibid.*, 226-27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Highland Falls. Highland Falls represents the "tiresome monotony and incredible variety and discordancy of small-town commercialism." West Point, on the other hand, represents "ordered serenity."

> West Point embodies the military ideal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many-colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon. Yet is it possible to deny that the military values—loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication—are the ones America most needs today?[34]

In a sense it must be possible to deny, since most of those in power denied it at the time of Huntington's writing and deny it yet. If anything, in the two decades since then, West Point has taken on the characteristics of Highland Falls rather than the reverse. Regrettable as this may be, Huntington's position is, in its own way, as perverse as MAD. For West Point, however appealing it may be for its own sake, exists precisely to defend—and *only* to defend—Highland Falls and all the tacky materialistic vulgarity Huntington takes that poor town to represent. If, for better or worse, Highland Falls does represent America's values (and disregarding the fairness of Huntington's presentation of both the town and the values), America is served only insofar as those values are protected.[35]

Despite the perversity, there remains a point to the paradox brought up by both Clausewitz and Huntington. In a period of total war, war is no longer subordinated to values—that is, to policy. Another consequence is that the distinction between war and peace, army and society, tends to fade—a process that both Clausewitz and Huntington advocate, despite the more general thrust of their analysis. Highland Falls overcomes West Point or West Point overcomes Highland Falls, or the two blur; but they no longer coexist. Leftist critics of American society and policy, such as C. Wright Mills, correctly identify this interpenetration, although I think they are mistaken in their interpretation of it. Japan has shown that capitalism does not require the warfare state (although that may change as American protection of Japan is gradually with-

[34] Huntington (fn. 2), 465.

[35] I suspect that Huntington is really arguing a political position—that he has a preference for what he takes to be military values over the values he takes to be those of liberal America. He does not, however, argue for his set of values on their own merits, but urges that they be adopted as instruments of security: the value system should be subordinated to the needs of war.

One might wonder just what it is that Clausewitz and Huntington value the security of. Presumably the guiding value that is not sacrificed for the sake of war is the survival of the existing regime—although Clausewitz's policy entails risk for that regime. Or one can speak of the "nation" and so forth—but the trouble is that this is vague. And unless the regime or the nation represent certain values, why should anyone care whether either or both survive? The condition of total war is conducive to nihilism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawn); the communist countries are, if anything, warfare states to a greater extent than the "capitalist" ones. But it is probably true that the health of the American economy requires a relatively high level of military spending. Analysts such as Mills tend, therefore, to present the cold war as a sort of boondoggle designed for the well-being of the merchants of death and the big generals. It would seem instead to have been an objective fact: the American warfare state was not caused by a conspiracy among the rich and powerful, but was a natural result of a given international structure and a given technological base. Once the economic structure is set, it generates its own interests, of course; and these may inhibit disarmament or arms control, if either of these policies should become feasible. But during this century, the state has generally been more potent than private interests; in any case, neither policy seems likely to become feasible.

Several implications seem to follow from this analysis. One is that total war is no *Ding an sich*; it is not the essence of war. Rather, like limited war, it is a product of particular historical and material circumstances. Those who like to make sweeping historical generalizations have noted a kind of war cycle in Europe since the consolidation of the territorial state, with periods of near-total war alternating with longer periods of relative peace and limited war. The cycle, if that is what it is, should perhaps not be taken too seriously. But it may show that total war is not inevitable—that we may not always be caught in this bind.

We should not be too confident, however. Total war requires both a technology of mass destruction and a high level of mass mobilization. Mobilization is achieved when the stake in war is ideological or religious, as in the near-total conflicts of the Thirty Years' War and the French Revolutionary Wars. These wars, however, were restricted by the relatively limited technology. Today the technology of mass destruction must be taken as given. It is an integral part of a technological base which both requires and creates popular mobilization. Human imagination being limited, it is difficult to see how these conditions could be reversed—except, of course, by a catastrophic total war.

Or, we may speculate that now that war (on the whole) no longer serves a political purpose, wars may no longer be fought. This, however, sounds like whistling while walking past the graveyard. The possibility of war—and, thus, under current conditions, total war—will remain as long as the present international structure endures, and this structure is apt to change only as a consequence of total war. The logic of total war—MAD and the like—would only seem to reinforce the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

current international structure. Today, the tendency in the world is not only toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also of political entities. Total war, one hopes, may never come again, but its possibility will remain.

The main implication of this analysis (aside from the advice to despair and die) is that we should re-evaluate some of our Enlightenment heritage, to do the sort of thing that is usually considered a flight from reason. Clausewitz himself was a product of the Enlightenment, and in some ways more representative of what that movement has really meant in history than are some of the more placid philosophes. It is commonplace to complain that all the advances in science, politics, technology, and so forth, which have done so much to enhance human life, have also tended toward its destruction. This connection is probably a necessary one. The connection between democracy and total war, for example, was seen not only by Clausewitz but also by his predecessors. Thus, the Count de Guibert (1743–1790) noted that no people in Europe was prepared to fight for despotism:

> But suppose that a people should arise in Europe vigorous in spirit, in government, in the means at its disposal, a people who with hardy qualities should combine a national army and a settled plan of aggrandizement. We should see such a people subjugate its neighbors and overwhelm our weak constitutions like the north wind bending reeds.[36]

Knowing, unlike our forebears, what total war really means, and attached—partly by conditioning, but also, I think, by reason—to some of the more humane outcroppings of the Enlightenment, we tend to cover up the connection that our ancestors clearly saw. But it is there. Contemporary society and total war grew up together. Their relationship is at least that of siblings, and more probably that of body and soul.

[36] Quoted by R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," in Earle (fn. 27), 49-74, at 64. Palmer contends that Guibert was no prophet, since he thought the change would come only as a result of revolution, and did not think a revolution would happen. Guibert may not have been much of a fortune-teller, but he is "prophetic" in a scientific sense, in that he makes an accurate contingent prediction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO TEXTS ON MATHEMATICAL MODELING

By DINA A. ZINNES*

Edward R. Bender, *An Introduction to Mathematical Modeling.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978, 256 pp., $16.95.
Charles A. Lave and James G. March, *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences.* New York: Harper & Row, 1975, 421 pp., $7.95 paper.
Joseph Malkevitch and Walter Meyer, *Graphs, Models and Finite Mathematics.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974, 515 pp., $13.95 paper.
Michael Olinick, *An Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978, 466 pp., $16.95.
Fred S. Roberts, *Discrete Mathematical Models.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976, 559 pp., $19.50.

Introduction

THE so-called "quantitative" study of international politics (QIP) currently connotes two rather different enterprises. Most typically, QIP is used as a label to refer to the testing of hypotheses through procedures of careful data collection and the use of appropriate statistical techniques. In recent years, however, the label has also been used to refer to the use of mathematical models in constructing theories of international politics, the best known perhaps being Richardson's model of an arms race.[1] The term "quantitative" is probably a questionable label for either enterprise; it is certainly not an appropriate designation for mathematical modeling. Moreover, the use of a single label has led some to conclude that there are no important differences between the two processes. It is not the purpose of this essay to draw definitive lines between hypothesis testing and mathematical modeling; but some distinction must be made if the basis for this review is to be understood.

The emphasis in hypothesis testing is on empirical reality, on what *is* or *was*. The careful specification of the operational rules for measuring variables, the systematic procedures used to collect data, and the

* Support for this research was provided by the Center for International Policy Studies, Indiana University, under Grant 750-0514 from the Ford Foundation. The author wishes to thank Dan Maki for his suggestions in selecting texts.

[1] Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press 1960).

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030434-23$01.15/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sometimes elaborate statistical analyses are all designed to allow the researcher to draw conclusions about what *is* (or was). The care and explicitness with which these steps are followed establishes ground rules that allow researchers to agree on empirical realities. Although a latent sense of cause and effect is inherent in the if/then phraseology of hypothesis testing, most hypothesis testers are careful to assert that such conclusions are really not warranted by their analyses; at best, their analyses allow for conclusions of association—e.g., the number of alliances and the number of wars seem to go together. Consequently, hypothesis testing can be seen as a form of empirical description.

The purpose of mathematical modeling is different. Its avowed goal is to explain, to provide answers to the why's of what is observed. The modeling enterprise involves the specification of assumptions and the use of standard rules of logic to draw new truths from these assumptions. "To model," then, is to create a theory of the phenomenon under consideration; and although important philosophical differences exist between the concepts of "theory" and "model," the terms are often used synonymously. If the model is expressed in mathematical language, it becomes a mathematical model. Clearly, however, one can develop models or theories in languages other than mathematics. Favorite examples of models expressed in non-mathematical terms are road maps and model airplanes. The advantage of using the language of mathematics is two-fold. First, it is precise and has well-established rules of inference and deduction. Second, it is a reasonably advanced field of study in which a variety of results already exist. If a problem can be expressed in certain mathematical forms, it is known what conclusions can and cannot be obtained.

There is an important connection between hypothesis testing and mathematical modeling. The modeling enterprise primarily involves the statement of assumptions and the subsequent drawing of conclusions; but most researchers would be dissatisfied if the process ended there. As noted before, the goal of modeling is to provide an explanation for what is observed. Clearly, then, the conclusions of the model must be matched with empirical observation—i.e., the hypotheses generated by the model must be tested. Thus, mathematical modeling and hypothesis testing are not just two different enterprises—nor, as some seem to infer, two antithetical enterprises—but are complementary parts of the general scientific process.

The evolution of quantitative international politics has primarily emphasized hypothesis testing. Although QIP is highly sophisticated in procedures of data collection, development of operational measures,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and use of statistics, its practitioners have not developed a comparable understanding of the steps of modeling *qua* theory construction—mathematical or otherwise. The typical QIP article will begin with a general discussion designed to show the reader why an hypothesis or set of hypotheses are of interest. At best, these discussions present a vague, incompletely stated argument that does not permit the reader to see exactly how the subsequent hypotheses emerge; or worse, they merely state the researcher's suspicion that the variables to be examined and interrelated have some relevance to one another. Having completed a typical QIP article, then, the reader's strongest impression is that certain variables did or did not go together; he takes away with him very little feeling about the problem that the researcher was posing, and about how the results of the study fit into a more general understanding of that problem. Thus, it is not surprising that some less sympathetic political scientists have concluded that QIP is atheoretical.

But QIP is by no means atheoretical. Although one cannot deny that there are a few "experimentalists" among its practitioners who are simply curious about any and all types of associations between variables, more typically the examination of relationships between variables is motivated by a particular problem, and is the consequence of an idea or an argument in the researcher's head. The suspicion that x is related to y is usually the last step in a series of assumptions about how nations interact, and/or the structure of the international system, and/or the attributes of the nations. In many cases, the researcher does not draw these assumptions out sufficiently to make the argument clear; hence, the analyses appear unnecessarily "headless." That is regrettable not simply because it makes QIP appear atheoretical, but also because it contributes to our inability to theoretically develop and integrate the main findings and ideas within the discipline. If most of the argument that leads to the statement of a particular hypothesis remains in the head of the researcher, there is very little opportunity for another researcher to build on the ideas of the first. The best the second researcher can do is to "replicate" the test of the same hypothesis in a new set of data or with different measures and analyses. How can the second researcher elaborate on or extend the ideas that have only just barely been sketched in the first few paragraphs of an article? The inescapable conclusion would thus seem to be that QIP researchers must learn how to develop arguments, how to make assumptions explicit and deductions logically consistent. In short, if QIP is to make major theoretical strides, it would seem essential that researchers learn how to develop and state logically sound arguments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the behavioral or quantitative revolution hit the field of international politics, it necessitated considerable retraining. Not only were the rules of scientific procedures unfamiliar, but—of even greater consequence—the rules of statistical decision making were largely unknown. Numerous errors were made before researchers began to realize the importance of adequate statistical training. Today no respectable student of QIP would have less than a year of statistics; some have more. Indeed, it might be argued that we have gone too far in this direction, possibly overtraining students to think only in empirical, data-processing terms. But, whatever one's position on this issue, it is clear that if we are to move in a more theoretical direction, another type of training is required. This additional training is not statistical in nature; nor, it should be pointed out, is it a substitute for statistical training. Without losing statistical sophistication, QIP researchers must learn to make logically sound, explicit arguments.

Mathematical modeling is not the only answer, but it is certainly one possible solution. The problem is where to begin. How does one learn to create mathematical models? Must one take a four-year undergraduate major in mathematics before beginning? And, even if one had the time to pursue such a course of study, where and how does one learn to use mathematics to construct arguments or to draw conclusions about phenomena other than mathematical symbols? There are no easy answers to these questions; but in recent years scholars in applied mathematics have turned their interest from the physical sciences and have written texts designed to help those in the biological and social sciences. The extent to which such volumes are actually useful and relevant for researchers in the field of international politics is the subject of this review.

Our purpose, then, is to examine a series of recent texts and to assess the extent to which each volume is capable of teaching the student of international politics how to use mathematical modeling within the context of his own problems. The examples provided in the text were among the principal criteria in choosing the books for review. Ideally, these examples of mathematical modeling should be within the field of international relations, or at least within political science. There is no better way to come to grips with the modeling process than to see the steps executed within one's own subject matter. Familiarity with the substantive context gives the reader a deeper understanding of how and why assumptions are chosen, of the process of deduction, and of the general power and significance of the modeling enterprise. However, there are very few examples within international politics or even polit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical science; and, so, it is not surprising to find that texts in mathematical modeling only barely touch on these areas. Thus, we must be content with the next-best thing: observing the modeling process within related fields of social science, and hoping that we can gain sufficient understanding of the steps to extrapolate to our specific problems.

To keep the review manageable, I made the somewhat arbitrary decision to cover only texts published since 1974—i.e., within the last five years. Although I would not necessarily maintain that the texts ultimately selected are the best or the most appropriate, their diversity of coverage and levels of mathematical sophistication, taken together, are probably representative. In this sense, then, these volumes are a reasonable place to begin.

The five texts can be reviewed from a variety of perspectives; since our interest is in making mathematical modeling more available to the practicing QIP researcher, our discussion should focus on a series of very practical questions. First, the reader will want to know the mathematical background required to follow the modeling analysis. More generally, he will probably be interested in the overall readability of the book: Are the steps clearly explained? Are there numerous examples? A second and very important point is whether the volume is written in such a way as to *train* a reader to "think mathematically." Are the modeling steps sufficiently broken down and presented in such a way that the reader will be able to apply the lessons learned in one context to another? Is there a progressive continuity between chapters, so that the reader develops increasing expertise as he moves from earlier chapters to later ones? Are the different purposes for which mathematical models are appropriate explicitly delineated? And, finally, is there some discussion and illustration of the major philosophical issues inherent in mathematical modeling? Although each of these questions raises a somewhat different issue, all are concerned with the extent to which a text is a useful guide for self-training. A last consideration in evaluating these texts must be the types of models presented. Here the reader will want to know the amount of coverage given to problems in social science, as well as the types of mathematics typically encountered.

Mathematical Background and General Readability

The five texts under review may be placed in three groups, on the basis of mathematical prerequisites. Those by Malkevitch and Meyer, and Lave and March make the smallest demands on the reader's knowledge of mathematics. Both books essentially assume a limited back-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ground of high school math—little more than algebra. Malkevitch and Meyer focus entirely on finite mathematics and begin their text with graph theory. After showing the reader how simple graphs can be used to model such problems as determining an optimal route for a mailman, the text provides several extensive chapters on definitions and theorems of graph theory. From there, the volume introduces the reader to functions, systems of equations, elementary concepts of probability, and game and decision theory; it concludes with a chapter on very elementary aspects of difference equations. In all cases, the mathematics is explained in elaborate detail and illustrated with numerous examples that are carefully worked out in the text.

Lave and March also assume a very limited background in mathematics. Unlike Malkevitch and Meyer, however, they do not spend much time teaching mathematics *per se*. For example, there are no chapters entirely devoted to specific mathematical topics, as is the case in Malkevitch and Meyer. The focus of the volume by Lave and March is on how to think about and formulate problems so as to make them amenable to modeling. The first three chapters teach the reader how to think theoretically. The four chapters that follow explore four types of modeling exercises—decision making, economic models involving utility and indifference curves, learning models, and models of diffusion (birth, death, epidemics). In each case, the mathematics necessary for understanding the model is provided; but the level of mathematical development is minimal. For example, the mathematical component of the discussion of decision making principally involves simple notions of probability theory and the calculation of expected values. The chapter on learning models provides a slightly more extensive treatment of probability theory, but one which could easily be followed without any prior background. The mathematically most sophisticated discussion occurs in the last chapter on the diffusion models. Here the reader is introduced not only to difference equations, but also to differential equations. However, the treatment is at an elementary level, and the basic underlying concepts of calculus are fully explained and carefully illustrated. Both Malkevitch and Meyer, and Lave and March provide numerous examples throughout, so that, with a modicum of perseverance the reader with a very limited background in mathematics can gain considerable insight into the modeling process.

The volumes by Roberts and by Olinick have to be placed in a second group. Both explicitly (in terms of what the authors state in their prefaces) and implicitly (in terms of the coverage), these books require more mathematical background than the previous two. Roberts specifi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cally notes in his preface that he assumes that the reader has been exposed to set theory, linear algebra, elementary notions of probability theory, and in some cases, elementary calculus. However, a potential reader should not be discouraged by this list of prerequisites, nor should he perhaps take it too seriously. Although parts of this volume will certainly not be comprehensible without the required background, a tenacious reader, willing to spend the time to study the chapters carefully, can gain a considerable amount if he simply has a solid background in high school mathematics. Roberts, like Malkevitch and Meyer, introduces the reader to modeling through graph theory. Like Malkevitch and Meyer, he also spends a considerable amount of time on the mathematical aspects of modeling. After an initial chapter on philosophical aspects of modeling, the volume presents an extensive discussion of relevant concepts and theorems in graph theory, followed by a chapter devoted to graph-theoretic models. If the reader has studied Chapters 2 and 3 in detail, he will be able to follow subsequent chapters on Markov chains, *n*-person game theory, group decision making, and measurement theory, since the author has been very careful to present the necessary mathematical ideas. For example, a background in probability theory is certainly useful in reading the chapter on Markov chains. However, if the reader has studied the discussion of weighted graphs, then Roberts's presentation of Markov chains through the medium of graph theory follows naturally. Still, the reader should not be misled: although written clearly and with careful attention to each step and numerous examples, Roberts's text is by no means easy. Unlike the two volumes previously discussed, this text is formal: definitions are given mathematically rather than intuitively, and most theorems are explicitly proven. This is not the book for a reader who is easily discouraged by pages containing numerous symbols and equations.

The contrast between Roberts and Olinick is interesting. In the preface, Olinick implies that his text basically assumes only an acquaintance with high school math and one semester of calculus. Unlike any of the other authors, he includes five appendices designed to provide background in such relevant mathematical topics as set theory, matrices, solutions to systems of equations, functions of two variables, and differential equations. Flipping through the pages of Olinick's text, the reader will find fewer theorems, considerably fewer formal mathematical definitions, and many more words than in Roberts's. The unsuspecting might thus conclude that the Olinick volume is easier to understand—but that is not the case. While Roberts focuses only on discrete models and attempts to provide a sufficiently extensive founda-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion in graph theory to allow a reader to follow more complex mathematical topics in later chapters, Olinick covers both discrete and continuous models, but does not provide an adequate background for understanding continuous models. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 13 and parts of 11 cover models using differential equations and are presented together with discussions of their equilibrium and stability properties. To the reader without a background in calculus and differential equations, these discussions will probably not be meaningful; the appendix on differential equations is far too short to provide an adequate self-study guide. Olinick's chapters on linear programming, social choice theory, measurement, utility theory, probability, and Markov models are more self-contained; the reader with a minimal mathematical background will probably get more from these discussions than from the comparable chapters in Roberts's volume. Compared to Roberts, Olinick provides a more intuitive background to motivate mathematical topics, and a fuller step-by-step discussion of the modeling process. In this sense, Olinick's approach is akin to that of Lave and March: while Roberts, and Malkevitch and Meyer, wish to teach the student mathematics and then show him how to use that mathematics in modeling contexts, Olinick, and Lave and March, are more concerned with getting the student to formulate problems in terms of mathematical models, and provide only the mathematics necessary to permit this to be done successfully.

Bender's book is in a more advanced class. The author states that the first part of the volume requires elementary calculus and probability theory. However, even in these early chapters, steps are often omitted; the reader must have a fair amount of background in these two areas to make the discussions fully comprehensible. Unlike Roberts, Bender does not provide the mathematical details; it is obvious that he assumes that this volume will be a text in a mathematics course where the instructor will provide the necessary background. Since Part II, moreover, requires a reasonable familiarity with differential equations, this volume could be used as a self-study guide only by someone with about three years of college math.

The general readability of the volumes has been a consideration in the discussion of the mathematical prerequisites for each of the texts. However, there are a few additional points worth mentioning. The text by Lave and March is probably the most fun to read. Although some readers may be offended by what appears to be a "talk-down tone" (e.g., the authors' continual exhortations to "STOP AND THINK"), the sense of humor that pervades the volume and the ingenious exam-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ples that illustrate various facets of modeling make the book an enjoyable reading experience. For example, having discussed the important parts of a basic learning model, the authors show how this model allows one to explain phenomena such as superstitious behavior or the extinction of creative behavior; and, having presented the basic concepts of indifference curves, they show how this type of analysis will allow one to explain why marriage partners come to take one another for granted.

Olinick's book is probably the next most interesting to read, for a different reason. Each chapter includes a biography and photographs of those individuals who were instrumental in developing the mathematical models contained in the chapter. The author thereby provides a historical dimension and probably makes it easier for the non-mathematical reader to relate to the ideas. Malkevitch and Meyer do something similar, but on a more limited basis: they include brief biographies and pictures of a few personalities who have been of major importance in the development of mathematical ideas.

Training for Mathematical Modeling

While the potential reader will obviously want to know what mathematical prerequisites undergird a text, his greatest concern will or should be the ability of the volume to accomplish its basic goal of training him to develop his own models. A reader might be willing to acquire the mathematical background necessary for a particular volume if he felt that this text would be a major stepping stone in developing his theoretical capabilities. We turn, then, to a consideration of each book's capacity to train the reader to do his own modeling. Four issues need to be raised in this regard: (1) the extent to which the modeling steps are enumerated and illustrated; (2) the degree of continuity between chapters; (3) the delineation of the different purposes of modeling; and (4) the exposure to some of the basic philosophical issues inherent in modeling. Texts in mathematical modeling typically begin with the cautionary statement that modeling is an art. The implication of this statement seems to be that the reader must not expect to be taught hard and fast rules which, if followed, will guarantee him an authentic product. But, although a text cannot prescribe how one chooses the assumptions of a model, nor what specific deductions will be meaningful within the context of any given substantive problem, the reader can be shown the sequence of steps that must be followed. Ideally, the modeling examples that are then presented should explicitly illustrate these steps. While this procedure will not tell the student

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exactly how he must proceed in developing his own model, it will sensitize him to the necessity of each step.

None of the five texts does a completely satisfactory job on this score, although some make a greater effort than others. In their first two chapters, Lave and March provide an excellent description of how to proceed. Begin, they suggest, with an observation—something that intrigues you and that you do not fully understand. Suppose, for example, that you have observed—through either an extensive reading of history or through some statistical comparisons—that nations which fight together on one side in a war will tend to fight together on the same side in a subsequent war. The question that you pose for yourself is, why? The second step is to begin the formulation of an answer. Lave and March propose that you formulate the answer as a process: a series of events that could have produced the observation. Suppose that, when nations fight together, they establish important ties of cooperation, feelings of friendship between the citizens of the two countries, a common history, and an exchange of essential goods. When the next war comes along and one of the nations becomes involved, the friendly ties pull the other into the war. Thus, partnership in one war leads to partnership in a subsequent war.

The third step is to generate a deduction—a conclusion *different* from your original observation. The purpose of your new deduction is to test the model. Your initial observation cannot be used, since it will not allow for falsification of the model. You might hypothesize that nations that fought together in wars are more likely to exchange peoples, goods, and services than nations that have not been allies in wars. A comparison of allied nations and non-allied nations would then provide a partial test of your model. These are the critical steps of the modeling process; but Lave and March point out that modeling is never finished. If the new hypothesis is supported by additional observations, then the modeler must attempt to generate additional deductions. This may, in turn, require that the process—i.e., the model—be generalized so that additional deductions can be obtained. If the deduction is not supported, then the modeler must reformulate the process and begin again.

Lave and March thus present a good exposition of the steps in the modeling process and provide a number of useful examples to illustrate each step. The difficulty with the volume is that the remaining four chapters ignore what was presented in the first three. When the authors turn to actual models in economics, psychology, and so forth, they seem to forget the steps they outlined in the earlier chapters. Thus the reader is not explicitly shown how, for example, in the case of the learning

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

models, observations made by some psychologists have led to the generation of the models. What process was being proposed? What new deductions were generated? How, in fact, were the models tested? Some of the steps are implicit in the discussions of the models, but they are not explicitly noted. This is particularly true with respect to the stages of formulating new deductions and testing those deductions—probably the most difficult parts of the modeling process. In fact, in several cases, the authors omit any discussion of how a model (e.g., the economic model) was tested. Since they so strongly emphasized in the earlier chapters the necessity of testing a model by generating new deductions that lead to additional observations, this omission is troubling.

Olinick also makes an effort to break down the modeling process into a series of identifiable steps; his discussion of Newton in Chapter 1, as an illustration of these stages, is well done. However, his discussion of the steps is not as explicit as that of Lave and March. For example, Lave and March's emphasis on finding some initial, puzzling observation is a very important and often difficult step for students in political science and international politics: they know they are interested in a general topic (e.g., alliances or wars), but they have trouble formulating a question. In Olinick's Newton example, Lave and March's notion of finding a puzzling observation is implicit—viz., the falling apple—but the difference is that Olinick does not draw attention to this essential first step. Olinick's discussion of how the Newton model was formulated—i.e., what assumptions were proposed—is fine, but he does not make clear that *new* deductions were subsequently obtained (they are rather confusingly called "interpretations"), and why it was important to generate these deductions. Thus, Olinick provides the reader with all the important steps, nicely illustrated through the medium of the Newton example, but without sufficient explicitness about each step and its significance for the modeling process.

However, in subsequent chapters, Olinick (unlike Lave and March) does discuss each of the modeling examples under a comparable set of headings: assumptions of the model, analysis, interpretation, and testing. This potentially very useful organizing device allows the reader to see how each step is carried out in the context of a specific example. Unfortunately, however, the device is not entirely successful because Olinick fails to define his categories explicitly. Thus the relationship and difference between "interpretation" and testing is fuzzy. In the discussion of Richardson's arms-race model, for example, a reader might wonder why the "analysis" of the model does not lead to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deductions that are ultimately tested: the stability properties of the Richardson model are presented as though they were the deductions of the model, yet in the discussion of how the model is tested, an entirely different deduction is tested. Moreover, Olinick does not always adopt the same sequence in presenting models in each chapter; he sometimes introduces additional topics whose bearing on each of the four categories is not clear. Thus, while he makes an explicit attempt to delineate the assumptions, deductions, and testing stages of model development, he does not always do it adequately within the context of each presentation.

In an initial chapter, Roberts outlines the basic ingredients of modeling; in Chapter 3, he returns to these steps in describing the application of graph theory to a series of problems. However, probably because of the heavy mathematical emphasis of the text—its careful definition of concepts and detailed presentation of theorems—in later chapters it is difficult for the reader to relate each of the steps with regard to the specific models described. Bender's volume poses a similar problem; because of its general brevity in presenting the models, it is probably even more difficult for a reader to follow the development. Finally, Malkevitch and Meyer make no attempt at all in this direction. While the other four texts contain at least introductory chapters on the steps of modeling, Malkevitch and Meyer touch on this issue only briefly, apparently believing that the most useful approach is to move the reader through specific examples.

Another important characteristic of a text which is intended to train the reader is the progression from chapter to chapter. The continuity between the presentations, from simple to complex models, or from one type of mathematics to another, should make the reader feel that there has been some development, and not that he has been exposed to a random scattering of models. The most successful text in this regard is Roberts's. The continuity is provided by the graph-theoretic approach. Treating all modeling topics through the medium of graph theory allows Roberts to attain two objectives. First, he is able to illustrate the multiplicity of modeling applications by using graph theory. Second, and perhaps of greater importance, he is able to show the underlying structural similarities between different forms of mathematics. (I, for one, found it fascinating to discover how Markov chains, group decision making, *n*-person game theory, and measurement theory could all be seen in graph-theoretic terms.) The reader is thus not only learning about the modeling process, but is also discovering something about the fundamentals of mathematics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Malkevitch and Meyer make a similar attempt to provide continuity across chapters through the medium of graph theory. However, their text is less successful than Roberts's in this respect. They manage to sustain a connection between the first five and parts of the sixth chapter, but by the seventh chapter and throughout the remainder of the volume, they drop graph theory and treat topics in a scattered fashion. It is difficult to see any progression between the chapters covering functional models, statistics, probability, games and decisions, social choice theory, and difference equations. Consequently, after the first six chapters the reader has the feeling that he is being given a bit here and a piece there. It is particularly unfortunate and confusing to have a chapter that deals with statistics midway in the text. While one might introduce such a topic in the context of estimating the parameters in a model or for the purposes of testing a model, such is not the case in this discussion. The chapter, which presents such simple notions as medians, standard deviations, etc., therefore stands out as a strange discontinuity.

As has already been noted, Lave and March initially provide three well-developed chapters outlining the steps required in modeling. But the continuity across these first chapters is not carried over into the remaining four. Each chapter presents a very different type of model, in terms of both substance and mathematics. Since the modeling steps of the earlier chapters are not explicitly discussed again in the context of the later models (economics, learning, and so forth), the connection between the first part of the book and the last is weak. The reader leaves the volume with the feeling that he has seen examples from different disciplines, but with little appreciation of the connection between the models.

The texts by Olinick and Bender are probably the weakest in providing continuity. Olinick's book is marred in several respects. First, it begins with the more difficult rather than the simpler models, presenting models that involve differential equations in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and discussing such topics as stability and equilibrium—even though the preface states that the reader need have no more than one semester of calculus. Second, the chapters skip around from topic to topic. It is strange, for example, to find three chapters on differential equation models, followed by chapters on linear programming, social choice theory, measurement theory, utility theory, elementary probability, Markov processes—and then, a return to differential equation models. With the exception of the three early chapters on differential equation models and four later chapters on stochastic models, the reader gets a strong sense of "here a model, there a model, everywhere a model. . . ."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bender divides his volume into two main parts on the basis of mathematical background: elementary and advanced. The part that covers elementary mathematics is a scattering of simple models which principally involve graphs and probability theory. The more advanced section has greater continuity: three of the four chapters are devoted to differential equations and proceed to develop such topics as analytic solutions, numerical methods, stability theory, and differential-difference equations. However, this last section contains an unexplained and unconnected chapter on probability models, which mars the continuity.

Thus far, we have discussed the ability of each text to take a reader through the modeling steps and to sustain some kind of progressive development from chapter to chapter. Two additional attributes should be present in a text that is meant to train its audience: (1) it should explicitly note the different types of purposes for which mathematical models are appropriate, and (2) it should discuss and illustrate some of the basic philosophical issues inherent in mathematical modeling.

There are at least four different types of modeling exercises. First, a mathematical model can be used for what some have called a *descriptive* purpose: to isolate the key ingredients of a situation, formulate these in terms of assumptions, and then draw from them some type of deduction. This is essentially the way in which mathematical modeling has been discussed in the foregoing pages and, used in this way, a mathematical model provides the framework for a theory of the phenomenon under study. The label "descriptive" is used to denote the fact that the model's goal is to provide, through its assumptions, a characterization of reality. Second, in contrast to the descriptive use, a mathematical model can also be used as a *prescriptive* tool. Seen from this perspective, the purpose of a model is to prescribe what ought to be done if some goal is to be optimized. The prescriptive use of a model is as a decision-making tool: if a mailman has to make contact with particular mailboxes along a complicated network of roads, what route should he take so as to minimize the number of miles traveled and still be able to make a mail delivery to each box?

Although the descriptive and prescriptive uses pose rather different goals for a model, it is important to note that the same model can be viewed from either perspective. In the example just given, an optimal route can be found using graph theory. On the other hand, suppose we were attempting to understand human behavior or, more specifically, the behavior of a mail carrier, and simply observed how he traversed his route. We could propose various goals that he might be optimizing—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in addition to covering the distance, perhaps he needs to be near a restaurant at lunch time, or must go back to the post office to get additional packages to deliver—and then show which of these goals comes closest to predicting the carrier's behavior. However, while the same model can be seen either from a descriptive or a prescriptive perspective, it is important not to lose sight of a significant difference between the two types of modeling. A model that is formulated for descriptive purposes must be tested: its goal is to describe reality, and one can only be sure of its success by making predictions that are then compared to observation. But a model formulated for prescriptive purposes is complete once the goal to be optimized is specified and the necessary analysis has been performed.

Third, in addition to descriptive and prescriptive purposes, mathematical models can be used to explicate a concept (i.e., to make a vague idea explicit). A classic example is found in small-group sociology in the analysis of "tension" among members of 3, 4, or more person-groups. Tension in this context connotes patterns of liking and disliking: if two members of a three-person group dislike each other, but like the third member, there is said to be a certain degree of tension among the members of the group. Roberts, for one, shows that the existence of tension and even the degree of tension within a group of n members can be exactly specified using graph theory (done originally by Harary).[2] Thus, the rather vague notion of tension can be given a very explicit, measurable representation.

The fourth use of mathematical modeling is for the purpose of demonstrating whether an argument is logically consistent: whether or not a set of assumptions or axioms contains contradictions. One of the most famous examples of this type of modeling exercise is found in an area that is variously called social welfare theory, group decision making, or social choice. The example is Arrow's impossibility theorem.[3] By specifying a series of axioms designed to capture what might be termed a "just" voting mechanism—one that might be characterized as "democratic"—Arrow shows that the axioms are inconsistent: there is no voting scheme that can simultaneously satisfy all of the axioms.

For the novice who is just beginning in the mathematical modeling game, these distinctions are significant and yet not at all obvious. If the potential modeler is told that modeling is an art and that the only way

[2] Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman and Dorwin Cartwright, *Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs* (New York: Wiley 1965).

[3] Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (2d ed.; New York: Wiley 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to learn is through imitation, but is not also told that modeling can serve different purposes, he will not know when to copy which type of model. It would be like teaching the beginning tennis player how to lob and volley without explaining to him the different conditions under which each type of shot is appropriate. Furthermore, as should be obvious from the above distinctions, in only one of the four usages does the modeler test his model—i.e., compare his predictions with observations. If the different purposes are not delineated, the modeler will not know when he must test a model.

The strange thing about each of these five texts is that the four distinctions are seldom made explicit. In his first chapter, Roberts does distinguish between explication and descriptive and prescriptive models, but this presentation is confusingly interspersed with a discussion of deterministic and probabilistic models. Although the latter distinction is important, it represents a different dimension: the terms explication, descriptive, and prescriptive all refer to the purpose of the model, while the terms probabilistic and deterministic refer to the types of mathematics used in formulating it. Roberts does not note the use of modeling for exposing logical inconsistencies, even though he later devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of social welfare functions and Arrow's impossibility theorem. Olinick attempts, in Chapter 1, to distinguish between what we have called the descriptive and prescriptive uses—though his terminology differs from that employed here—but he does not carry through in later chapters. Thus, Chapters 2 through 4 all present descriptive models, while the discussion of linear programming in Chapter 5 is actually in the prescriptive mode; yet no explanation of this important difference is given. The transition into Chapter 6 is even more confusing. Not having been introduced to the use of mathematical models to expose logical inconsistencies in arguments, the reader is most perplexed by the analysis of the Arrow impossibility theorem and its relationship to what took place earlier.

Lave and March make no distinction at all between types of models; yet, in one sense, their volume is the least confusing one in this respect. Since their entire presentation is from the point of view of descriptive modeling, and since they do not cover Arrow or such optimization topics as linear programming and game theory, the reader is not likely to become confused. The entire focus of Lave and March's volume is on how to construct models that will explain what we observe. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not acquaint the reader with the richness and multiple potential of mathematical models.

Malkevitch and Meyer, like Lave and March, make no distinction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the different uses of mathematical models. Also, like Lave and March, these authors are not likely to confuse their readership because they adopt a consistent, single-minded approach throughout. However, they differ from Lave and March in that their approach to modeling is entirely from the prescriptive perspective—from the point of view of how one can use mathematics to solve problems. For this reason, the volume is probably of limited use to researchers in the field of international politics. Although most of the models can be turned around and seen from a descriptive point of view, it is questionable whether a beginner will be able to accomplish this without some direction and a discussion of the differences.

Bender also does not make any overt distinction and, unfortunately, presents both descriptive and prescriptive models throughout the text in a confusing mishmash. However, Chapter 4 contains an interesting discussion that illustrates how the same model can be used both descriptively and prescriptively. In the beginning of the chapter, the author poses a problem in how to optimize the trade-off between production and storage of a commodity. Following the solution of this problem, he uses a very similar model to describe the structure of blood vessels. Although the mathematics of this section is somewhat difficult, a reader can get the flavor of the contrast between the types of models without fully understanding the mathematical details.

The final issue relevant in training a mathematical modeler's sensitivity is that of the philosophical issues inherent in mathematical modeling. Although it is probably unnecessary for a practicing mathematical modeler to be conversant with the extensive literature in this area, there are a few key issues that should be brought to his attention. Let us note one of these. When using a model descriptively, a supported prediction does not imply that the model is correct—i.e., that the assumptions of the model are true. Two very different sets of assumptions can lead to the same prediction, i.e., deduction. An illustration is provided in an article by Wagner, Perkins, and Taagepera,[4] which shows that the prediction that Richardson obtained from his arms-race model (and the prediction discussed by Olinick) could have been deduced from two different models. Thus, the fact that this prediction was consistent with observations of an arms race prior to World War I (Richardson's test) would not permit a conclusion as to which of the two underlying models was correct.

The significance of this issue is several-fold. First, a modeler can never

[4] David L. Wagner, Ronald T. Perkins, and Rein Taagepera, "Complete Solution to Richardson's Arms Race Equations," *Journal of Peace Science*, 1 (Spring 1975) 159-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assert that he has confirmed his model; at best, he can argue that observations collected thus far are consistent with the predictions of his model. Second, a modeler must hunt for ways in which he can discriminate between models that under certain situations produce the same prediction. Wagner, Perkins, and Taagepera were able to do this by showing that the two models provided very different predictions when solutions to each of them were first obtained and then tested empirically. (Richardson simply added the two differential equations without providing solutions.) In this way, it is possible to rule out *possible* explanations and thus narrow down the set of potentially relevant explanations. A third, related conclusion that a modeler can draw is that the degree of confidence in a model is enhanced to the extent to which a model can generate multiple predictions that are supported by observation. Thus it is important for the modeler to obtain as many deductions from his model as possible. And this conclusion, in turn, leads to a fourth: the more general the model, the greater the probability that additional deductions will be possible. If the model was originally formulated in terms of a very specific phenomenon, then, by expanding its applicability to a broader class of phenomena, additional predictions can be obtained.

The beginning mathematical modeler needs to be aware of these issues so as to know how to develop and refine his models. Yet, with the exception of Lave and March who explicitly deal with these questions in Chapters 2 and 3, none of the texts under review are satisfactory along these lines. Olinick implicitly touches on these issues when he presents a series of related models (particularly in Chapters 2, 3 and 4), but the discussion is not as direct as it could be. None of the other texts raise or discuss these issues.

Substantive and Mathematical Topics Covered

The final question that a potential modeler is likely to ask about a text on mathematical modeling concerns its coverage: What kinds of examples are given? While one criterion for selecting these five volumes was that each volume contain at least some examples from the social sciences, a potential reader will want to know which areas in the social sciences are covered. In addition, a reader may be interested in the kinds of mathematics employed. To some extent, these questions have been discussed in earlier sections of this review, but it is probably useful to summarize the mathematical topics in each volume.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize and compare the substantive and mathe-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matical coverage of each of the texts. The authors are listed along the rows of both tables while the columns indicate the various categories possible. In Table 1, these categories concern the substantive coverage; in Table 2, they note the mathematical coverage. Since one difficulty with this form of presentation is that the categories listed may obscure important differences, a brief explanation of the column headings may be in order.

Table 1 lists the substantive areas that are covered by the modeling examples. The models are classified on the basis of the discipline represented. Although this approach is not entirely satisfactory (since some examples can be placed under more than one discipline), almost any other classification scheme is open to comparable difficulties. The category of "psychology," for instance, contains several types of examples. Most notably it includes models of learning theory—the constant proportion and some of the simpler Markovian types—and models that cover problems in individual optimization and general decision making, such as expected value, utility theory, and decision trees. Models in "economics," the second column, include the analysis of indifference curves, the theory of the firm, and general optimization, involving such factors as supply, demand, storage, production, and so forth. The column designated "politics & sociology" combines two disciplines because it was not clear which was the most appropriate label. In Olinick, Roberts, and Malkevitch and Meyer, this category covers social decision making: how to compile the votes, and therefore, the preferences of individual members so as to consistently produce a group decision. In all three of these volumes, Arrow's theorem is featured. Olinick also presents the Richardson arms-race model, and Roberts discusses n-person game theory. Lave and March include short sections at the ends of Chapters 6 and 7 on interactive learning and the spread or diffusion of ideas within social groups. The "anthropology" model found in Olinick concerns an attempt to explain why a particular society having a rather strange division of labor remains stable over long periods of time.

The column labeled "biology" primarily covers the models known as birth-death and predatory-prey. These models attempt to describe the growth or decline in population size of particular species as a function of such factors as birth rates, food resources, competition between species, and so forth. Olinick, Lave and March, and Malkevitch and Meyer present this type of modeling. Roberts is included in this column because of his coverage of food webs—a topic related to, but not identical with, population and predatory-prey models—and genetics. Bender's contribution is in the field he calls "biogeography," or a model of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

SUBSTANTIVE TOPICS COVERED IN TEXTS ON MATHEMATICAL MODELING

	Psychology	*Economics*	*Politics & Sociology*	*Anthropology*	*Biology*	*Physical Sciences*
Bender		*			*	*
Lave and March	*	*	*		*	
Malkevitch and Meyer	*	*	*		*	*
Olinick	*		*	*	*	
Roberts	*		*		*	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diversity of species on an island, and his discussion of desert lizards. The last column covers all models that might be described very generally as falling within the physical sciences. Bender, for example, presents models in chemistry (long-chain polymers), water-ski towing, and the frictional dampening of a pendulum.

Table 2 outlines mathematical coverage. With two exceptions, the column labels are probably self-explanatory. The first exception is the distinction between "graphical analysis" and "graph theory." Graphical analysis means the plotting of functions—usually in two dimensions—and the drawing of conclusions on the basis of the shape of the function or the relationship between functions. The analysis of indifference curves or the exchange model involving the Edgeworth box are examples. Graph theory, on the other hand, is a more abstract area of mathematics. Roberts defines graph theory as involving a "mathematical object" composed of "a collection of points and lines" (p. 9). Following extensive definitions of various attributes of points, lines, and connections between them, numerous theorems can be proven to show the relationship between characteristics of graphs. For example, what characteristic must a graph have to permit one to go from one particular point to another? When is a graph "strongly connected?"

The other possibly confusing category is the one entitled "axiomatic." The difficulty with this term is that it is too general: all branches of mathematics can be axiomatically derived. Thus, the designation is a catch-all label and refers primarily to topics in formal measurement theory, utility theory, and Arrow's impossibility theory.

Summary and Conclusion

Any overall recommendation based on the variety of different dimensions covered must make certain assumptions about the reader which are not necessarily reasonable. It is probably fair to say that, regardless of mathematical sophistication, the beginning mathematical modeler cannot go astray by starting with Lave and March. The individual with considerable mathematical training will be able to read the volume quickly and gain insight into how to model; the individual with minimal mathematical training will not be intimidated by the mathematics in the volume, and will be able to see the fun and usefulness of the modeling process. Although the tone of the writing may eventually irritate some readers, the text is generally accessible, and the types of models covered are all solidly within the social science disciplines.

Next, the reader who has no training in mathematics should probably proceed to Malkevitch and Meyer. Although this entire text is focused

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

MATHEMATICAL TOPICS COVERED IN TEXTS ON MATHEMATICAL MODELING

	Graphical Analysis	*Graph Theory*	*Linear Programming*	*Statistics*	*Probability*	*Game Theory*	*Difference Equations*	*Differential Equations*	*Axiomatic*
Bender	*				*			*	
Lave and March	*				*		*	*	
Malkevitch and Meyer	*	*	*	*	*	* (2-person)	*		*
Olinick			*		*			*	*
Roberts	*	*			*	* (*n*-person)			*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on "prescriptive modeling," and is thus not very useful to the political scientist, the mathematical development is extremely clear, and the numerous examples and exercises will provide the mathematically unsophisticated with a reasonable background from which to proceed. While one might argue that such a background could be provided by any standard math text, the advantage of Malkevitch and Meyer is that a variety of mathematical topics relevant for modeling are covered, *and* modeling applications are provided. After the reader has mastered the topics in this volume, the next step might be Olinick. As noted above, this work presents some severe handicaps for the individual with limited mathematical background. Still, if he has covered some of the mathematical topics in Malkevitch and Meyer, he may find Olinick quite comprehensible. Nevertheless, the models involving differential equations will probably only be understood at a very superficial level. The more gutsy individual should tackle Roberts. Although the mathematical treatment is considerably more extensive and, therefore, perhaps more awesome, the total development is far more satisfying and complete. Even for the mathematically sophisticated, however, this volume will require serious study. While he writes clearly, Roberts is far more concise than Lave and March; the typical political scientist who is used to reading several pages a minute will probably be chagrined to discover that it takes more than a few minutes to cover only a few sentences of Roberts.

The individual with a background in mathematics—say, at least two years of college math—should consider omitting Malkevitch and Meyer altogether and moving directly to Olinick and Roberts. He might read Olinick first, since this text covers a large variety of models and, for the social scientist, is possibly more readable since it is not as terse as Roberts. With two years of college math, the individual will have a reasonable background in calculus, and the transition from calculus to differential equations may have been provided by Lave and March. Hence, the differential equation models in Olinick should not be too difficult to follow. Having read Olinick and possibly feeling somewhat perplexed by the mishmash presentation from model to model, the reader should immediately proceed to Roberts to get a more coherent picture of how mathematics and modeling fit together. From there, the reader might wish to go through some sections of Bender. Although the physical science approach is heavier in this volume than in any of the others, the more advanced modeling discussions in Part II cover interesting topics in differential-difference equations that could be useful for problems in international politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEARNING FROM HISTORY:
Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process

By ROBERT C. GRAY*

Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics.* New York: Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University Press, 1976, 273 pp., $15.00.

Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making.* Cambridge, Mass.: Program for Science and International Affairs, Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975, 237 pp., $17.50.

Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972, 261 pp., $9.95.

I

A NUMBER of scholars in the last two decades have produced case studies of the weapons acquisition process.[1] Such studies inevitably deal with the operations of organizations; the rise in recent years of a bureaucratic politics approach to the study of foreign policy has both stimulated new studies and cast new light on older ones.[2]

Although it remains less than a coherent theory, the bureaucratic politics approach has, by making certain assumptions explicit, altered the context in which studies of weapons procurement take place.

* The author would like to thank the H. B. Earhart Foundation for the fellowship that enabled him to study the weapons acquisition process. He is also indebted to Robert J. Bresler, David V. Edwards, and Stanley J. Michalak, Jr., for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of the manuscript.

[1] See, for example, Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969); Robert J. Art, *The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military* (Boston: Little, Brown 1968); Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, eds., *American Defense Policy* (3rd ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1973), esp. the essays by Vincent Davis, "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Naval Cases," and Richard G. Head, "Doctrinal Innovation and the A-7 Attack Aircraft Decisions." Also see the essays in the volume by Halperin and Kanter cited in note 2.

[2] For major works on the bureaucratic politics approach, see Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution 1974); and Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in Halperin and Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973). For a somewhat different but related approach, see John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), and the application of this theory to the F-111 in Robert F. Coulam, *Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977).

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/030457-14$00.70/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Graham Allison and Frederic Morris stated the basic assumption of this approach most succinctly when they wrote that "the weapons in the American and Soviet force postures are *predominantly* the result of factors *internal* to each nation."[3] Thus, the attention of analysts is oriented away from "the arms race," "the strategic balance," or "national choice," and toward a concern with organizational behavior and bureaucratic "pulling and hauling."

The purpose of this article is to assess the utility of case studies of the weapons acquisition process by examining three of the most impressive examples, each dealing with a major strategic system in the American arsenal. A related purpose is to place these volumes in the new perspective generated by the bureaucratic politics approach.

Because the weapons described in these volumes are the most important strategic systems of our era, one could justify a review of them on substantive grounds alone. By considering the three books together, this essay will provide a record of the changing environment of American strategic weapons choices from the late 1940s to the late 1960s and early 1970s. Edmund Beard describes the evolution of the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the 1940s to the late 1950s, with primary emphasis on the years prior to 1955. Harvey Sapolsky, in discussing the evolution of the Polaris submarine and missile, focuses on the period from 1955 to the 1960s. And Ted Greenwood describes how, in the 1960s, follow-on systems to the Atlas ICBM and the Polaris were equipped with the multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) instead of the single warheads of the past.

II

The three books are meticulously researched, and they conveniently illustrate alternate paths that one can take in such studies. Beard approached the history of the ICBM without a security clearance by using an Air Force procedure that permits scholars to apply for access to classified records.[4] He also drew extensively on Congressional hearings and, to a lesser extent, on interviews. His interviewees permitted themselves to be identified, possibly reflecting the fact that Beard focused on the period prior to 1955.

[3] Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," in Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens, eds., *Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control* (New York: W. W. Norton 1976), 126; emphasis in original.

[4] Beard reports a favorable experience with this procedure. If a proposal is approved, the researcher takes notes on the classified material and leaves them with the Air Force —whereupon they are, if declassified, sent to the scholar.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sapolsky also had access to classified material and also used interviews, but his task was simplified by the fact that he was invited by the Navy to write a history of the development of the Polaris system. Thus, he had "access to all program records and permission to interview any civil servant or naval officer connected with the program." The book, a revised version of the report he prepared for the Navy, was published "without review other than for security purposes" (p. viii). In order to ensure candor, Sapolsky granted all interviewees anonymity. He does identify quotations by reference to code designations (e.g., Int IV-18, V-26, etc.) so that one at least knows which assertions are based on interviews, although there is no indication of the positions held by the persons interviewed.

Alone among the three books surveyed here, Greenwood's study of MIRV is not based on any access to classified documents. The more timely nature of the topic no doubt precluded that. In addition to the extensive use of industry journals and Congressional hearings, Greenwood relied on interviews with some one hundred people. As with Sapolsky, anonymity was assured to elicit candor. Unlike Sapolsky, however, there are no coded references. Thus, Greenwood writes that "[t]he reader must simply assume that statements addressing matters that are not common knowledge and that are not footnoted are based on information conveyed in interviews" (p. xii).[5]

The main problem with the use of interviews by Sapolsky and Greenwood is that one does not know the source of the information or even, in the case of Greenwood, which statements are based on interviews. Both books would be more useful if the system of Robert Coulam had been used. In his book on the F-111, Coulam cited interviews by number, but he included in an appendix some indication of the nature of the interviewees (e.g., contractor official, high-level Navy official, etc.). This practice permits a better evaluation of the probable validity of assertions. However, one must add that the difficulties of doing research on such sensitive topics impose unique burdens, and none of the three books is seriously weakened by its author's method of using sources.

III

Edmund Beard, whose work is a worthy contribution to a distinguished series sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of

[5] Greenwood does add, however, that "[f]ull documentation of [the] interviews, telephone conversations, and letters is maintained in . . . files, and inquiries concerning . . . sources from serious scholars will be given careful consideration."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Columbia University, seeks to explain why it was not until 1954 that a high-level decision was made to produce an ICBM. He hypothesizes that "the political judgments and resulting decisions . . . remained rigid while the technological or strategic elements of the issue evolved over time . . ." (p. 5). In seeking to demonstrate the validity of that hypothesis, he has produced a searching and innovative study of governmental *in*action.

Rather than concentrating on the "pulling and hauling" concerning a major decision that many analysts of bureaucratic politics dwell on, he seeks instead to "provide a detailed review of what happens before a major decision. This period may well shape the timing of the large decision as well as its nature. It should be examined more often" (p. 12). Almost four-fifths of the book is devoted to the period prior to the assignment of "highest priority" to ICBM development.

Beard describes the ambivalent attitude of the Army Air Forces toward guided missiles in the aftermath of World War II. The prevailing view was that manned jets were "the weapons of the future," while "long-range rockets were considered pure dreaming" (p. 73). And yet, if research and development on guided missiles were to be done, the Army Air Forces wanted control—control that it won in skirmishes with Army Ordnance and the Navy. Immediately after the war, there was a great burst of Army Air Force research, with some twenty-six projects on guided missiles. By the time of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, there were only four, the others having been casualties of lean research and development budgets in the Truman years and lack of enthusiasm in the Air Force for long-range guided missiles (p. 102).[6]

One consequence of the Korean War was an increase in defense expenditures, an increase large enough to permit the Air Force to renew its consideration of long-range guided missiles. Convair, the contractor who had worked on a 5000-mile ballistic missile (MX-774) from late 1946 until its cancellation in late 1948, had, in fact, continued work at its own expense; in January 1951, this firm was given a contract for what was to become the Atlas ICBM (MX-1593) (p. 132). The Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), a new organization responsible for Air Force research and development, pressed the case for the ICBM, although Air Force headquarters, skeptical about the

[6] Air-to-surface (Rascal) and air-to-air (Falcon) missiles retained priority because, as manned-bomber armament, they fit with the Air Force's concept of its mission. The two surface-to-surface missiles under development (Navaho and Snark) were cruise missiles rather than ballistic ones because they were extensions of existent technology and not radically new ventures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potential of the proposed missile, clung to a rather leisurely development plan that did not call for an operational ICBM for years to come (pp. 150-51).

The Eisenhower Administration in 1953 brought into office Trevor Gardner as a special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. After reviewing the missile proposals of the Air Force, he became an advocate of the Atlas program and, in cooperation with ARDC and Convair, finally managed to move the program forward. He established the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (SMEC), more popularly known as the von Neumann Committee, and "stacked it with long-range ballistic missile proponents" (p. 159). On the recommendation of this committee, a separate agency was established to manage the development of the Atlas program, and ICBM appropriations were considered apart from other Air Force requests (pp. 171 and 191). A reluctant Air Force staff had finally been made to act by civilian officials of the Eisenhower Administration and those elements in the Air Force that favored the ICBM. In September of 1955, President Eisenhower accorded the ICBM "the highest priority in the nation" (p. 189).

Although the Atlas program never had unlimited funding, and even suffered budget cuts shortly before Sputnik, the efforts from 1953 on succeeded; there was a full-range flight of Atlas in November of 1958. Beard's conclusion—fully supported by the evidence he presents—is that "the United States could have developed an ICBM considerably earlier than it did but that such development was hindered by organizational structures and belief patterns that did not permit it" (p. 8).

IV

While Beard focuses on factors that led to delay in the development of the ICBM (devoting only one chapter to the evolution of the ICBM program itself), Sapolsky is almost entirely concerned with the successful management of the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM), also known as the Polaris program.

These differences in emphasis are not completely arbitrary, for the Polaris system emerged only in 1955–56. By that time, the general case for ballistic missiles had already been successfully made; it was sealed with the Soviet launch of Sputnik in fall of 1957. The chief obstacles to Polaris in the mid-1950s had been doubts among Naval officers that FBM contributed to the organizational health of the Navy, and President Eisenhower's limitation of missile programs to four (Atlas ICBM, Titan ICBM, Thor IRBM, and Army Jupiter IRBM) (p. 15). Initially,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the forces in the Navy that sought a ballistic role had to work with the Army on a joint intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) because of the Eisenhower limitation; by the end of 1956, the Navy had moved toward the separate development of the Polaris system. Thus, although there were internal Navy struggles and inter-service rivalry over Polaris, it faced substantially less opposition and suffered much less delay than had the ICBM, simply because in the mid-1950s there was a widely perceived need to counter a growing Soviet capability.

As in the ICBM program, advocates of Polaris succeeded in establishing a new organization to oversee its development—the Special Projects Office (SPO). And, as with ICBM, appropriations for Polaris were considered as a package separate from regular service requests (pp. 23, 45).

The bulk of Sapolsky's book is devoted to examining the largely successful efforts of the SPO "to gain the organizational autonomy required to deploy a force of FBM submarines in the shortest possible time" (p. 41). Sapolsky enumerates four bureaucratic political strategies used by the Special Projects Office—differentiation, co-optation, moderation, and managerial innovation (p. 43).[7] Under the leadership of Admiral William Raborn, the SPO indefatigably promoted the special importance of Polaris in countering the Soviet threat. Through *differentiation*, a "unique demand" was thus created for the FBM system. Through *co-optation*, potential sources of opposition to Polaris—both within and from outside the Navy—were made to feel a part of the program. *Moderation* as a strategy "refers to the attempts of organizations to build long-term support . . . by sacrificing short-term gains" (p. 54). The Special Projects Office refused to press for total control over all tasks related to FBM (e.g., communications research and development) and restrained criticism of competing ballistic missile programs in the Air Force.

Finally, Sapolsky isolates the strategy of *managerial innovation*, which he claims was "essentially an independent invention of the Special Projects Office" (p. 58). Chief among the innovations was the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and its extension to cover project costs, PERT/COST. Because SPO succeeded in fostering an image of great managerial innovation, it became the focus of widespread private and public interest and, in the process, "gained an

[7] Sapolsky's four-fold categorization has proven useful to others. See, for example, Richard G. Head, "The Weapons Acquisition Process: Alternative National Strategies," in Frank B. Horton III, ed., *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1974), 418.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unparalleled independence within the Navy and with the Department of Defense that has only recently been eroded" (p. 59).

As Sapolsky demonstrates, however, the management innovations that were so successful in generating confidence and in leading to organizational autonomy were of almost no value in the successful management of the program. As he puts it, "PERT did not build the Polaris, but it was extremely useful . . . to have many people believe that it did" (p. 125). The strategies described, in short, enabled SPO to control the necessary resources.

In describing what *did* lead to the successful management of the Polaris program, Sapolsky notes excellence of leadership, structural decentralization that facilitated "subunit initiative," intraprogram competition so that there was "a range of alternatives for each major decision," and the esprit de corps of the Special Projects Office (pp. 131-32). In the latter regard, Admiral Raborn consistently emphasized that Polaris was "not just another missile that was being built; it was, rather, the missile that was going to stop the Russian threat to the U. S. mainland" (p. 159).

Sapolsky seems correct in concluding that the Polaris managers achieved their goals. By the end of 1960, two FBM submarines were in operation, with forty-one of them ultimately deployed. The Special Projects Office accomplished this feat with a minimum of interference, despite the fact that Polaris was one of the costliest projects in U. S. history (at least $10 billion through 1967) (p. 162). But, just as Polaris was developed in an environment different from that of Atlas, so, by the mid-1960s, the environment had changed again. Sapolsky notes that, perhaps because of the success of Polaris in promoting a sense of safety born of deterrence, the conditions that gave rise to such a nearly autonomous Special Projects Office ceased to exist. The structural reforms of the McNamara era in the Department of Defense diluted the power of the Special Projects Office. And arms control considerations rose as a factor that had been totally absent in the 1950s. Thus, the decision to move to MIRVed Poseidon missiles as a follow-on to the single-warhead Polaris was not characterized by the harmony of the Polaris system development.

V

Ted Greenwood, whose study of MIRV is a publication of Harvard University's new Center for Science and International Affairs, focuses on "the most important technical innovation in the field of offensive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategic forces since the ballistic missile" (p. xiii). When considered along with Beard's and Sapolsky's, the volume illustrates the extent to which the environment of weapons acquisition has changed from the early days of Atlas, through Polaris, and to the beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). One can separate the book into two components—factors leading to the development of MIRV and factors leading to opposition to it. In doing this, the contours of the environmental changes in weapons acquisition become clear.

One significant feature of Greenwood's study is a multidimensional approach that does not overstress any one factor (including bureaucratic politics). As he succinctly says of MIRV development, "technology, strategy, politics, and organizational factors were all woven together in an intricate, unique and changing fabric" (p. 81). Because of the richness and subtlety of his own argument, it is difficult to do justice to it in a brief review, but a few examples will illustrate his achievement.

Greenwood details the technical background of MIRV, making clear that because it was a qualitative improvement rather than a completely new weapon, it "was able to advance quite far in conceptual design without receiving explicit authorization from either the services or DDR&E" (p. 35). It moved forward simply on the initiative of the "technical and industrial community." Thus, technological momentum played a role, a point to which Greenwood returns at the end of his book.

Technological momentum is not a sufficient explanation, however, for putting multiple warheads on missiles. The Soviets were believed to be developing a significant antiballistic missile (ABM) capability, and with the McNamara freeze on Minuteman missiles at 1000, the obvious way of fulfilling an Air Force mission and of countering the potential Soviet threat was to MIRV future missiles. These facts helped squelch what opposition to MIRV did exist in the Air Force (pp. 37-43).

As for bureaucratic politics, the Special Projects Office was not as enthusiastic as the Air Force about putting MIRV on its new Poseidon missile. SPO faced continued opposition within the Navy over the deployment of forty-one Polaris submarines that to some "did not contribute to any of the Navy's traditional missions" (p. 34). With the submarines deployed, further funds were now to be expended on missile modernization, a development not welcome to non-Polaris elements in the Navy. By the end of 1964, however, both Air Force and Navy were including in their force planning the development of MIRV for Minuteman and Poseidon.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In terms of strategy, MIRV was originally justified (as suggested above) as a means of overwhelming a Soviet ABM system, although it soon came to be perceived by the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a counterforce weapon useful against other military targets in the event of a nuclear war. Thus, MIRV never lacked strategic missions. Greenwood depicts the evolving doctrinal formulations and their consequences for MIRV development.

Finally, Greenwood discusses domestic politics. Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted to avoid the deployment of a large-scale American ABM system. Because multiple warheads could overwhelm an ABM system, McNamara publicly discussed the potentials of MIRV in 1967. Greenwood draws an analogy between such political use of MIRV by civilian leaders and the use of strategic arguments by the Air Force or Navy "to protect their organizational autonomy." As he puts it, "[i]n both cases the arguments or policies are designed primarily to further the objectives of the individual or organization that makes them," although he cautions against overemphasizing such factors (p. 79).

Thus, Greenwood concludes that numerous factors interacted to move MIRV forward, among them technological momentum, perceived mission needs (based on possible Soviet threats and the desire by the services to preserve organizational essence), nuclear strategy, and domestic politics.

Having described the evolution of MIRV, Greenwood turns his attention to the sources of opposition to the weapon. Just as he stresses a multiplicity of forces leading to development, so he argues that in 1968, numerous factors converged to produce opposition:

> It was the combination of technical advances [improved accuracies that might be destabilizing], new intelligence information [reducing the severity of the Soviet ABM threat], changes in the mood of Congress and the country [Vietnam], and the apparent imminence of arms control negotiations that led to the initial challenge to the MIRV programs (p. 116).

Until quite late in the development of MIRV, the most likely source of opposition, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), was not sufficiently involved in weapons developments to express a view; once involved, it did not adequately foresee the arms control implications of MIRV. The central debate eventually focused on whether MIRV testing should be postponed pending arms talks with the Soviets. Greenwood makes clear, however, that an ongoing MIRV program was thought necessary to serve as bargaining leverage.[8] In the

[8] On the use of MIRV as a bargaining chip in SALT, see Robert J. Bresler and Rob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

end, the various efforts in Congress and among certain segments of the public failed to forestall MIRV testing and deployment. As Greenwood aptly puts it:

> By 1968 the military's commitment to MIRV was exceedingly strong. The programs were too far advanced, deployment schedules of Poseidon and Minuteman III were too integrated with the maintenance and modernization of existing systems, and too many other programs had been given up along the way for the military to forego or delay the new MIRVed missiles willingly (p. 127).

In sum, MIRV was challengeable not on military or cost-effectiveness grounds, but only on those of arms control. And the voices of arms control were too weak or too late, or both. No less a figure than Secretary of State Kissinger has stated that he wishes he "had thought through the implications of the MIRVed world more fully in 1969 and 1970."[9] Despite the failure to constrain MIRV, the episode reveals a central fact about the era of SALT. A new set of factors—arms control considerations—has risen to be taken into account in the acquisition of weapons. The battles of the 1950s recounted by Beard and the near-autonomy and universal acclaim of Polaris described by Sapolsky are quite far removed from the opposition that developed to MIRV.

VI

Greenwood observes that in his work "the central concern . . . is not so much with recounting history, as with understanding it" (p. 49). The same can be said about Beard and Sapolsky. An element common to all three is a concern with bureaucratic and organizational politics. It will be useful here to place these efforts in perspective.

Beard's volume on the ICBM owes the most to the bureaucratic-political approach of recent years, although he remains cognizant of other factors as well. It is to his credit that his study extends the approach to encompass the explanation of *in*action. Because of this extension, his work is probably the most innovative of the three books. It may become a classic study illustrating governmental inertia in the face of technological change, and it may stimulate future studies of other periods preceding major decisions.

Sapolsky also focuses on bureaucracy, but his emphasis is on the suc-

---

ert C. Gray, "The Bargaining Chip and SALT," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92 (Spring 1977), 74-76.

[9] Quoted in *The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.S. Security, Arms Control, and World Peace*, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O. 1975), 68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cessful management of Polaris. This type of history of a program is essential in building a solid body of data on which to draw in broader studies of weapons acquisition. But the conditions surrounding Polaris were unique, so that there are limits on the extent to which one can generalize from this case.

Sapolsky himself notes the uniqueness of Polaris, a convergence of technology and national will that he compares with the Manhattan and Apollo Projects. But he reiterates the necessity of skill in bureaucratic politics in the progress of any project. "Politics is a systemic requirement," he says (p. 244), and it seems plausible that if the bureaucratic strategies he outlines were important in achieving the goals of Polaris advocates, they would be even more important in successfully managing more controversial programs.

If Beard's and Sapolsky's works are studies in bureaucracy, Greenwood's is something different; although he deals with bureaucratic and organizational factors in discussing MIRV, he periodically warns the reader against relying too heavily on any one explanation. Greenwood is clearly interested in promoting multidimensional explanations, and his excellent study is itself proof enough of the utility of such works.

Because of their skill, Sapolsky and especially Beard have produced works that focus on bureaucracy but do not seriously neglect other factors. But there is potential for great distortion as less talented researchers immerse themselves in documents and transcripts of interviews, and emerge with unidimensional accounts of this or that governmental program. The bureaucratic politics approach will continue to stimulate research into important dimensions of government operations. The crucial *caveat*—and the one correctly emphasized by Greenwood—is that those dimensions should not preclude adequate attention to technology, strategy, domestic politics, and other factors that may get neglected when one embraces a single paradigm too closely. Thus, the statement by Allison and Morris quoted at the outset of this essay is an exaggeration that, if accepted uncritically, could lead to inadequate explanations of complex events.

Just as there are differences in their emphasis on bureaucratic politics, so the three books differ in terms of relevance to contemporary policy. Sapolsky's is relevant mainly in terms of illustrating the strategies that, useful in the development of Polaris, might also be useful in other projects. Since Sapolsky's focus is fairly narrow, however, it does not lead him to a sustained effort at making specific recommendations about other weapons acquisitions.

Beard, in a concluding chapter, not only places his own work in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the context of a framework of bureaucratic politics, but also draws conclusions of contemporary relevance. Reiterating his finding of organizational resistance to the ICBM, he suggests that new weapons developments may be aborted unless an agency that stands apart from prevailing doctrine or methods can assume direction. Beard concludes that an independent agency to assess research and development issues might have led to earlier development of the ICBM, and recommends the creation of such an institution, perhaps within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Assuming a broader perspective, however, Beard notes that such an agency for new weapons proposals should not only give novel concepts "a more objective hearing, but old and potentially outmoded weapons and doctrines might also face valuable scrutiny. . . . If war is too important to be left to the generals; so too may the choice of weapons which may determine whether or not you get into a war and how you fare once there" (pp. 245-46). Thus, Beard wisely seeks a way around dysfunctional organizational routines so that weapons proposals may get a more detached evaluation.

It falls to Greenwood to address most adequately the wider dimensions of weapons acquisition in an era of arms control. He concludes with eight propositions that may be useful in further research—an explicit categorization that might have been usefully adopted by Beard and Sapolsky. Among the principal propositions that he sets forth, two are particularly noteworthy: "the critical event in the life of a weapon system is the decision to enter into engineering development"; and, "the technical community plays a central role in the weapons acquisition process" (pp. 145 and 147). Once it was in engineering development, MIRV acquired crucial constituencies in favor of deployment; and MIRV advanced quite far on the initiative of the technical community. Thus it is that Greenwood stresses "the need to have a high degree of responsiveness to political will built into the weapons acquisition process" (p. 151).

Greenwood suggests a number of ways of fulfilling this need, including laws that would mandate the submission to Congress of "major review and concept justification papers" of weapons about to enter engineering development (p. 153). The extent to which recent reforms that seek to clarify the mission prior to any major system development will accomplish Greenwood's goals is difficult to project now, but at least efforts are being made.[10]

[10] The major reform is OMB Circular A-109 on Major Systems Acquisitions, the purpose of which is to "ensure that each major system fulfills a mission need." On p. 310

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The tension between the kind of bureaucratic resistance to innovation documented in Beard and the possibility of technological momentum leading to the deployment of unnecessary weapons suggested by Greenwood is difficult to resolve. Greenwood catches its essence when he states that "some development programs that are desirable as a hedge against uncertainty may gain enough political support to become full-fledged, but perhaps unnecessary, deployed systems" (p. 156). He then suggests that increased competition, better program management, and greater caution before entering engineering development may help solve this problem.

As one examines Beard and Greenwood, one lesson seems more important than any other. The key decisions must be made by civilian leaders as far removed from bureaucratic and organizational biases as possible. This practice may lead either to progress in a program that had been resisted at lower levels (e.g., Trevor Gardner and the ICBM), or the termination of programs that are pressed by the technical community and the services from below, but are deemed marginal or counterproductive. In an age of arms control, moreover, responsible leaders would do well to consider the arms control implications of weapons developments, and to delay testing and deployment where that seems necessary and prudent.[11] Once it has been decided that a proposed weapon is needed, the weapons acquisition process might well be streamlined to reduce the time from research and development to deployment. The crucial point is that, to the extent possible, decisions at each step in the weapons acquisition process should be the product of rational choice by reasonably detached decision-makers who have not had their options excessively constrained at lower levels.[12]

As further case studies of weapons acquisition are published, several challenges are identifiable. One is to keep the explanatory tools used in proper proportion. The multidimensional approach of Greenwood is, on balance, preferable to unidimensional explanations. A second is to

---

of his *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1979*, Secretary of Defense Brown states that this reform will be implemented and that "programs will start when the Secretary of Defense approves a mission element need statement (MENS) which states the requirement in general operational terms."

[11] The consideration of arms control implications is, in theory at least, more likely now because of legislation requiring arms control impact statements for "a request to the Congress for authorization or appropriations." For an excellent critique of the actual statements for fiscal year 1978 (and some suggestive *model* impact statements), see *Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in Connection with Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request*, U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O. 1977).

[12] It is necessary to underscore such an obvious recommendation because of the cases in which it has *not* been followed (e.g., delay on ICBM and excessive alacrity on MIRV).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understand the relationship of the weapons acquisition process to the process of arms control. How have these processes interacted since the beginning of SALT I? How can they be more closely aligned so that technology does not outpace diplomacy? A third challenge is less temporal: What can be extracted from case studies that might lead to generalizations testable either on other weapons systems in America or in weapons acquisition in other countries?[13] What are the differences between the acquisition of unique central strategic systems, such as those discussed here, and less glamorous tactical systems? Although a genuine theory of weapons acquisition seems remote, a better understanding of how nations translate threat perceptions into hardware is achievable through the cumulative efforts of authors such as Beard, Sapolsky, and Greenwood.

[13] For one interesting comparative effort, see Arthur J. Alexander, "Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, the United States, and France," Horton (fn. 7), 426-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe between the Superpowers

The Enduring Balance

A. W. DePorte

A thoughtful, informed analysis of Europe's recent past in the light of its history. It presents the distinctive thesis that the division of Europe into East and West and the relationship between the United States and Western Europe are both sound, firm, and likely to endure. A Council on Foreign Relations Book. $18.50

The Politics of Faction

Christian Democratic Rule in Italy

Alan S. Zuckerman

Using the behavior of factions in Italy's Christian Democratic party as evidence, Zuckerman argues that political clienteles can be found within the political elites of many, if not most, countries—and not just in transitional societies. His book makes a significant contribution to our understanding not only of Italian politics but of political elites, political parties, political cleavages, and comparative politics. $18.50

The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record

Second edition, revised and enlarged

Volume 2: British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945

compiled, translated, and edited by J. C. Hurewitz

This volume examines the evolution between 1914 and 1945 of the international political system in the Middle East and North Africa, radically rearranged by the First World War and its settlement and again in the Second. Hurewitz once more provides essential background for understanding today's problems in the Middle East. $40.00

Now available in paper

The Military and Politics in Modern Times

On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers

Amos Perlmutter Foreword by Samuel P. Huntington

"A major and surely lasting contribution to the growing literature on civil-military relations."—*Foreign Affairs* Cloth $17.50 Paper $6.95

Yale University Press New Haven and London

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Since its foundation in 1964, the *Journal of Development Studies* has established itself as a major international forum for the discussion of the fundamental issues of development. It has become a crossroads where economists, political scientists, sociologists and others whose studies centre on the Third World, can examine the full dimensions of the development process and the obstacles blocking its path.

Recent and forthcoming articles include:

Rural Poverty and Agricultural Performance in India
Montek S. Ahluwalia

Brazilian Income Distribution in the 1960s: 'Facts,' Model Results and the Controversy
Edmar Bacha and Lance Taylor

On Measuring Rural Unemployment **P. K. Bardhan**

Alternative Theories of Sharecropping: Some Tests Using Evidence from Northeast India **Clive Bell**

The Public Investment Criterion and the Role of the State
E. V. K. FitzGerald

Allende's Chile: The Judgment of History and the Verdict of Fringe-Marxism—Review Article **David Lehmann**

Qlaju: A Yoruba Concept of Development **J. D. Y. Peel**

Published quarterly by

FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.

Gainsborough House, Gainsborough Road, London E11 1RS

***Subscriptions*: $49.00 institutions; £24.00** **$35.00 individuals £16.00**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Theory of International Politics

Kenneth N. Waltz,
University of California, Berkeley

This book constructs and applies a systems theory of international politics making use of theories and concepts from various social sciences, especially economics. The author defines two types of theory — theory in terms of units of action and theory in terms of systems. He moves from theory to practice and uses many examples to show how expectations about future outcomes can be inferred and how such expectations vary with changes in international systems. (08349)

Addison-Wesley Publishing Company
Reading, Mass. 01867

KENTUCKY

THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
Unfinished Business for America's Third Century
Harold & Margaret Sprout

In this important work, these two eminent scholars offer hard counsel on what has to be done to halt the despoliation and pollution of our world. The solution, they make clear, is necessarily political. Their searching approach to a grave, controversial problem demands the attention of all who would reverse the destruction of our environment before it is too late. "A well-balanced, realistic assessment of the nation's ability to cope with its environmental problems. . . . Helps to meet a long-standing need for books that examine environmental politics in their full dimensions" — Lynton K. Caldwell.

224 pages $9.75

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY • LEXINGTON 40506

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FORO INTERNACIONAL

Revista Trimestral Publicada Por el Colegio de México

Fundador: DANIEL COSIO VILLEGAS
Director: LORENZO MEYER COSIO
Directora Adjunta: BLANCA TORRES RAMIREZ

VOL. XIX JULIO-SEPTIEMBRE, 1978 NUM. 1

INDICE

ARTICULOS

Jorge Castañeda, **La zona económica exclusive y el nuevo orden económico internacional**
Yoram Shapira, **La política exterior de México bajo el régimen de Echeverría: retrospectiva**
Roderic A. Camp, **Quienes alcanzan la cumbre: la élite política mexicana**
Enrique Villanueva, **Acerca de la libertad política y la distinción apariencia-realidad**
Luis Angel Rojo, **La economía española ante la liquidación del franquismo**
Manuel A. Garretón, **De la seguridad nacional a la nueva institucionalidad**

APENDICE ESTADISTICO

RESEÑAS

LIBROS RECIBIDOS

Precio del ejemplar 45.00 pesos, U.S. Dls. 2.46
Suscripción anual (4 números) 160.00 pesos, U.S. Dls. 9.18

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO
Departamento de Publicaciones
Camino al Ajusco 20
México 20, D.F.

THE ROUND TABLE

The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs

Editor: Alexander MacLeod

THE ROUND TABLE offers a combination of scholarship and controversy on current international, political and economic affairs with special reference to the Commonwealth.

ISSUE NO. 268—OCTOBER 1977

Editorial	A Deepening Tragedy
Shridath Ramphal	A Quiet Conference
Shyam Bhatia	Beyond Proliferation
Leo Goodstadt	Democracy v Dynasties
David Rudnick	The Winding Road of Good Intentions
Ravi Gulhati	A Mandate on Behalf of the Poor?
John Madeley	Standoff in Paris
Peter Lyon	Unstable Archipelago
Stanley Uys	A Very Dull Society
J.E. Spence	Scenarios for South Africa

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: £8

(four issues—January, April, July and October)
from The Journals Manager, Oxford University Press, Neasden, London, NW10 0DD
and from all booksellers
(rates for Overseas Subscriptions on application.)

THE ROUND TABLE

18, Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5AP, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparative Politics

A publication of the political science program of the City University of New York.

Comparative Politics is an international journal containing articles devoted to comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. Articles range from the patterns of emerging nations to contrasts in the structures of established societies.

Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to political and social scientists, scholars, and students. The journal is indispensable to experts in research organizations, foundations, consulates, and embassies throughout the world.

In a recent poll conducted by *PS*, political science professors ranked **Comparative Politics** fourth among political science journals and seventh among social science journals in a field of sixty-three journals.

Recent Contributors:
Bogdan Denitch
John Osgood Field
Paul H. B. Godwin
Arnold J. Heidenheimer
Irving Louis Horowitz
John D. Powell
Ellen Kay Trimberger
Myron Weiner

Editor-in-chief:
Arnold A. Rogow

Published quarterly.

Subscription Rates: *Individuals:* $13.00/year; $24.00/two years; $35.00/three years. *Institutions:* $18.00/year. *Students:* $7.00/year. Foreign postage: Add $1.00 per year.

Send prepaid orders to:
Comparative Politics
Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N.J. 08903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

The leading international journal
for the study of twentieth century China

Issues contain
Articles Book Reviews Comments
Research Notes Visitors' Reports from China
Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

Issue No. 75 (September 1978)

PERFORMANCE AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATION AND HEALTH POLICIES — *David M. Lampton*

HUA KUO-FENG AND THE ARREST OF THE "GANG OF FOUR" — *Andres D. Onate*

MAO AND LIU IN THE 1947 LAND REFORM: ALLIES OR DISPUTANTS? — *Tanaka Kyoko*

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE COLONIAL AREAS: THE VIEW FROM YENAN, 1937–41 — *Steven M. Goldstein*

Research Notes

SOME SPECULATIONS ON THE RETURN OF THE REGIONS: PARALLELS WITH THE PAST — *Dorothy J. Solinger*

CHINA'S DEMOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION 1850–1953 RECONSIDERED — *Peter Schran*

DAVID MARSHALL AND JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM CHINA — *Josef and Lynn Silverstein*

Review Article

MODERN CHINESE STUDIES IN JAPAN AND THE WEST: COMING CLOSER TOGETHER — *Ronald Suleski*

Editorial Office:
School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

For subscriptions write to:
Publications (*The China Quarterly*)
School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

Subscription rates:
£10 or U.S.$20 a year, post free
Full-time students £5 or U.S.$10
Individual copies £2.50 or U.S.$5

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

An interdisciplinary and international journal edited at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in cooperation with an international editorial committee.

Selected articles from 1977 issues (volume XIV):
Boulding, Kenneth: *Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung*
Dabelko, David and James M. McCormick: *Opportunity Costs of Defense: Some Cross-National Evidence*
Gleditsch, Nils Petter: *Towards a Multilateral Aviation Treaty*
Høivik, Tord: *The Lorenz Curve as a Peace Research Tool*
Langer, Albert: *Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy*
Lodgaard, Sverre: *The Functions of SALT*
Mytelka, Lynn K.: *Regulating Direct Foreign Investment and the Technology Transfer in the Andean Group*
Naustdalslid, Jon: *A Multi-Level Approach to the Study of Center-Periphery Systems and Socio-Economic Change*
Poleszynski, Dag: *Waste Production and Overdevelopment*
Stehr, Uwe: *Unequal Development and Dependency Structures in Comecon*

Annual subscription: Norwegian kroner 90.—/US $ 18.00
Single issues: Norwegian kroner 25.—/US $ 5.00

Editorial correspondence:
The Editor, Journal of Peace Research, Rådhusgt. 4, Oslo 1, Norway

Business correspondence:
Universitetsforlaget, P.O. Box 7508, Skillebekk, Oslo 2, Norway
or: P.O. Box 142, Boston, Mass., 02113, USA

International Journal of Politics

A Quarterly Journal of Translations

Editor: Arnold C. Tovell, M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

Provides translations of material that has appeared in scholarly journals, books, and legal documents throughout the world.

Quarterly. First issue: Spring 1971.
Institutions: $70 per year.
Individuals: $20 per year.

M. E. Sharpe, Inc., Publisher
901 N. Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON WAR

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret

"This new translation is all that an English-language reader could ask. It reads clearly and the distinction of the translators is all the guarantee one could require that it is faithful to the original . . . . This surely is *the* edition in English of *On War* for our time and some long time to come . . . . A major work of scholarship." —*International Journal*

"Translated with elegant clarity. All excuses for not reading Clausewitz are removed." —*The New Republic*

"One suspects that this edition will soon be to *On War* what victory was to Vince Lombardi: not the main or the best, but the only." —*Perspective*

Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University $19.50

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fall/Winter 1977 **Volume 30, No. 2**

WOMEN AND CHANGE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

POOR RURAL WOMEN: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Adrienne Germain

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: MARKET INTEGRATION OR FAMILY DISINTEGRATION?
Fredericka P. Santos

WOMEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL WORLD
Margaret Mead

EDUCATION AND THE UPSURGE OF FEMALE MODERNISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
Nadia H. Youssef

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF AFRICAN WOMEN'S ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT: A SEARCH FOR NEW DIRECTIONS
Ida Rousseau-Mukenge

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA
Steffen W. Schmidt

INDIAN WOMEN IN PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT
Doranne Jacobson

CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN IN THE DEVELOPING REGIONS OF THE WORLD
Helvi Sipila

BOOK REVIEW

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Single current issue $3.00; single back issue $3.00; one year $6.00; two years $11.00; three years $16.00; outside U.S. and Canada, add 50 cents per issue for postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University
Office: 420 West 118th Street, New York, N.Y. 10027

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China, the United Nations, and World Order

SAMUEL S. KIM

"This book renders obsolete the few existing studies pertaining to this subject and supercedes to an important extent others that deal with China's approach to international law. A benchmark study that will stand unchallenged for many years, it is the most thoughtful, comprehensive, and documented analysis of Chinese foreign policy behavior to be published thus far." —*Allen S. Whiting, University of Michigan*

China's role in the United Nations has been a significant one. Yet, Samuel Kim contends, as far as the literature on Chinese foreign policy is concerned, the People's Republic of China still remains outside the heuristic framework of the global community. In a comprehensive macro-analysis of Chinese global politics, Professor Kim probes China's image and strategy of world order as manifested through its behavior in the UN.

Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University

Cloth, $32.50. Limited Paperback Edition, $12.50

Write for our Political Science Catalogue.

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED